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Entering the Middle Way, Volume Two
The Sixth Bodhicitta: The Ground of Manifestation
We shall now expound the sixth bodhicitta. The verse states:
Abiding presently in correct concentration,
All qualities of perfect awakening manifest directly;
Directly perceiving the ultimate reality of dependent origination,
One attains cessation through abiding in prajñā.
Having already purified the pāramitā of meditative concentration (dhyāna-pāramitā) on the fifth ground, bodhisattvas on the sixth ground abide in superior concentration and directly perceive the profound ultimate reality of dependent origination. Only through the purified pāramitā of prajñā can one attain cessation (nirodha-samāpatti); this was not possible previously, because superior wisdom (adhiprajñā) had not yet been attained. Even though the other pāramitās—such as generosity (dāna)—have become more refined, attainment of cessation remains impossible without superior wisdom.
Because phenomena are known to be like reflections in a mirror, because the truth of the path (mārga-satya) was realized on the fifth ground, and because all buddha-qualities are directly approached for realization, this ground is called “The Ground of Manifestation.”
This illustrates that all other accumulations of merit and wisdom depend upon the pāramitā of prajñā. The verse states:
Just as a sighted person can guide countless blind people to their destination,
So too does wisdom gather up merit—devoid of insight—and lead it toward the sacred fruit.
Just as a single sighted person can guide all blind people to wherever they wish to go, so too does the pāramitā of prajñā—whose essential nature is discerning the right path from the wrong—gather up the merits of all other pāramitās and establish them upon the Buddha’s universally radiant ground.
Question: Earlier it was stated: “Directly perceiving the ultimate reality of dependent origination, one attains cessation through abiding in prajñā.” How, then, do bodhisattvas perceive the ultimate reality of dependent origination?
Answer: That ultimate reality of dependent origination lies beyond the scope of beings whose wisdom-eye is obscured by thick veils of ignorance. It belongs exclusively to bodhisattvas of the sixth ground and above; thus, this question should not be posed to us ordinary beings, but rather to the Buddhas and bodhisattvas who have applied the excellent eye-medicine of emptiness-knowledge, removed the cataracts of ignorance, and fully developed the wisdom-eye.
Question: Do not the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras and the Daśabhūmika Sūtra, among others, explicitly state that bodhisattvas practicing the pāramitā of prajñā directly perceive the nature of dependent origination? Therefore, we ought simply to follow those authoritative scriptures and explain accordingly.
Answer: The implicit meaning (saṃdhābhāṣā) of the scriptures is difficult to grasp. Even relying upon those scriptures, our own unaided efforts cannot correctly articulate the ultimate truth. However, treatises composed by great masters qualified as valid authorities (pramāṇa-puruṣa) can accurately interpret the sutras’ meaning. Only by relying upon such treatises can we properly understand the scriptures’ hidden intent. The verse states:
Just as one who directly realizes the profound Dharma
Relies upon both scripture and sound reasoning,
So too, in Nāgārjuna’s treatises,
Whatever is established therein, I shall now expound.
Just as bodhisattvas practicing the pāramitā of prajñā directly realize the ultimate nature of all phenomena, so too did the great master Nāgārjuna—having perfectly understood the meaning of the sūtras—accurately reveal in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way) the ultimate nature of all phenomena, based upon scriptural authority and valid reasoning: namely, that all phenomena lack intrinsic existence (svabhāva). I shall therefore expound the ultimate nature of phenomena solely in accordance with Nāgārjuna’s teachings and reasoning.
Question: How do we know that Nāgārjuna correctly interpreted the sūtras’ meaning?
Answer: This is known through scriptural testimony (āgama-pramāṇa). As stated in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra:
“In the southern land of Bhadrāvarta, there lives an auspicious śramaṇa named Nāga. He will vanquish the extremes of existence and non-existence, widely propagate my teaching in the world, skillfully teach the unsurpassed vehicle, attain the Joyous Ground (Pramuditā-bhūmi), and be reborn in the Pure Land of Ultimate Bliss.”
And the Mahāmegha Sūtra states:
“Ānanda, this Kāśyapa youth, beloved by all sentient beings, will, four hundred years after my parinirvāṇa, take birth as a śramaṇa named Nāga, widely propagate my Dharma, and later attain Buddhahood in the Pure Light World as the Tathāgata, Samyaksaṃbuddha, Jñānaprabhāsa.”
Thus, this bodhisattva is certainly capable of correctly interpreting the sūtras’ meaning.
Treatises that authentically elucidate dependent origination should be taught only to those who have long cultivated seeds of emptiness; they must not be taught to others. For if others hear of emptiness, they may develop distorted views and incur grave misfortune. Some ordinary beings, lacking skill, slander emptiness and thereby fall into evil destinies. Others, misunderstanding emptiness as sheer non-existence, slander all phenomena and increase their wrong views. Therefore, the teacher must carefully discern differences in the listener’s faith and understanding before teaching the correct view of emptiness.
Question: Since it is difficult to determine precisely for whom emptiness may be taught and for whom it must not be taught, how then can one know whom to teach?
Answer: Such distinctions can be recognized by external signs. The verse states:
If, while still an ordinary being, one hears of emptiness
And repeatedly feels inner joy,
Tears flow spontaneously from that joy,
And one’s body hairs stand on end—
Such a person already possesses the seed of Buddha-wisdom,
And is a suitable vessel for hearing the ultimate nature.
To such a person, the ultimate truth should be taught;
Its nature is explained below.
For such listeners, diligently teaching the ultimate truth bears genuine fruit. The verse states:
Such a vessel naturally develops various virtues:
Steadfastly upholding pure precepts,
Diligently practicing generosity and cultivating compassion,
Practicing patience for the sake of liberating sentient beings,
Dedicating roots of virtue toward supreme enlightenment,
And revering all bodhisattvas.
Moreover, such listeners do not misconstrue emptiness or incur harm; instead, hearing the correct view of emptiness generates merit. Hearing this view of emptiness is like discovering a treasure—its value must not be lost or squandered.
Such a person reflects: “If I break the precepts, I will surely fall into evil destinies, thereby interrupting my understanding of emptiness; therefore, I must always uphold and safeguard the precepts.” They further reflect: “Even if I maintain the precepts and are reborn in higher realms, if I am born into poverty, I will constantly struggle for food, clothing, medicine, and other necessities, and thus my hearing of emptiness will again be interrupted; therefore, I must continually practice generosity.” They also reflect: “Only when compassion supports the view of emptiness can Buddhahood be attained; therefore, I must continually cultivate great compassion.” They further reflect: “Anger leads to evil destinies, causes ugliness, and prevents noble beings from rejoicing; therefore, I must continually practice patience.” They also recognize that unless roots of virtue are dedicated toward omniscience, they cannot become causes of Buddhahood nor yield immeasurable, enduring fruits; thus, they dedicate their virtuous roots toward enlightenment for the sake of liberating sentient beings. Finally, seeing that others cannot expound the nature of dependent origination as bodhisattvas do, they develop profound reverence for bodhisattvas.
Having thus continuously accumulated vast stores of merit and wisdom, the verse states:
Skillful practitioners, deep and vast in wisdom,
Gradually attain the Joyous Ground.
Those seeking that attainment should hear this path.
“Seeking that” means seeking attainment of the Joyous Ground. Here, “that” refers to the ultimate nature of all phenomena, as explained below.
As stated in the sūtras, the Daśabhūmika Sūtra says:
“Sons and daughters of the Buddha! When a bodhisattva-mahāsattva has perfected the fifth ground and wishes to enter the sixth ground—the Ground of Manifestation—he must contemplate ten kinds of equality regarding all phenomena. What are these ten? Equality due to all phenomena being signless (animitta); equality due to all phenomena lacking intrinsic substance (nirātman); equality due to non-arising (anutpāda); equality due to non-emergence (anāvirbhāva); equality due to being inherently distant (pratibhāna); equality due to being originally pure (prabhāsvara); equality due to being free from conceptual elaboration (nirvikalpa); equality due to being neither grasped nor abandoned (anupādāna-anapahāra); equality due to all phenomena being like illusions, dreams, reflections, echoes, moonlight on water, images in mirrors, or magical creations; and equality due to the non-duality of existence and non-existence. When a bodhisattva thoroughly comprehends the intrinsic nature of all phenomena in this way, he gains luminous, pliant, and compliant forbearance (kṣānti), and enters the sixth ground—the Ground of Manifestation.”
Since the equality of non-arising is established here by valid reasoning, the remaining nine equalities become easy to understand. Thus, the Ārya begins the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with:
“Not from self, not from other,
Not from both, nor without cause—
Whatever phenomenon arises,
Its arising is ultimately impossible.”
“Ultimately” (antaḥ) means “absolutely,” and “whatever” (yatra) indicates the time, place, or philosophical school upon which arising depends. “Phenomena” (dharmāḥ) denotes all internal and external phenomena—the phenomena depending upon those conditions. The phrase should be interpreted as follows: “Internal and external phenomena, at any time, place, or philosophical school, absolutely do not arise from themselves.” Here, “not” (na) modifies only “arise from self”; it does not modify “exist,” yet the negation of existence is also established. The same applies to the remaining three positions. Thus, the four positions are all refuted in this treatise. The verse states:
That phenomenon does not arise from itself, nor from another,
Nor from both, nor without cause.
The meaning of “not arising from self” is expressed here as “that phenomenon does not arise from itself”; similarly, the meanings of the other three positions should be understood likewise.
How do we know that phenomena do not arise from themselves? The verse states:
There is no benefit whatsoever in something arising from itself.
Here, “that” refers to a sprout actively undergoing the process of arising; “from that” means from its own active, self-existent nature. Thus, the sprout’s own nature does not arise from the sprout’s own nature—that is the point of this position. Since the sprout’s nature already exists, for it to arise again from itself would produce no additional benefit, as it already existed beforehand.
This self-arising position contradicts valid reasoning. The verse states:
It is unreasonable for something already arisen to arise again.
If one claims that something already arisen arises again,
Then sprouts and such could never arise.
If one claims that a seed, having already arisen, arises again, then what factor prevents the seed from arising and allows the sprout to arise? Since no obstacle impedes the seed’s repeated arising, sprouts, stems, and leaves would never arise in this world.
There is another flaw. The verse states:
Until the end of cyclic existence, only seeds would arise.
The reasoning is as stated above.
Suppose one objects: “Water, time, and other assisting conditions cause the seed to decay and the sprout to emerge. Since the sprout and seed cannot coexist, the seed ceases and the sprout arises; thus, the earlier objection does not apply. Moreover, the sprout and seed are not different, nor do they arise independently of self.”
This is illogical. The verse states:
How could that destroy that?
Since the sprout and seed are not different, it is unreasonable for the sprout to destroy the seed—just as one’s own nature cannot destroy itself.
There is another flaw. The verse states:
If sprout and seed are not different, then the sprout’s shape, color, taste, potency, and maturation would be absent in you.
“Shape” refers to roundness, elongation, etc.; “color” refers to green, yellow, etc.; “taste” refers to sour, sweet, etc.; “potency” refers to functional differences—for example, holding a hemorrhoid-curing herb near the body relieves hemorrhoids, or holding a divine medicine enables flight. “Maturation” refers to transformative changes—e.g., black pepper becoming sweeter in taste. If sprout and seed were truly identical, then the sprout would possess no distinctive features beyond those inherent in the seed. Yet distinct features clearly exist—for instance, garlic seeds produce watery stems—thus, asserting their identity is unreasonable.
Suppose one argues: “The seed relinquishes its prior state and assumes a new state—thus, the seed transforms into the sprout.”
This too is illogical. The verse states:
If it relinquishes its prior nature to assume another,
How can one say that ‘that’ is ‘this’?
The proponent intends to assert identity of nature, yet this claim undermines the very possibility of identity: the sprout’s nature is definitively not identical to the seed’s. Even if one asserts that shape, color, etc., differ while the underlying substance remains the same, this too is illogical, since no substance exists apart from shape, color, etc.
There is another flaw. The verse states:
If you accept that sprout and seed are not different,
Then the sprout, like the seed, should be ungraspable.
Or, since they share one nature, the seed, like the sprout, should be graspable—yet this is unacceptable.
If the seed’s nature is ungraspable at the sprout-stage, then the sprout’s nature should likewise be ungraspable, since it shares no distinction from the seed’s nature—as with the seed’s nature. Conversely, if the sprout is graspable, then the seed should also be graspable, since it shares no distinction from the sprout’s nature—as with the sprout’s nature. To avoid the above flaws, one must reject the claim that sprout and seed are identical.
Having refuted the erroneous position of self-arising, held by those falsely claiming mastery of ultimate truth, we now show that even within conventional worldly discourse—uncontaminated by such false doctrines—self-arising remains illogical. The verse states:
Because the seed’s causal state has ceased, yet a different effect remains visible,
Even conventionally, the world does not accept their identity.
The seed-as-cause has ceased, yet the sprout-effect remains visible; thus, even the world does not see sprout and seed as identical. If they were identical, then when the cause disappeared, the effect should also vanish—but it does not; therefore, they cannot be entirely identical.
Thus, self-arising contradicts valid reasoning in both ultimate and conventional contexts. The verse states:
Therefore, asserting that phenomena arise from themselves
Is unreasonable in both ultimate and conventional truth.
Hence, Ācārya Nāgārjuna, without qualification, directly refutes self-arising. Some qualify the statement: “Phenomena do not arise from themselves ultimately, because they exist—like sentient beings.” But adding the qualifier “ultimately” is utterly unnecessary.
The self-arising position entails further flaws. The verse states:
If one asserts self-arising, agent and action become identical;
Since they are not identical, self-arising must be rejected—
Because it incurs the many faults already detailed.
The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states:
“If cause and effect are identical, this is ultimately untenable. If cause and effect are identical, the act of producing and the produced thing would be one.”
But identity is impossible—if father and son, or eye and visual consciousness, were identical, absurd consequences would follow. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā further states:
“If the fuel is identical to the flame, the agent and the action would be identical.”
Therefore, fearing the many faults described, anyone wishing to correctly understand both truths must reject self-arising.
Since phenomena definitely do not arise from themselves, the self-arising position is invalid. Yet one might ask: “Do they arise from another?” This too is illogical. Although sūtras state that phenomena arise from four conditions—the causal condition (hetu-pratyaya), the object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya), the immediate antecedent condition (samanantara-pratyaya), and the dominant condition (adhipati-pratyaya)—even if undesirable, one must accept other-arising. Some define the causal condition as the five causes excluding the efficient cause (kāraṇa-hetu); anything cognized constitutes the object-condition—i.e., all phenomena cognized by the six consciousnesses; all mental events except those entering nirvāṇa constitute the immediate antecedent condition; and the efficient cause equals the dominant condition. Others define “causal condition” as “that which produces”—i.e., if phenomenon A possesses the capacity to produce phenomenon B, then A is B’s causal condition. For example, just as an elderly person relies on a staff to rise, so too does a consciousness in the process of arising rely upon its object (as the staff) to arise—thus, that object serves as the object-condition for the arising consciousness. When the cause ceases, the immediate antecedent condition arises—e.g., the seed’s cessation immediately precedes the sprout’s emergence. If phenomenon A’s existence necessitates phenomenon B’s existence, then A is B’s dominant condition. Other conditions—simultaneous, subsequent, etc.—are included herein. Since entities like Maheśvara are not conditions, there is no fifth condition.
This theory of other-arising cannot be established, as it contradicts both scripture and reasoning. We now explain its logical contradictions. The verse states:
If other-arising depends upon otherness,
Then fire should produce darkness.
Because fire is “other” than darkness. Yet this is not observed; therefore, such other-arising is impossible. As the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states:
“If cause and effect are different, this too is untenable. If cause and effect are different, the cause becomes indistinguishable from a non-cause.”
Another flaw: the verse states:
Then everything should arise from everything.
Everything—both causes and non-causes—should produce everything—both effects and non-effects.
Why? The verse states:
All non-causal phenomena share the same otherness.
Just as rice-seeds—being “other” than rice-sprouts—produce rice-sprouts, so too should fire, charcoal, wheat-seeds, etc.—also “other” than rice-sprouts—produce rice-sprouts. Similarly, if rice-sprouts arise from rice-seeds, then jars, cloth, etc., should also arise from rice-seeds—but this does not occur.
An opponent replies: “Although cause and effect are different, not everything arises from everything, because observation confirms definite causal relationships.” The verse states:
That which is produced by another is definitively its effect;
Though different, what produces it is definitively its cause.
Only a specific other—belonging to the same continuum and possessing causal power—produces an effect;
Rice-sprouts do not arise from wheat-seeds, etc.
If phenomenon A is produced by phenomenon B, A is definitively B’s effect. If phenomenon B produces A, though B differs from A, B is definitively A’s cause. Thus, only a particular “other”—belonging to the same continuum and possessing causal efficacy—can serve as cause and effect. If the continuum differs—as with wheat-seeds—or if the continuum is identical but lacks causal power—as with a preceding moment failing to produce the succeeding moment—then causation fails. Thus, not everything arises from everything.
This reply is illogical. Let us ask proponents of causality: “You claim only rice-seeds cause rice-sprouts, and only rice-sprouts result from rice-seeds. On what basis is this determination made?” If they answer, “Because observation confirms it,” we ask further: “Why does observation confirm this?” If they merely repeat, “Because observation confirms it,” they fail to justify their claim and cannot resolve the prior objections.
Moreover, “otherness” is universally pervasive and undifferentiated—this alone undermines the other-arising position. The verse states:
Just as wheat-seeds, lotus-seeds, and Jātī flowers
Do not produce rice-sprouts, lack causal power,
Belong to different continuums, and are not of the same kind,
So too, rice-seeds lack the very differences claimed—because they are “other.”
Just as wheat-seeds, lotus-seeds, and Jātī flowers—being “other”—are denied the capacity to produce rice-sprouts, lack causal power, belong to different continuums, and are not of the same kind, so too must rice-seeds lack these claimed differences—since they too are “other.”
Having thus refuted the “other” in other-arising, we now declare that the “other” between cause and effect does not exist. The verse states:
Since sprout and seed never coexist,
How can “otherness” exist in the seed?
Sprout-from-seed is ultimately impossible;
Therefore, abandon the doctrine of other-arising.
Just as Maitreya and Upagupta appear different only through mutual dependence, sprout and seed are never simultaneously observable—since the seed has not yet decayed, no sprout exists. Thus, no sprout exists simultaneously with the seed, so no “otherness” (distinctness) from the sprout exists in the seed. Without “otherness,” asserting sprout-from-seed is definitively illogical; therefore, abandon other-arising. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states:
“Just as the intrinsic nature of phenomena is not found in any condition—whether cause, condition, combined cause-and-condition, or uncombined—so too, because phenomena lack intrinsic nature, ‘otherness’ is likewise nonexistent.”
Here, “conditions” refer to causes, conditions, combined causes-and-conditions, or uncombined ones. If a phenomenon’s intrinsic nature remained intact, no effect could arise—since the effect has not yet arisen. If no effect exists, then no “otherness” exists within the conditions—because “otherness” implies the presence of one thing indicating another (the seventh grammatical case). If the effect is absent in the conditions, the effect cannot arise from them—just as oil cannot arise from sand. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states:
“If conditions lack the effect, yet the effect arises from them,
Why does the effect not arise from non-conditions?”
The meaning of “dependence” (āśraya) is already well clarified by Ācārya Nāgārjuna in this verse, so no further explanation is needed.
An opponent objects: “Your claim that sprout and seed do not coexist is illogical. At the very instant the seed decays, the sprout arises—like the two ends of a balance-scale rising and falling simultaneously. At the moment the seed decays, the sprout arises; thus, sprout and seed coexist, possessing ‘otherness,’ avoiding the prior flaws.” The verse states:
Just as the two ends of a balance-scale
Rise and fall simultaneously,
So too do the produced and producer arise.
Though posited thus, the verse states:
Even if simultaneous, this is impossible.
Using the balance-scale analogy to claim simultaneity of production and producer is illogical. Though the scale’s ends move simultaneously, the phenomena they represent do not coexist—thus, the analogy fails.
How is it impossible? The verse states:
“Arising” means moving toward existence; “decaying” means moving toward cessation.
How can these be likened to the balance-scale?
“Arising” means moving toward existence—thus, it is future-tense; “decaying” means moving toward cessation—thus, it is present-tense. Therefore, what has not yet arisen arises, and what already exists ceases—how can this resemble a balance-scale, whose ends are both present and whose rising/falling occurs simultaneously? Here, sprout and seed—one present, one future—do not coexist; thus, the analogy fails.
Suppose one argues: “Though phenomena are not simultaneous, their functions are.” This too is invalid, since functions are not distinct from the phenomena themselves.
Another flaw: the verse states:
This arising has no agent, which is also illogical.
The agent of arising is the sprout, which is still future and therefore nonexistent. If its basis is nonexistent, its function must also be nonexistent. If arising is nonexistent, how can it be simultaneous with cessation? Thus, claiming simultaneous functions is illogical. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states:
“If something unarisen is said to arise,
How can it arise if it does not exist?”
If one claims that unarisen phenomena like sprouts exist prior to arising, this is untenable—since they have not yet arisen, no aspect of them can be established as existent. If the phenomenon upon which arising depends does not exist before arising, how can arising occur? Here, “phenomenon” denotes a specific characteristic (the seventh grammatical case); “nonexistence” is also a characteristic—how can it connect with “arising”? Meaning: if this phenomenon does not exist, how can it arise? It would not arise at all.
If one cites the Śālistamba Sūtra: “Like the balance-scale’s rising and falling, at the instant the seed ceases, the sprout arises”—does this not use the balance-scale as an analogy?
Answer: Though the analogy is used, it does not affirm other-arising or self-arising; rather, it reveals simultaneous dependent origination, free from all conceptual distinctions—like magical illusions. As stated:
“Whether the seed ceases or does not cease, the sprout’s arising is impossible;
Thus, the Buddha teaches that all arising is like illusion.”
Some argue: “If sprout and seed do not coexist, other-arising is illogical due to absence of ‘otherness.’ If they do coexist, ‘otherness’ exists, making other-arising valid. Just as visual consciousness arises simultaneously with associated feeling, and just as eye and form coexist with feeling, so too do eye and mind coexist as conditions for feeling.”
This is definitively impossible. The verse states:
If visual consciousness exists apart from simultaneous conditions,
Eye, form, and feeling are “other”—
But what use is re-arising something already existent?
If you deny this flaw, it has already been refuted.
If one accepts eye, form, and feeling—all simultaneous—as conditions for present visual consciousness, then although eye, etc., are “other” to the already-existing visual consciousness, re-arising something already existent is utterly useless—thus, arising is impossible. To avoid the flaw of “nothing arising,” one must deny that the visual consciousness already exists—but then visual consciousness is nonexistent, and thus not “other.” This flaw has already been refuted. Thus, even if “otherness” exists, arising is impossible; without arising, both “otherness” and arising are absent. Even if arising exists, “otherness” is absent—without “otherness,” both are absent. Hence, “otherness” is entirely nonexistent; only the name “other” remains. Therefore, this view is illogical.
Now we clarify that no “dependent cause” exists in cause-and-effect relationships. The verse states:
The cause that produces the produced,
Whether producing something existent or nonexistent, is impossible.
What use is producing the existent? What benefit is producing the nonexistent?
Both are equally useless.
First, a cause producing something already existent is definitively impossible—previously stated: “It is unreasonable for something already arisen to arise again.” Thus, conditions are utterly useless for such a purpose. If the produced is nonexistent, what benefit do the producers confer? Like rabbit’s horns, they are utterly nonexistent. The Catuḥśataka states:
“If the effect already exists, or is yet nonexistent,
Then pillars and ornaments decorating a house are meaningless.”
The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states:
“If the effect definitively possesses intrinsic nature, why does the cause produce it?
If the effect definitively lacks intrinsic nature, why does the cause produce it?
If the cause does not produce the effect, it lacks the mark of a cause;
If it lacks the mark of a cause, how can the effect exist?”
If both existent and nonexistent effects are considered, what use is the cause? Both cases incur the prior flaws. “Both” means “both characteristics”; whatever possesses both characteristics is “both.” Since existence and nonexistence cannot coexist in one phenomenon, such a phenomenon is impossible; thus, conditions are useless for producing it. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states:
“How can Nirvāṇa be both existent and nonexistent?
These two cannot coexist—just as light and darkness cannot.”
And:
“An agent cannot perform both definite and indefinite actions—
Because existence and nonexistence contradict each other,
They cannot coexist in one place.”
If one claims the effect transcends both extremes—neither existent nor nonexistent—what use is the cause? Since an effect transcending both existence and nonexistence is definitively impossible, asserting “neither existent nor nonexistent” to negate existence and nonexistence introduces no distinct phenomenon. If both existence and nonexistence are impossible, then “neither existent nor nonexistent” is also impossible. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states:
“To distinguish ‘neither existent nor nonexistent’ is called Nirvāṇa;
If existence and nonexistence were possible, ‘neither existent nor nonexistent’ would also be possible.”
An opponent states: “The logical arguments previously presented to establish other-arising—like pouring ghee onto dry firewood—have been consumed by your wisdom-fire. Your wisdom-fire’s fuel—these arguments—is already sufficient. Yet other-arising is an established worldly truth; no further logical proof is needed, since worldly perception is the strongest evidence.” The verse states:
The world relies solely on its own perception, accepted as valid;
Why invoke logic here?
Other-arising is known in the world;
Thus, other-arising needs no logical proof.
All ordinary people rely solely on their own perceptions, and since they perceive other-arising, this is the strongest evidence. Logic is needed only for phenomena not directly perceived—not for directly perceived ones. Thus, even without logic, other-arising is already established as the sole truth about phenomena.
This view arises from failing to correctly grasp the treatise’s meaning, compounded by deeply ingrained habitual tendencies of clinging to phenomena since beginningless time. Upon suddenly hearing of abandoning this clinging—like parting from a close friend—they feel unbearable resistance and declare it contradicts worldly experience. Without extensively explaining worldly logic, this contradiction cannot be resolved. To clarify the distinction between worldly experience and its contradictory aspects, we first establish the two truths. The verse states:
Because phenomena are seen as true or false,
Two natures of phenomena are established:
That seen as true is the ultimate truth;
That seen as false is the conventional truth.
The Buddhas and World-Honored Ones perfectly and correctly realize the natures of the two truths, and teach that phenomena—both internal and external, such as volitions and sprouts—possess two natures: conventional and ultimate. The ultimate truth is the nature directly realized by wisdom that perceives ultimate reality—though singular, it is not intrinsically existent. The conventional truth is the nature apprehended by ordinary beings whose wisdom-eye is obscured by ignorance’s veil, and thus apprehended through deluded perception. Yet this nature is not truly as ordinary beings perceive it—i.e., not intrinsically existent. Thus, all phenomena possess these two natures. The object of wisdom perceiving truth is the ultimate truth. Its nature will be elaborated below. The object of deluded cognition is the conventional truth.
Having thus established the two truths, we now clarify that within deluded perception, there are two types—correct and incorrect—so both the perceived object and the perceiving consciousness are twofold. The verse states:
Deluded perception is also accepted as twofold:
Sharp faculties and impaired faculties.
Consciousness arising from impaired faculties
Is deemed mistaken relative to consciousness arising from sharp faculties.
“Sharp faculties” means faculties unimpaired by cataracts, jaundice, etc., correctly perceiving external objects. “Impaired faculties” are the opposite. Consciousness arising from impaired faculties is deemed mistaken relative to consciousness arising from sharp faculties.
Just as consciousness is divided into correct and mistaken, so too are its objects. The verse states:
The objects perceived by unimpaired six faculties
Are what the world knows.
Only the world establishes them as real;
Everything else the world deems mistaken.
Conditions damaging internal faculties include jaundice, cataracts, and consuming certain herbs like Sarcostemma brevistigma. Conditions damaging external faculties include viewing oil, water, mirrors, empty valleys, echoes, sunlight, or special times/places. With such conditions, even without internal damage, one sees reflections, valley-echoes, mirages, etc. Similarly, mantras and medicines employed by illusionists, as well as false doctrines and apparent causes, can impair the mental faculty. Dreams, etc., will be elaborated below. Thus, if no such obstructive conditions exist, the objects perceived by the six faculties are all known to the world; relative to the world, they are designated “real”—not relative to noble beings. Objects perceived by impaired faculties—like reflections—are deemed mistaken even by worldly standards.
Now, a simile clarifies this meaning. The verse states:
Ignorance and sleep disturb non-Buddhist teachers,
Who posit self-nature and such;
And who posit illusions, mirages, etc.—
Even these are nonexistent in the world.
These non-Buddhist teachers claim to have realized ultimate truth, yet they cannot correctly understand even commonly known phenomena—such as arising and cessation—known to cowherds and women. Thus, they seek to transcend worldly reality without grounding themselves in it—like climbers releasing one branch before grasping the next, falling into the deep ravine of wrong views, forever severed from both truths and incapable of attaining results. Therefore, their posited “three guṇas” and such are nonexistent even conventionally.
Hence, it is further stated:
Just as objects perceived by cataract-impaired eyes
Cannot refute perception by unimpaired eyes,
So too, ordinary beings’ consciousness—devoid of pure wisdom—
Cannot refute the stainless wisdom of noble beings.
Earlier, refuting other-arising was not based solely on worldly perception; it is also accepted as the noble beings’ perception. When refuting arising, specifying the noble perspective avoids contradiction with worldly experience. Just as a cataract-impaired person seeing hair-threads does not invalidate unimpaired perception, so too, ordinary beings’ consciousness—lacking stainless wisdom—cannot contradict the stainless vision of noble beings; thus, opponents are secretly ridiculed by the wise.
Thus, distinguishing ultimate and conventional truths, we have shown phenomena possess two natures. Now, we specifically explain worldly conventional truth. The verse states:
Called “conventional” because it obscures with ignorance;
Conventional phenomena appear real due to this.
The Buddha calls this “conventional truth”;
All conventional phenomena are merely conventional.
Due to ignorance, sentient beings fail to perceive phenomena’s ultimate nature, falsely imputing intrinsic existence upon phenomena that lack it; this ignorance veils perception of reality and is thus termed “conventional.” Through this convention, phenomena appear truly existent—phenomena lacking intrinsic existence appear to possess it. Since this appearance is real for deluded, conventional beings, it is termed “worldly conventional truth.” This is the dependent, illusory nature of phenomena—like reflections, echoes, etc. Even ignorant beings recognize the illusory nature of some dependent phenomena—e.g., reflections, echoes. Yet phenomena like colors and mental feelings appear truly existent. The ultimate nature of phenomena is never perceived by ignorant beings. Thus, this ultimate nature—and the illusory nature perceived within convention—are not conventional truth. Rather, phenomena like colors and minds are established as conventional truth due to ignorance’s power—the afflictive ignorance constituting the twelve links of dependent origination. For śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas who have severed afflictive ignorance and directly see phenomena as illusory, conventional phenomena are purely illusory—lacking any truth—since they no longer cling to reality. Thus, conventional truth only deceives fools; for noble beings, it appears as illusion—its dependent nature appearing as conventional. For noble beings practicing signless meditation, it does not appear; for those practicing sign-based meditation, it appears—due to their residual cognitive obscurations (jñeyāvaraṇa) and ignorance. Buddhas’ mental and mental factors never operate upon any phenomena—thus, they fully awaken to all phenomena. Therefore, the Buddha teaches “conventional truth” and “merely conventional.” Among ordinary beings, the ultimate truth they perceive corresponds to the conventional phenomena perceived by noble beings practicing sign-based meditation; its emptiness of intrinsic nature is the noble beings’ ultimate truth. The Buddhas’ ultimate truth is the true intrinsic nature—unfailing, thus the ultimate truth—exclusively realized individually by Buddhas. Conventional truth is deceptive, thus not ultimate truth.
Having thus explained conventional truth, we now explain ultimate truth. Yet ultimate truth lies beyond speech and conceptual thought—it cannot be directly indicated. Instead, we clarify its nature through similes understandable to the listener. The verse states:
Just as a cataract-impaired person, under cataract’s influence,
Sees hair-threads—illusory and mistaken;
The nature perceived by unimpaired vision
Is the true nature—so too is this.
Just as a cataract-impaired person, under cataract’s influence, sees hair-threads in a vessel held in their hand, and attempts to remove them by repeatedly overturning the vessel—while unimpaired observers approach, look closely where the hair-threads appear, and find absolutely nothing—neither confirming nor denying their existence, nor distinguishing color, etc.—if the impaired person describes their experience to the unimpaired, saying, “I see hair-threads,” then to dispel their conceptualization, one tells them, “No hair-threads exist here.” This statement involves no reduction—since the hair-threads’ true nature is indeed nonexistent for the unimpaired observer. Similarly, beings afflicted by ignorance’s cataract fail to perceive ultimate reality, instead seeing aggregates, elements, and sense-fields as possessing intrinsic nature—this is the conventional nature of phenomena. Yet the Buddhas and World-Honored Ones—who have completely eradicated ignorance’s habitual tendencies—see these very aggregates, etc., as devoid of intrinsic nature, just as the unimpaired see no hair-threads—this is the ultimate truth of phenomena.
Suppose one asks: “Is such a nature invisible? How, then, do Buddhas perceive it?”
Answer: Indeed! Yet precisely because it is invisible, it is called “perception.” The Entering the Two Truths Sūtra states:
“Son of Heaven! If the ultimate truth in the ultimate sense were an object of body, speech, or mind, it would not belong to the category of ultimate truth, becoming conventional truth. Son of Heaven! In the ultimate sense, the ultimate truth transcends all speech, is without distinction, unborn and unceasing, beyond speaker and spoken, knower and known. Son of Heaven! The ultimate truth surpasses even the omniscient realm adorned with all supreme qualities—it is not the ultimate truth as verbally described. All phenomena are false and deceptive. Son of Heaven! The ultimate truth cannot be demonstrated. Why? Because all phenomena—speaker, spoken, to-whom-spoken, etc.—are unborn in the ultimate sense. Unborn phenomena cannot demonstrate the unborn.”Therefore, the wisdom that realizes the ultimate meaning is entirely free from distinctions such as existence and non-existence, self-nature and other-nature, reality and unreality, permanence and annihilation, permanence and impermanence, suffering and bliss, purity and impurity, self and no-self, emptiness and non-emptiness, subject and object, oneness and difference, arising and cessation—because such intrinsic natures are ultimately unfindable. When one thus contemplates the ultimate meaning, only the noble ones (āryas) constitute valid cognition (pramāṇa); ordinary beings (pṛthagjanas) do not.
If someone raises worldly objections, claiming that during contemplation of the ultimate meaning, conventional worldly cognition is also accepted as valid, then the following verse states:
If worldly cognition is accepted as valid,
Then what purpose do the Buddhas’ teachings serve?
What use is there for practicing the noble path?
It would be unreasonable to accept fools as valid authorities.
Since it is admitted that worldly cognition is valid, and since this cognition directly perceives the ultimate meaning, one should already have eradicated ignorance. Thus, accepting foolish persons as valid authorities is logically untenable. Whoever is ignorant of any phenomenon cannot be a valid authority regarding that phenomenon—just as one unfamiliar with genuine jewels cannot validly cognize them. If sensory consciousnesses such as visual cognition were already directly perceiving the ultimate meaning, then diligent practice of pure ethical conduct, hearing, reflection, and meditation—undertaken specifically to realize the noble path—would be utterly fruitless.
But this is not the case. The verse states:
All worldly cognition is invalid;
Hence, no worldly objection arises when contemplating the ultimate meaning.
By the reasoning previously established, worldly cognition is invalid in the context of contemplating the ultimate meaning; therefore, no worldly objection can arise.
Then, under what conditions do worldly objections arise? The verse states:
If worldly conventions are used to refute worldly meanings,
That is precisely what constitutes a “worldly objection.”
For example: Someone says, “My property has been stolen.”
Another asks, “What property?”
He replies, “A vase.”
The other refutes: “A vase is not a real thing—it is merely an object of measurement, like a vase seen in a dream.”
Here, something commonly accepted by the world is employed to undermine worldly meanings. Such situations involve “worldly objections.” However, when one abides in the noble ones’ perspective—taking the wise person as the standard—no worldly objection arises. A discerning person should apply this principle to all other matters.
Thus, having explained worldly objections based upon the worldly convention of “other-arising,” we now further show that even conventionally there is no “other-arising”; hence, holding this view and refuting “other-arising” incurs no worldly objection. The verse states:
The world plants only a small seed,
Yet declares, “This child is my own.”
Likewise, it feels, “This tree I planted.”
Therefore, even conventionally there is no “other-arising.”
Just as one points to a male child and says, “This child is my own,” it does not mean that one physically extracted such a form from one’s own body and placed it into the mother’s womb; rather, one merely deposited the impure seed. From merely depositing that causal factor, one claims, “I gave birth to this child.” Thus, even conventionally, the world does not regard the seed and the child as “other.” Were they truly “other,” the child could not reasonably be called “my son,” just as another sentient being (pudgala) could not be so designated. The same applies to the relationship between seed and tree.
From this reasoning, dependent origination is shown to be free from the extremes of permanence and annihilation. The verse states:
Since the sprout is not other than the seed,
The seed remains unbroken at the time of the sprout.
Since the sprout is not identical to the seed,
One cannot say the seed exists at the time of the sprout.
If the sprout were truly other than the seed, then the seed could cease while the sprout arose—just as, when a yellow ox dies, a blue ox need not simultaneously die; or when an ordinary being attains nirvāṇa, a noble being need not simultaneously attain nirvāṇa. But since no true “otherness” exists, the sprout’s nature and the seed’s nature remain uninterrupted—thus avoiding the extreme of annihilation. And since no true “oneness” exists, the sprout is not identical to the seed—thus rejecting the notion that the seed persists unchanged, thereby avoiding the extreme of permanence. As the sūtra states: “There is seed; likewise there is sprout. The sprout is not the seed itself, nor is it other than the seed. Such is the nature of phenomena—neither annihilated nor permanent.” “There is seed” means: if there is a seed.
Question: Shouldn’t there be a sprout, yet not one that arises separately from the seed?
Answer: The sprout is not the seed itself.
Why is the sprout not identical to the seed?
Answer: It is neither different nor identical. Since both identity and difference are untenable, asserting either is illogical. By rejecting both extremes, the nature of phenomena is revealed as neither permanent nor annihilated.
One should understand that the ultimate meaning here is this: if seed and sprout possessed even the slightest intrinsic nature (svabhāva), then those two phenomena would necessarily be either identical or different. But when they are entirely devoid of intrinsic nature—as in a dream—how could identity or difference even be meaningfully asserted? The sūtra elaborates further: “All conditioned phenomena arise from ignorance; they are not truly existent. Both phenomena and ignorance are empty; their intrinsic nature is free from fluctuation.” The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way) also states: “If a phenomenon arises from conditions, it is neither identical to those conditions nor different from them; thus, it is neither annihilated nor permanent.”
It must be definitively accepted that no phenomenon whatsoever possesses intrinsic nature—even though it arises dependently. If this were not accepted, the following verse states:
If one asserts that phenomena possess intrinsic characteristics arising dependently,
One thereby denigrates all phenomena.
Emptiness would become the cause of destruction,
Yet this is illogical; therefore, phenomena lack intrinsic nature.
If one claims that forms, feelings, etc., each possess intrinsic characteristics, intrinsic natures, and intrinsic essences—and arise dependently—then a meditator who perceives the emptiness of all phenomena and realizes that all phenomena lack intrinsic nature would thereby be slandering the intrinsic nature of arising and realizing emptiness. Just as a hammer is the cause of breaking a pot, so too would emptiness become the cause of slandering the intrinsic nature of phenomena. But this is actually illogical; therefore, at no time should one accept that phenomena arise with intrinsic characteristics. As the Ratnakūṭa Sūtra states: “Moreover, Kāśyapa, one who views phenomena correctly via the Middle Way does not make phenomena empty through emptiness; rather, phenomena are empty by their very nature. One does not make phenomena signless through signlessness; rather, phenomena are signless by their very nature. One does not make phenomena wishless through wishlessness; rather, phenomena are wishless by their very nature. One does not make phenomena non-actional through non-actionality; rather, phenomena are non-actional by their very nature. One does not make phenomena unborn through unbornness; rather, phenomena are unborn by their very nature. One does not make phenomena unarisen through unarisal; rather, phenomena are unarisen by their very nature.” And so on, extensively.
Some assert that the dependently arisen (paratantrasvabhāva) possesses intrinsic nature, and that its emptiness is characterized by the absence of subject and object—just as impermanence cannot be said to be either identical or different. If one accepts this view, then one must claim that emptiness alone makes phenomena empty—not that phenomena are intrinsically empty. The Catuḥśataka (Four Hundred Verses) states: “May I attain nirvāṇa—not by misapprehending emptiness as non-emptiness—but because the Buddha declared that wrong views cannot lead to nirvāṇa.” The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā likewise states: “The Great Sage taught the doctrine of emptiness to eliminate all views. If one clings to emptiness itself as real, even the Buddhas cannot guide such a person.”
Question: Since there is no arising in the ultimate sense, self-arising and other-arising are refuted. Yet forms, feelings, etc., are objects of valid cognition—both direct perception and inference—so their intrinsic nature must be “other-arising.” If this is denied, how can the two truths be maintained? There would be only one truth, and thus “other-arising” must exist.
Answer: Indeed, in the ultimate sense, there are not two truths. The sūtra states: “O monks, there is only one supreme truth—the unerring, un-deceptive Dharma of nirvāṇa. All conditioned phenomena are deceptive, illusory, and false.”
Conventional truth serves as the means to realize ultimate truth; thus, one should not scrutinize whether things arise from self or from other, but accept them according to worldly conventions. The verse states:
If one scrutinizes these phenomena,
Apart from their ultimate nature—non-arising and non-ceasing—nothing else can be found.
Therefore, one should not mistakenly scrutinize the conventional truth of worldly language.
That is: if one examines forms, feelings, etc., asking whether they arise from self or from other, nothing beyond their ultimate nature—non-arising and non-ceasing—can be found. Thus, one should not examine self- or other-arising, but simply accept the worldly perspective: “Because this exists, that arises,” etc.—which serves as the gateway for ordinary people to enter the Dharma. As Āryadeva states: “Just as others cannot convert barbarians through foreign languages, so too the world, lacking understanding, cannot be instructed by the unenlightened.” The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā also states: “Without relying on conventional truth, one cannot realize the ultimate truth; without realizing the ultimate truth, one cannot attain nirvāṇa.”
If one wrongly scrutinizes conventional language, it will collapse entirely. As the sūtra states: “Just as a lute produces beautiful sounds through wood, strings, and hand movements, so too all conditioned phenomena arise from causes and conditions. If an intelligent person investigates where the sound comes from or goes to—searching exhaustively in all directions—they find no coming or going. Similarly, all conditioned phenomena arise from causes and conditions. A practitioner with right view sees that phenomena are empty and unmoving; the aggregates, sense bases, and elements—all are empty inwardly and outwardly; existence is empty, abiding nowhere; the nature of phenomena is like space.” And so on, extensively.
Those attached to conventional truth, seeing such a teaching that eliminates all reifications, become alarmed and declare: “The fundamental causes of defilement and purification in phenomena must certainly involve arising.” Though such statements are made, they are mere empty words. Why? The verse states:
With what reasoning, when examining ultimate nature,
Could self- or other-arising ever be valid?
That same reasoning applied to conventional language is equally invalid—
So how could your asserted ‘arising’ be established?
Just as self- and other-arising are invalid when examined by the reasoning used for ultimate truth, so too is intrinsic arising invalid within conventional language. How, then, is your claimed arising of phenomena established? Thus, intrinsic arising does not exist in either truth. Whether you wish it or not, you must accept this.
Some claim: Nāgārjuna’s statement “not self-arising” etc., only refutes the imagined intrinsic nature (parikalpita-svabhāva), not the dependently arisen intrinsic nature (paratantra-svabhāva). But such a view lacks grounding—hence, those making it deserve only rebuttal.
If intrinsic arising does not exist in either truth, why does the world perceive things as existing? The verse states:
Like reflections and such, phenomena are fundamentally empty,
Yet arise dependently—due to the convergence of conditions.
Even though reflections and such are fundamentally empty,
They still give rise to perceptions, actions, and cognitions.
Likewise, although all phenomena are empty, they arise from emptiness itself. “All phenomena” means they abide inseparable from cause and effect. If one understands the causal structure of reflections—which lack intrinsic nature—who, possessing intelligence, would, upon seeing forms, feelings, etc., which likewise abide inseparable from cause and effect, rigidly cling to their intrinsic nature? Thus, although they appear to exist, they do not arise with intrinsic nature. As the sūtra states: “Just as a reflection appears in a mirror without intrinsic nature, O great tree, know that all phenomena are likewise.”
Therefore, the verse states:
Since both truths lack intrinsic nature,
Phenomena are neither annihilated nor permanent.
Because all phenomena are like reflections—empty of intrinsic nature—they lack intrinsic nature in both ultimate and conventional truths, and thus are neither annihilated nor permanent. As the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “If a phenomenon had a fixed nature, it would be permanent—not non-existent. If it existed before and ceased now, that would be annihilation.” Again: “If one posits any phenomenon as real, one falls into either permanence or annihilation. Know that any phenomenon one posits is either permanent or annihilated.” And again: “Like the Buddha’s miraculous powers, a magically created person is produced; that magically created person, in turn, creates another. The first magically created person is the creator; the second is the creation. Afflictions, karma, and body; creators and results—all are like a city of gandharvas, like a mirage, like a dream.” Using the simile of illusion, it clarifies that phenomena without intrinsic nature arise from causes without intrinsic nature.
Thus, since phenomena lack intrinsic nature in both truths—not only are the extremes of permanence and annihilation avoided—but even after karmic actions have long ceased, their karmic results remain connected. Although one does not posit an ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness), nor an enduring mental continuum, nor “acquisitions” (prāpti), such explanations are fully reasonable. Why? The verse states:
Since karma does not cease by intrinsic nature,
Even without an ālayavijñāna, it can produce results.
Although karma ceases after a long time,
Know that it can still produce its own results.
How can results arise from karma that has already ceased? To answer this, some posit latent potentials of ceased karma—either an ālayavijñāna, or other enduring factors like promissory notes, or “acquisitions,” or karmic imprints on the mental continuum. But according to Madhyamaka, karma does not arise intrinsically, and thus does not cease intrinsically. Arising from what does not cease is not impossible; thus, karma remains unbroken, and the connection between karma and result is perfectly logical. As the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “Karma never arises, due to its lack of fixed nature; karma never disappears, because it never arises.” The sūtra also states: “A human life span is said to be one hundred years; yet years cannot be accumulated, just as this conditioned process cannot. I may speak of endlessness or of ending—endlessness is spoken of in relation to emptiness; ending is spoken of in conventional terms.”
Let us clarify this further with an analogy. The verse states:
Just as a fool, seeing objects in a dream,
Remains attached upon waking,
So too, although karma ceases without intrinsic nature,
Results still arise from it.
As the Parinirvāṇa Sūtra states: “Great King, know this: suppose a man, while deeply asleep, dreams of intimacy with a beautiful woman; upon waking, he recalls that woman. Great King, what do you think? If this man dreamed of intimacy with a beautiful woman and, upon waking, recalled her—could he be considered wise? The King replied: ‘No, World-Honored One! Why? Because the beautiful woman in his dream does not exist, cannot be found—how much less could he have intimate relations with her? He merely exhausted himself pointlessly.’ The Buddha said: ‘Great King, similarly, foolish, ignorant ordinary beings, upon seeing forms with their eyes, generate delight and attachment, believing forms to be truly existent. Having grasped them, they develop craving; from craving arise greed, hatred, and delusion; and through body, speech, and mind they perform various karmic actions. Yet once performed, these actions immediately cease; having ceased, they do not reside in the eastern direction.’ … Nor do they reside in the four cardinal or four intermediate directions, nor above or below.”
Again: “Later, at the time of death, when the life-force nears exhaustion, consciousness begins to fade, and all past actions appear before him—like a man recalling the image of the beautiful woman he saw in his dream upon waking. Great King, just as the final moment of consciousness ceases and the initial consciousness of the next life arises—whether in heaven … or in the hungry ghost realm.”
Again: “Great King, when that initial consciousness ceases, a similar mental continuum arises clearly experiencing the maturing result (vipāka) it has generated. Great King, no phenomenon transfers from this life to the next; yet death, rebirth, and karmic results are evident. Great King, know this: the cessation of the final consciousness is called ‘death’; the arising of the initial consciousness of the next life is called ‘birth.’ Great King, the final consciousness ceases without going anywhere; the initial consciousness of the next life arises without coming from anywhere. Why? Because its intrinsic nature is free from location. Great King, the final consciousness is empty of the final consciousness; death is empty of death; karma is empty of karma; the initial consciousness is empty of the initial consciousness; birth is empty of birth—yet those karmas never disperse.”
Suppose one thinks: “If karma, lacking intrinsic arising and cessation, can produce maturing results, then since it does not cease, it should produce results repeatedly—even after producing a maturing result.” Since karma does not cease, if it produced results repeatedly, it would lead to infinite regress.
Answer: Not so. The verse states:
Though objects are equally non-existent,
Only those with cataracts see hair-like appearances,
Not other appearances like rabbit-horns or barren-women’s sons.
Know that once matured, it matures no more.
Just as objects are equally non-existent, yet those with cataracts see only non-existent hair-like appearances—not appearances of rabbit-horns or barren-women’s sons—so too, although karma does not cease intrinsically, its maturation is definite.
Moreover, this analogy not only clarifies the definiteness of karma but also establishes the definiteness of its maturation. The verse states:
Thus, painful results arise from black (unwholesome) karma;
Blissful results arise solely from white (wholesome) karma.
Liberation is attained through wisdom free from virtue and vice,
While speculation about karma and its results is discouraged.
Although wholesome and unwholesome karma alike lack intrinsic nature, just as those with cataracts see only hair-like appearances, so too desirable maturing results do not arise from unwholesome karma, nor undesirable ones from wholesome karma. When one transcends both wholesome and unwholesome karma, liberation is attained. Therefore, the Buddha, fearing that ordinary beings, through rational analysis, might slander karma and its results and destroy conventional truth, stated: “The maturing results of karma are inconceivable”—thereby discouraging speculation about karma and its results.
If karma and its results are thus established, then how can the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, which speaks of the ālayavijñāna as the basis for the infinite functional distinctions of all phenomena—called the “storehouse of all seeds,” like ocean water giving rise to waves, the source of all phenomena’s arising—be reconciled? Does this imply that all phenomena arise?
Answer: No. The ālayavijñāna is taught only for those who require such a teaching to be tamed. Since it follows the nature of all phenomena, it is merely emptiness itself that is named “ālayavijñāna.” Not only is the ālayavijñāna taught, but also the “person” (pudgala)—for those beings requiring such instruction for their taming, it is taught accordingly. As the sūtra states: “O monks! The five aggregates are the burden; the bearer of the burden is the person.” For another group, only the aggregates are taught: “Mind, mental factors, and consciousness, long cultivated with faith, ethics, etc., later lead to rebirth in heavenly realms.” All such statements are provisional, skillful means.
For whom are these provisional statements intended? The verse states:
Speaking of the ālayavijñāna and the person,
Or stating that only the aggregates exist—
These are taught for those unable to comprehend
The profound meaning explained above.
If sentient beings, habituated over lifetimes to non-Buddhist views, cannot penetrate the profound nature of reality, upon hearing the teaching of such nature, they become terrified, thinking, “I will be completely annihilated!” and conceive of the Buddha’s teaching as dangerous ground, abandoning the Dharma and losing great benefit. Initially, teachings like the ālayavijñāna are given to remove their non-Buddhist wrong views and guide them toward great benefit; later, through correct understanding of the sūtras, they naturally relinquish the ālayavijñāna, etc. Thus, this approach brings only benefit, with no fault. As Āryadeva states: “If one delights in any practice, one should first examine that practice; if one has already abandoned it, one is not a proper vessel for the Dharma.”
To guide beings, not only is the ālayavijñāna taught first. The verse states:
Though the Buddha has abandoned the view of personal identity,
He still spoke of ‘I’ and ‘mine.’
Likewise, though phenomena lack intrinsic nature,
Provisional sūtras speak of their existence.
Though the Buddha has severed all views of personal identity—including clinging to ‘I’ and ‘mine’—he nevertheless used ‘I’ and ‘mine’ as skillful means for worldly understanding. Likewise, although phenomena lack intrinsic nature, speaking of their existence is a skillful means for worldly comprehension; thus, such statements are made. As the East Mountain Abode school states in its verses: “If the World-Honored One did not follow worldly conventions, no one could know the Buddha or the nature of the Dharma. Though the aggregates, sense bases, and elements share one nature, speaking of three realms follows worldly conventions. Though the nature of phenomena is nameless, naming it ‘inconceivable’ follows worldly conventions for sentient beings. Though entering the Buddha’s nature reveals no phenomena, speaking of ‘no phenomena’ follows worldly conventions. Though no meaning or meaninglessness is seen, the Supreme Teacher speaks of cessation and ultimate truth, following worldly conventions. Though neither destroyed nor born, equal to the Dharmadhātu, speaking of cosmic conflagrations follows worldly conventions. Though no sentient nature is found in the three times, speaking of the ‘sentient realm’ follows worldly conventions.” And so on, extensively.
Entering the Middle Way, Chapter Two, concludes.
Entering the Middle Way, Chapter Three
Thus, proponents of the Mind-Only (Cittamātra) school, unable to accept the above Madhyamaka position, seek to establish their own view, constructed from their own conceptual fabric. The verse states:
Not seeing the subject apart from the object,
One comprehends that the entire threefold world is merely consciousness.
Thus, this bodhisattva abides in Prajñā,
Realizing the ultimate truth of Mind-Only.
“Abide” means “to dwell.” “Abiding in Prajñā” means dwelling in wisdom. Since this wisdom belongs to the bodhisattva, “abiding in wisdom” signifies practicing Prajñā. “This bodhisattva” refers to one dwelling in the “Present Stage” (Prabhākarī-bhūmi). How does he avoid erroneous superimposition and correctly realize the ultimate truth? Through realizing that external forms do not exist, and that all minds and mental factors arise only dependently—this is called “realizing the ultimate truth of Mind-Only.” How, then, does one realize the ultimate truth of Mind-Only? Thus: “Not seeing the subject apart from the object, one comprehends that the entire threefold world is merely consciousness.” This bodhisattva, using the reasoning described above, examines his own mind; finding no object, he also does not see a subject. Through prolonged cultivation, he realizes that the entire threefold world is consciousness-only. Through such cultivation, he internally realizes the ineffable “mere event” (vastu-mātra); gradually, he attains realization of the ultimate truth of Mind-Only.
If only consciousness exists, with no external objects, how can consciousness arise bearing the aspect of those external objects? The verse states:
Just as wind stirs the ocean,
Producing countless waves,
So too, from the ālayavijñāna—the storehouse of all seeds—
Consciousness arises through its own functional capacities.
Just as waves arise from the ocean—their basis—when stirred by wind, like sleep-induced waves surging ceaselessly, so too, beginningless consciousness, transmitted across lifetimes, arises when the habitual tendencies of dualistic grasping mature. At the very moment this consciousness ceases, it imprints distinctive habitual tendencies in the ālayavijñāna—causing future consciousnesses, conforming to their own aspects, to arise. Gradually encountering conditions for maturity, these tendencies mature, giving rise to impure, dependently arisen phenomena. Ordinary beings, mistaking these, grasp them as subject and object—though in reality, no external object exists apart from consciousness. Those who posit causes like Maheśvara (the Great Lord) state: “The spider is the cause of its web; crystal causes water; roots are the cause of branches; this is the cause of sentient beings.” Just as they posit Maheśvara as the creator of sentient beings, so too proponents of the ālayavijñāna posit it as the “seed-basis” for all phenomena, calling it the “storehouse of all seeds.” The sole difference is that Maheśvara is eternal, whereas the ālayavijñāna is impermanent.
Further, they claim scriptural authority for such assertions. The verse states:
Therefore, the dependently arisen nature
Is the causal basis for conventional phenomena.
Arising without external objects,
It is truly existent and non-conceptual.
This dependently arisen nature must indeed be accepted, as it serves as the basis for all conceptual proliferations. Just as one mistakes a rope for a snake, it would be unreasonable to posit the snake without the rope. Likewise, mistaking earth for a vase requires dependence on earth; without earth, such a mistaken cognition could not arise in empty space. Here, since no external objects exist, what serves as the basis for generating perceptions of blueness, etc.? Therefore, the dependently arisen nature must be accepted as the cause of such perceptions. Since it is the basis for all defilement and purification, this constitutes skillful engagement with emptiness: recognizing that “this” is absent because “that” is present—thus rightly viewing it as empty; and recognizing that “this” is truly present because “that” is absent—thus knowing it as existent without error. This is correct realization of emptiness. Moreover, it is not itself a conceptual object, because speech captures only conventional appearances; whatever is expressed linguistically cannot denote ultimate reality. In summary, the dependently arisen nature is established with three defining characteristics: (1) it is not known externally, (2) it arises solely from internal habitual tendencies, and (3) it possesses intrinsic nature and lies beyond conceptual proliferation. Its role as the basis for conventional phenomena is established precisely because it possesses intrinsic nature—thus, these three characteristics are not distinct.
Now, let us question them. The verse states:
What analogy exists for consciousness without external objects?
If you reply “like a dream,” then carefully examine it.
Here, one should examine carefully: if someone sleeps in a tiny room and dreams of wild elephants inside, that is certainly unreal. Therefore, even without external objects, consciousness must be accepted.
To expose the emptiness of this reply, one must examine it critically. How? The verse states:
When I say the dream lacks consciousness,
Your analogy collapses entirely.
The consciousness perceiving the appearance of wild elephants—we too assert it is like an object: unreal, because it does not arise. If no consciousness exists, then no analogy acceptable to both parties remains; thus, no internal consciousness exists apart from external objects.
Suppose one argues: “If there were no mistaken consciousness in the dream, one could not recall dream experiences upon waking.”
This too is illogical. The verse states:
If recollection upon waking proves consciousness exists,
Then external objects must also exist.
Why? The verse states:
Just as you claim recollection proves consciousness,
So too external objects must exist.
Just as recollection of dream experiences proves consciousness exists, recollection of experienced objects proves objects exist—or consciousness itself does not exist.
Suppose one says: “In a dream, forms like elephants exist; since they are perceived, eye-consciousness must exist—but in fact, it does not. Due to sleep disturbing the senses, the five sense-consciousnesses are definitely absent.” The verse states:
Suppose one says: “During sleep, eye-consciousness is absent,
So forms are perceived only by mental consciousness,
Which grasps their appearance as external—
Just as in a dream, this too occurs.”
Eye-consciousness in dreams is absolutely absent; thus, forms like elephants—the objects of the eye faculty—are also absent. Only mental consciousness remains. Therefore, external objects are definitely absent; instead, mental consciousness’s appearance is mistakenly taken as external. Just as in a dream, no external objects exist, yet consciousness arises—so too here.
Refutation: Not so! Mental consciousness in dreams also does not arise. The verse states:
Just as your external objects do not arise in dreams,
So too mental consciousness does not arise.
Eye, visible form, and eye-consciousness—
All three are utterly illusory.
When perceiving forms, eye, form, and mental consciousness must co-arise. Likewise, when perceiving objects in dreams, these three co-arise. And just as eye and form are absent in dreams, eye-consciousness is also absent. Thus, the verse states:
Likewise, ear, etc., and their threefold co-arising do not arise.
“Ear, etc.” includes sound, ear-consciousness, up to mind-faculty, dharma-realm, and mental consciousness. Therefore, all three components in dreams are illusory; thus, asserting that mental consciousness must exist in dreams is illogical.
Bhavya (Bhāviveka) reasoned: “Mental consciousness apprehends phenomena belonging to the mental domain (dharmāyatana), including those in dreams; thus, internal consciousness cannot exist without external objects.” This too is illogical, because the three components in dreams are absolutely non-existent. If one admits this only to refute opponents, then the dream analogy becomes entirely useless—since a non-illusory dream cannot illustrate the illusory nature of the phenomenon being analogized.
Since the three components in dreams are all unreal, the well-established unreality of dream components proves the unreality of the not-yet-established components of waking experience. The verse states:
Just as in dreams, awakening is likewise illusory—
All phenomena are illusory; consciousness does not exist.
Without objects, faculties do not exist.
Just as faculties, objects, and consciousness in dreams are illusory, so too are those in waking experience. Thus, the sūtra states: “Just as an illusory sentient being appears, though not truly existent, so too the Buddha teaches that all phenomena are like illusions and dreams.” Again: “Sentient beings in the three realms are like dreams—neither born nor dying; sentient life is unfindable; all phenomena are like foam or banana trees.” All such statements are supremely well-articulated.
Having explained that, in waking experience, faculties, objects, and consciousness do not arise intrinsically, let us now consider them relative to dream-consciousness. The verse states:
Here, just as in the awakened state,
Until awakening, all three exist.
Even though ignorance is like sleep, for one who has awakened from ordinary sleep, phenomena do not arise intrinsically—yet due to the sleep of ignorance, they appear like dream images, and all three components exist. Likewise, for one not yet awakened from the sleep of ignorance, these three components—existing by their intrinsic nature—also exist.
The verse states:
Just as, after full awakening, the three are absent,
So too, after dispelling the sleep of ignorance, they are absent.
Just as, upon full awakening from a dream, the three components seen in the dream are absent, so too, upon fully uprooting the sleep of ignorance and directly realizing the Dharmadhātu, those three components are also absent. Thus, without external objects, internal consciousness does not exist.
Just as one with cataracts sees hairs despite their non-existence, so too, without external objects, internal consciousness exists.
This too is illogical. The verse states:
Consciousness arising from an afflicted sense faculty
Sees hairs due to the affliction.
Relative to that consciousness, both are real;
Relative to clear vision, both are illusory.
Know that, just as the dream analogy is used, relative to the cataract-afflicted perception, hair-like appearances exist. Relative to unafflicted perception, both are non-existent. Since consciousness without objects is difficult to ascertain, one must accept this.
If not, the verse states:
If consciousness arises without objects,
Then wherever hairs appear to the afflicted,
The unafflicted should also see hairs there—
But this is not the case; thus, it does not exist.
If an afflicted person, lacking hairs, generates consciousness bearing the appearance of hairs, then wherever the afflicted person sees hairs, an unafflicted person observing that place should generate the same hair-perceiving consciousness—since the object is identical. Thus, claiming consciousness arises without objects is illogical.
Suppose one counters: “If objects were required for consciousness to arise, this would be correct. But consciousness arises—or fails to arise—based on whether the habitual tendencies imprinted by prior consciousness have matured. Thus, only the consciousness bearing the hair-appearance, whose imprinted tendencies have matured, arises; others do not.”
This too is invalid. The verse states:
If you claim the pure faculty’s functional capacity
Has not matured, thus consciousness does not arise—
It is not because objects are absent that the capacity is absent;
Thus, this claim fails.
“Absence of objects” means objects are non-existent. If one accepts functional capacities, one could speak of immaturity causing consciousness to arise or not. But we do not accept such functional capacities.
How are functional capacities non-existent? The verse states:
Functional capacities do not exist in already-arisen phenomena,
Nor in unarisen phenomena.
If one posits functional capacities, do they belong to presently arisen consciousness? Past? Or future? Functional capacities do not exist in already-arisen consciousness: if one names consciousness “functional capacity” in the nominative case, then consciousness becomes the result, and the capacity the cause—an impossibility. If one accepts this, results would arise without causes, like seeds persisting unbroken after sprouts arise. Thus, functional capacities do not exist in already-arisen consciousness. If one names consciousness “from functional capacity” in the ablative case, then already-arisen consciousness arises from functional capacity—an impossibility, since consciousness already exists. This was previously explained. Thus, functional capacities do not exist in already-arisen consciousness.
Functional capacities also do not exist in unarisen consciousness. The verse states:
Without a qualifier, there is no qualified entity—
Or even the barren-woman’s son would possess it.
Without a qualifier, the qualified entity cannot exist. “Functional capacity of consciousness”: consciousness is the qualifier; functional capacity is the qualified entity. An unarisen phenomenon cannot be labeled “consciousness” or “non-consciousness”—both are indefinable. Since both are indefinable, how can one distinguish its functional capacity? Saying “this is its functional capacity” is impossible. When no qualifier exists, one cannot say “this arises from that.” If one accepts functional capacities in unarisen phenomena, one must also accept them in the barren-woman’s son. Thus, functional capacities do not exist in unarisen phenomena.
Suppose one thinks: “If consciousness arises from this functional capacity, one imagines the consciousness-to-come and says, ‘This is the functional capacity of that consciousness,’ and ‘That consciousness will arise from this.’” Thus, both qualifier and qualified entity are established—like worldly expressions: “cooking rice” or “this thread weaves cloth.” The treatise also states: “The first three types of conception refer to the wheel-turning king and the two Buddhas.”
This is entirely meaningless. The verse states:
If one speaks of ‘that which will arise’ by imagining it,
Then neither functional capacity nor arising exist.
Only if something arises can one speak of “what will arise.” Things that never arise—like the barren-woman’s son or space—definitely do not arise. Thus, if functional capacities exist, one may speak of consciousness arising in the future; if future consciousness does not exist, functional capacities do not exist; and if functional capacities do not exist, consciousness’s future arising does not exist—like the barren-woman’s son. This also explains the “cooking rice” analogy.
Furthermore, consciousness and functional capacity must mutually depend on each other. Thus, the dependently arisen nature cannot exist. The verse states:
If things mutually depend to arise,
Learned masters declare they cannot arise.
Consciousness must already exist for functional capacity to exist; functional capacity must exist for consciousness to arise from it. Thus, they mutually depend. If one accepts this, consciousness lacks intrinsic nature—like “long” depending on “short,” and “short” on “long”: “that” depends on “this.” As the Catuḥśataka states: “If a phenomenon arises through dependence, the phenomenon itself becomes dependent; now, without a basis for dependence, no phenomenon can arise.” This means: if phenomena like consciousness arise through dependence on functional capacities, then those functional capacities themselves depend on consciousness for their establishment. Thus, which is the basis, and which the dependent? Again: “If a phenomenon arises through dependence, how can it depend before arising? If it has already arisen, why depend?” This means: if consciousness arises through dependence on functional capacity, does consciousness depend on capacity before or after arising? If before, it is non-existent—like a rabbit’s horn—and needs no dependence. If after, it is already arisen—why depend? Thus, learned masters declare mutual dependence invalid. Hence, functional capacities do not exist in future consciousness.
Now, let us further show functional capacities do not exist in past consciousness. The verse states:
If functional capacities, having ceased, mature and produce results,
Then from another’s capacity, another’s result arises.
If one claims that consciousness, currently ceasing, imprints functional capacities in the ālayavijñāna to produce future results, and that from those ceased consciousnesses’ functional capacities, future consciousness arises, then results must arise from another’s capacity.
Why? The verse states:
Because continuums are mutually distinct.
As stated: “Dhanu means expansion.” “Continuum” (santāna) denotes sequential continuity, like an unbroken river flow. During the continuous flow of cause and effect—without interruption across lifetimes—the instantaneous moments of the three times constitute the subject of continuity. Thus, the instantaneous moments comprising the continuum are called “having continuity.” These moments are mutually distinct and separate—accepted by the opposing school. Therefore, a result-moment arising later, separate from the cause-moment’s habitual tendencies, is “other” in nature—thus, “other-arising” from “other” capacity.
If one claims this poses no problem, that is also invalid. The verse states:
Everything should arise from everything.
This was already refuted in the section on “other-arising,” so it need not be repeated.
Suppose one counters with the verse:
Though those moments are mutually distinct,
The continuum is undivided—thus, no fault.
If one thinks: “These moments belong to one continuum, though mutually distinct; this continuum is singular—thus, not everything arises from everything.” If so, perhaps no fault arises—but this is untenable. The verse states:
This requires proof but remains unproven—
An undivided continuum contradicts reason.
Phenomena with mutually distinct intrinsic natures cannot serve as the basis for an undivided continuum—it is contradictory, since they are “other.” The verse states:
Just as Maitreya and Guṇamati’s methods differ,
Being “other,” they cannot form one continuum.
All phenomena with distinct intrinsic natures
Cannot constitute one continuum.Thus, it is unreasonable to assert that this is a continuous stream. Previously, it was explained that the maturation or non-maturation of consciousness arises from its functional capacity—not from whether the object of cognition exists or not. Now, since this functional capacity itself is denied, the object of cognition is thereby negated; consequently, consciousness itself must also be nonexistent.
Having thus refuted the opponent’s position, proponents of the “Mind-Only” (Cittamātra) school now attempt once again to establish their own view and substantiate their preferred thesis. A verse states:
The functional capacity intrinsic to the eye-consciousness
Gives rise immediately to consciousness itself.This inner consciousness, dependent upon such functional capacity,
Is falsely apprehended by ordinary beings as the material eye-organ.
The latent impressions (vāsanās) giving rise to eye-consciousness are imprinted upon the Ālayavijñāna (Storehouse Consciousness) at the very moment when other consciousnesses cease. When these impressions mature, they give rise in due course to a subsequent consciousness whose mode of appearance (ākāra) matches exactly that of the preceding one. The immediate functional capacity—the instantaneous causal condition—immediately preceding the arising of that consciousness constitutes the basis (āśraya) upon which that consciousness depends. Ordinary, ignorant people mistakenly grasp this functional capacity as a material eye-organ possessing color and form, whereas in truth, no such material eye-organ exists apart from inner consciousness. Likewise, the remaining sense-organs should be understood in precisely the same way.
Having already established that there are no sense-organs—such as the eye—existing independently of consciousness, we shall now demonstrate that forms (rūpa), and so forth, likewise do not exist apart from consciousness. A verse states:
Consciousness arising from the sense-organ
Has no external object; it arises solely from its own seeds.It transforms, appearing as blue and so on;
Yet ordinary beings, failing to comprehend this,
Mistakenly grasp such appearances as external objects.
Just as the flowers of the Phyllanthus emblica (dhātakī) and Ixora coccinea (kākola) appear red—not because they require external colored substances like jewels for dyeing—but rather due to the sequential unfolding of their own inherent sprouts and seeds, whereby distinctive appearances arise from their own seed-potentials: similarly, even without external blue-colored forms, consciousness still arises and appears as if blue. Ordinary beings, however, misapprehend these appearances-as-blue as external objects existing independently of consciousness. For example, when clear water fills a lake, and red jewels are suspended from branches along the lakeshore, their reflections appear in the water as jewel-like images; thus, observers mistakenly believe real jewels exist within the lake. Yet no such jewels actually exist in the lake. Likewise, consciousness is merely an appearance—there exists no external object apart from inner consciousness.
Moreover, another line of reasoning is presented. A verse states:
Just as in dreams, no external forms truly exist,
Yet consciousness arises therefrom due to matured functional capacity.Similarly, in the waking state, although no external objects exist,
Consciousness nonetheless arises.
Yet this is untenable. A verse states:
As in dreams, no eye-organ exists,
Yet consciousness arises appearing as blue and so on.Without an eye-organ, it arises solely through maturation of its own seeds—
Why then do blind persons in the waking state not generate such consciousness?
In the waking state, visual perception of forms gives rise to clear, manifest eye-consciousness. Likewise, if in dreams consciousness resembling eye-consciousness arises solely due to maturation of internal latent impressions—without any eye-organ—then why do blind persons in the waking state, whose latent impressions are equally matured, not generate consciousness with identical appearances? After all, both states lack an eye-organ.
If one argues that the cause of such consciousness is not simply the absence of an eye-organ, but rather the maturation of a specific functional capacity producing that particular appearance—and only when such functional capacity matures does such consciousness arise—then one must further posit sleep as an indispensable supporting condition. Hence, such consciousness occurs only in dreams, not while awake.
This too is unreasonable. A verse states:
If, as you claim, such functional capacity matures only in dreams
And not in the waking state, then the sixth consciousness (manovijñāna)
Cannot mature in the waking state either.But if the sixth consciousness cannot mature in the waking state,
Then why is it unreasonable to say it cannot mature in dreams either?
Here “the sixth” refers to mental consciousness (manovijñāna). If you merely assert verbally that such consciousness arises in dreams due to matured functional capacity, but not in the waking state, then we too may assert: just as such functional capacity does not mature in the waking state, neither does it mature in dreams.
A verse states:
Just as you deny that the absence of an eye-organ is the cause,
So too, we deny that sleep is the cause in dreams.
In dreams, the appearance of external objects arises not from eye-consciousness, nor from consciousness functionally aligned with eye-consciousness, since the sense-organ upon which consciousness depends is inactive—just as a blind person in the waking state lacks functioning eye-organs. Thus, just as the absence of an eye-organ is not the cause for a blind person’s consciousness in the waking state, likewise sleep is not the cause for the maturation of latent impressions underlying dream-consciousness.
Therefore, a verse states:
Hence, in dreams too, we must accept
That such forms, such consciousness, and such eye-consciousness
Depend upon an eye-organ as their basis.
A verse states:
As one replies accordingly,
One sees that each reply matches the opponent’s own thesis.Thus, this false controversy is dispelled.
Our own position states: In the waking state, the three factors—sense-organ, object, and consciousness—are all empty of intrinsic nature (svabhāva), being mere objects of cognition—just like dreams.
The opponent counters: In the waking state, inner consciousness is empty of external objects, yet remains conscious by nature—just like dream-consciousness.
Another objection: The object cognized in the waking state is illusory, being merely an object—just like the objects seen in dreams.
Similarly: Without the dependently-arisen nature (paratantrasvabhāva), purity and impurity would be impossible, lacking any basis—just as clothing made of turtle-hair is impossible. The analogy of cataracts is likewise used.
Thus, no matter how the Mind-Only proponents respond via such arguments, Mādhyamika sages, observing that each reply mirrors the opponent’s own thesis, can effortlessly dispel this erroneous controversy.
Such reasoning does not contradict the Buddha’s teachings. A verse states:
The Buddhas have never taught any truly existent phenomena.
As stated in the sūtra:
“The three realms are purely conventionally designated;
Not a single phenomenon possesses intrinsic nature.
Ordinary beings, clinging to conventional designations,
Misapprehend them as having intrinsic nature.
There is no substantial entity, no cognition, no Ālayavijñāna, no objective reality—
Only foolish, distorted discrimination,
Like a corpse mistaken for something alive.”
If one claims that emptiness—the absence of one phenomenon in another—is itself non-existent, that too is unreasonable. The sūtra says:
“Mahāmati! Emptiness defined as ‘the absence of one thing in another’ is the lowest form of emptiness.”
To say “a cow does not exist” merely because it is not a horse is illogical, since the cow has its own intrinsic existence. Likewise, the sūtra states:
“World-Honored One! When entering the sense-faculties, one enters the Dharmadhātu itself. By ‘sense-faculties,’ we mean the eye-faculty, ear-faculty, nose-faculty, tongue-faculty, body-faculty, mind-faculty, female-faculty, male-faculty, life-faculty, pleasure-faculty, pain-faculty, joy-faculty, sorrow-faculty, equanimity-faculty, faith-faculty, vigor-faculty, mindfulness-faculty, concentration-faculty, wisdom-faculty, faculty of desire-to-know, faculty of knowledge-acquired, and faculty of complete-knowledge. Among these, the eye-faculty is unfindable in past, present, or future. If it is unfindable in the three times, it is not the eye-faculty. If it is not the eye-faculty, how can it be designated as ‘eye-faculty’? Just as an empty fist is deceptive—lacking substance, bearing only a nominal designation—so too, in ultimate reality, neither the fist nor the emptiness thereof is findable. Likewise, the eye-faculty is like an empty fist: deceptive, unreal, appearing only as illusion, misleading ordinary beings. It bears only a nominal designation; in ultimate reality, neither the eye nor the eye-faculty is findable. Having attained omniscience, the World-Honored One teaches the term ‘eye-faculty’ solely to guide deluded sentient beings; it does not exist in ultimate reality, since all faculties are intrinsically empty. Since the eye-faculty is empty of intrinsic nature, neither the eye nor its nature is findable. Why? Because the eye is devoid of its own intrinsic nature. Whatever lacks intrinsic nature is not a substantial entity; lacking substantial existence, it neither arises nor ceases; thus, it cannot be said to belong to past, present, or future.”
Similarly, the sūtra continues:
“World-Honored One! Suppose someone experiences pleasure, delight, laughter, and play in a dream. Upon awakening, he recalls it, yet it remains unfindable. Why? Even the pleasurable experiences themselves in the dream are unfindable—how much less could they be found upon awakening! Thus, the sense-faculties are like dream-events. Likewise, all phenomena are devoid of intrinsic nature; being unfindable, they cannot be meaningfully asserted.”
Similar extensive explanations apply to the aggregates (skandhas), elements (dhātus), sense-bases (āyatanas), and dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda)—all are like the sense-faculties just described. Since none possess intrinsic nature, the Mind-Only proponents’ assertion that consciousness is truly existent is thereby refuted.
If external objects do not exist, how is it that yogis, relying on their teacher’s instructions, perceive the earth filled with skeletons? A verse states:
Yogis, following their teacher’s instructions,
Perceive the earth filled with skeletons.Yet even those three—sense-organ, object, and consciousness—do not arise.
That is, the three—sense-organ, object, and consciousness—do not arise. Why? A verse states:
Because this is a distorted mode of attention.
This meditative absorption (samādhi) is declared to be a mode of attention lacking true reality.
We must accept this. Otherwise, a verse states:
As your eye-consciousness perceives its object,
So too does the impure-mind perceive its object.Others observing that same object should also see it,
And thus this samādhi would not be illusory.
When you watch a drama, everyone jointly perceives the same scene. If one person’s eye-consciousness arises with a certain appearance, others’ eye-consciousnesses arise identically. Similarly, non-meditators carefully observing places filled with skeletons should, like the yogi, generate consciousness bearing that same appearance—just as consciousness perceiving blue does. Therefore, this samādhi would not be a mode of attention lacking true reality. Thus, it should be understood accordingly.
A verse states:
Just as eyes afflicted with cataracts perceive hairs,
So too do demons perceive rivers as thick and viscous.
As previously stated: “Due to the cataract, one sees hairs.” All such analogies should be understood likewise.
A verse states:
Since all objects of cognition are ultimately nonexistent,
Inner consciousness too must be recognized as nonexistent.
Just as objects of cognition lack intrinsic nature, so too the inner consciousness bearing their appearances must be understood as unarisen in intrinsic nature. As stated:
“What is unknowable is not known; ignorance of it is also nonexistent. Hence the Buddha declares: ‘Knowing and the knowable are both without intrinsic nature.’”
And again:
“All consciousnesses are like illusions—this is the Buddha’s teaching. Likewise, their objects are also certainly illusory.”
Thus, clinging to inner consciousness as truly existent, or denying external objects outright, leads one into perilous territory. Only wise practitioners cultivating great compassion, guided by scriptural authority, logical reasoning, and mantra practice, can prevent such a fall.
Having thus shown that inner consciousness cannot exist without external objects, we now proceed to refute the notion that mere phenomena possess intrinsic existence. A verse states:
If, apart from the apprehended, there is no apprehender,
Yet both the emptiness of apprehender and apprehended
And the dependently-arisen phenomenon remain—
How can this phenomenon’s existence be verified?
If it cannot be verified, asserting its existence is unreasonable.
If you claim that the dependently-arisen phenomenon exists as the basis for the emptiness of apprehender and apprehended, then by what cognition do you verify this existence? To claim self-cognition (svasaṃvedana) is unreasonable: a function cannot operate upon its own substrate—it is contradictory. Just as a sword cannot cut itself, a finger cannot touch itself, a nimble acrobat cannot ride his own shoulder, fire cannot burn itself, and the eye cannot see itself—so too, this consciousness cannot be verified by another consciousness, for that contradicts your own tenet. You hold that if another consciousness were the object of this consciousness, your Mind-Only doctrine would collapse. Hence, cognition of this existence is ultimately impossible. Nor is it reasonable to assert existence without cognition.
An opponent responds: Although no other consciousness can verify it, self-cognition exists. Self-cognition alone verifies this consciousness; therefore, its existence is established.
This too is untenable. A verse states:
Self-apprehension cannot be established.
Even if self-cognition were posited to verify self-consciousness, it remains unestablished.
Here, proponents adopt the Sautrāntika view to support self-cognition: Just as fire, upon arising, illuminates both itself and the pot simultaneously—not gradually—so too sound manifests both itself and its meaning instantly. Likewise, inner consciousness, upon arising, does not gradually cognize itself and its object, but knows both instantly; therefore, self-cognition must exist. Even those who reject self-cognition must accept it, otherwise recollection would be inexplicable: recalling an object as “previously seen,” or remembering “I saw it before,” would be meaningless. Since memory only apprehends what was previously experienced, consciousness that never apprehended anything could not be remembered. Without self-cognition, consciousness would not apprehend itself, and another consciousness apprehending it would lead to infinite regress: if eye-consciousness seeing blue is known by a subsequent consciousness, that subsequent consciousness must itself be known by yet another, and so on ad infinitum. Moreover, later consciousnesses would have no objects other than earlier ones, since each successive consciousness takes the previous one as its object. Sentient beings constitute a single continuum of consciousness. Sequential consciousnesses arise rapidly—like petals of a blue lotus opening swiftly—thus appearing simultaneous. To avoid infinite regress, self-cognition must be accepted. Thus, later memory—“I saw it before”—is established. If consciousness did not apprehend its own nature, such memory would be inexplicable. Since later memory arises—“I saw it before”—we infer the existence of a consciousness capable of apprehending both its own nature and the object’s nature. Hence, memory proves self-apprehension. Since self-apprehension exists, dependently-arisen nature also exists. You asked, “How is this existence verified?” The answer is given above.
Now, to show that this answer is flawed, a verse states:
If self-cognition is established only by later memory,
Then the establishment itself remains unestablished—
What is unestablished cannot serve as proof.
Even assuming genuine existence, such reasoning fails. Since consciousness arises neither from itself nor from another, memory itself is ultimately nonexistent. How then can unestablished memory establish unestablished self-cognition? Even conventionally, memory cannot take self-cognition as its reason. Why? Just as smoke proves fire only after fire is first established, self-cognition must be established before memory can prove it. But if self-cognition remains unestablished, how can memory—dependent upon it—exist? Just as seeing water does not prove water-droplets exist, nor fire prove fire-droplets exist—since water and fire arise from rain or fire-drilling—so too, memory arises even without self-cognition, as will be explained shortly. Hence, memory depending on self-cognition cannot prove self-cognition, since that memory itself remains unestablished. Thus, it lacks probative force—just as claiming sound is impermanent because it is visible to the eye is invalid.
A verse states:
Even granting self-cognition exists,
Memory of it remains unreasonable—
Since memory is other than the apprehending consciousness,
Like consciousness in an unaware person’s body—
This reason also undermines all distinctions.
Even if inner consciousness apprehends both itself and its object, claiming memory-consciousness remembers them is unreasonable, since memory-consciousness is distinct from the consciousness that apprehended the object. Just as Maitreya’s self-cognition and object-apprehension cannot be recalled unless first apprehended by a closely associated consciousness, so too, later consciousnesses cannot recall objects or states never previously apprehended—being distinct, like consciousness in an unaware person’s body.
If one objects: “Since they belong to the same continuum, cause-and-effect relationship allows memory.”
This too is untenable. Why? “This reason undermines all distinctions.” The reason “it is other” undermines even continuity and causal relationships. Since memory-consciousness arises after the apprehending consciousness, and is other, it should not belong to the same continuum or causal sequence—just as consciousness in another continuum. Thus, the reason “it is other” broadly undermines all such distinctions.
Question: How, then, should your school posit this?
Answer:
Apart from the consciousness apprehending the object,
I do not accept any other memory-consciousness.Thus, memory saying “I saw it” is valid—
But this is based solely on worldly convention.
As previously explained, no memory-consciousness distinct from the consciousness apprehending the object exists. Since no “other” memory exists, what the apprehending consciousness apprehends can be apprehended by later consciousnesses. Thus, memory-consciousness too has an object; what the apprehending consciousness knows, later consciousnesses can know. Hence, saying “I saw it” is acceptable—but only conventionally, not through rigorous analysis, since it rests on conventional, illusory meaning.
A verse states:
Therefore, since self-cognition is nonexistent,
How do you know your dependently-arisen nature?Agent, action, and instrument are not identical—
Thus, self-cognition is unreasonable.
Saying “I know myself” makes the knower an object of knowledge—an action performed by the knower. Thus, the knower becomes both agent and object, with no distinct instrumental function. Then agent, action, and instrument would collapse into one—yet nothing like this is ever observed. Just as the woodcutter, the tree, and the act of cutting are distinct, self-cognition is likewise impossible. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra states:
“Just as a sword cannot cut itself, a finger cannot touch itself—so too, the mind cannot cognize itself.”
Since self-cognition is absent, a verse states:
If it neither arises nor is known,
How can dependently-arisen nature exist?What harm does the ‘daughter of a barren woman’ do you?
Why do you refuse to accept her?
Dependently-arisen nature arises neither from itself nor another, as previously shown; now we add that it is also unknowable. If you accept a dependently-arisen nature that neither arises nor is known, then what reason prevents accepting similar entities? What harm does the ‘daughter of a barren woman’ pose? You refuse to accept her—but she is beyond all conceptual elaboration, the domain of noble wisdom, the ineffable intrinsic nature.
Further, you previously claimed: “It is the causal basis for conventional phenomena.” If dependently-arisen nature existed, this might be reasonable. A verse states:
If dependently-arisen nature is entirely absent,
How can there be any conventional cause?
This means all conventional phenomena lack real causes. Thus, your school’s claim—that conventional causes exist in worldly discourse—lacks intrinsic nature.
A verse states:
As others, clinging to real entities,
Destroy all worldly conventions—
Clinging to real entities due to lack of wisdom, dependently-arisen phenomena—like an unburnt clay pot—collapse under your scrutiny, as if doused with water. Thus, all worldly conventions—sitting, walking, acting, cooking, forms, feelings, etc.—are undermined. This yields only loss, no benefit.
Those entering such paths based on personal speculation: A verse states:
Departing from Nāgārjuna’s path,
No authentic method of pacification remains.Losing both conventional and ultimate truths,
Liberation becomes impossible.
Why does losing the two truths prevent liberation? A verse states:
Conventional truth is the means;
Ultimate truth is the fruit of that means.Failing to distinguish these two truths,
One strays onto wrong paths through distorted views.
As the Samādhirāja Sūtra (Ratnakūṭa Sūtra, “Seeing Reality” chapter) states:
“Worldly wise ones naturally understand true phenomena without hearing from others—
Namely, conventional and ultimate truths;
Beyond these, no third truth exists.Seeking happiness, sentient beings place faith in the Buddha.
Out of compassion, the Buddha teaches conventional truth for worldly benefit.The Lion among Men establishes conventional truths,
Showing sentient beings the six realms:
Hells, animals, hungry ghosts, asuras, humans, and gods.
Low and high castes, wealthy and impoverished families,
Servants and maids, males, females, and hermaphrodites—
All such differences among sentient beings,
The Buddha, peerless in the world, explains.Wise ones understand conventional truth,
Which the Buddha teaches for worldly benefit.Clinging to it, sentient beings revolve in saṃsāra,
Unable to escape the eight worldly dharmas:
Gain and loss, praise and blame, fame and disgrace, pleasure and pain.Gaining leads to elation; losing provokes anger.
All unmentioned cases should be understood similarly—
These eight afflictions constantly damage the world.Whoever asserts conventional truth as ultimate truth
Has inverted wisdom.Calling the impure pure, the painful pleasurable,
The non-self self, the impermanent permanent—
Clinging to such views, one loves and clings to them.Hearing the Buddha’s teaching, one feels terror, slanders, rejects it—
Having slandered the Buddha’s Dharma, one falls into hell, suffering intensely.Foolish beings irrationally seek happiness,
Yet endure countless unbearable sufferings.Whoever, in the Buddha’s Dharma, observes correctly without distortion,
Transcends all conditioned existence, entering Nirvāṇa—
Like a snake shedding its old skin.All phenomena are intrinsically empty, devoid of signs—
The supreme ultimate truth.Hearing this teaching, one develops joyful faith,
Certain to attain unsurpassed perfect enlightenment.The Buddha sees all aggregates as empty and still,
All elements and sense-bases likewise;
All sense-faculties are signless—
The Buddha fully and accurately knows all.”
Who attains liberation without conventional and ultimate truths? Thus, clinging to Mind-Only leads one astray through distorted views.
Calling conventional truth “means” is scripturally supported:
“In the Dharma beyond words, what is spoken? What is heard?
Since changelessness is falsely superimposed, speech and hearing arise.”
Only through conventional truth can ultimate truth be expressed; realizing that expression yields ultimate truth. As the treatise states:
“Without relying on conventional truth, the ultimate truth cannot be realized; without the ultimate truth, Nirvāṇa cannot be attained.”
The expressed ultimate truth is the fruit born of the means; means, fruit, attainment, and realization are synonymous.
An opponent retorts: You show no restraint toward us—I will show none toward you. You skillfully refute our positions using valid reasoning, declaring dependently-arisen nature unreasonable. Now, using your own reasoning, I refute your accepted conventional truth as equally unreasonable.
Response: If someone, having accumulated wealth through immense hardship over lifetimes, is robbed by another who feigns friendship and poisons him—seeking revenge—you may act as you wish. What harm does this do to us, who gain supreme beneficial results?
A verse states:
As you posit dependently-arisen phenomena,
I do not accept your conventional truth.Though they are ultimately nonexistent,
I speak of them as existent conventionally.
You assert your school’s dependently-arisen nature as certified by noble wisdom—I do not accept such conventional truth. Yet, though nonexistent ultimately, they are commonly accepted conventionally; thus, I speak of them as existent solely on that conventional basis, which serves precisely to negate them. As the Buddha says:
“The world disputes with me, but I dispute not with the world. Whatever the world says exists, I say exists; whatever the world says does not exist, I say does not exist.”
A verse states:
As Arhats, having extinguished all aggregates, enter tranquil Nirvāṇa,
All conventional phenomena become nonexistent.If such conventions were nonexistent even conventionally—
Like the aggregates of Arhats—
Then I would not speak of them as existent conventionally.
Like Arhats entering the nirvāṇa without remainder, where all conventional phenomena vanish, if such conventions were nonexistent even conventionally—as with Arhats’ aggregates—I would not call them existent conventionally. Thus, I accept conventional truth only on the basis of worldly convention—not by intrinsic validity.
Since this is merely worldly convention, it should be refuted only relative to those who accept it—not others. A verse states:
If the world poses no obstacle to you,
Refute this conventional truth relative to the world.First dispute with the world yourself—
Then, if victorious, I shall follow you.
We exert great effort to eliminate worldly convention. You may refute it—if the world poses no obstacle to you, I shall assist. But the world will inevitably oppose you; thus, I shall merely observe. First dispute with the world; if you prevail, I shall follow you. Yet you will surely be defeated by the world; hence, I follow the world’s authoritative stance.
An opponent asks: If you fear worldly obstacles, and thus accept convention even without valid reasoning, you should likewise fear scriptural obstacles and accept Mind-Only. As the sūtra states: “These three realms are nothing but mind.”
Response: The Buddha’s sūtras are like a flawless lapis lazuli ground. You fail to discern their essential distinctions, mistaking them for actual “mind-water.” Attempting to extract this “mind-water,” your wisdom resembles an unburnt clay pot—trying to draw water, it shatters into hundreds of pieces, inviting ridicule from those who know its true nature. The sūtra’s intended meaning is not as your intellect interprets.
Then what is its meaning? A verse states:
Bodhisattvas on the sixth ground directly realize
That the three realms are exclusively mind—
To refute the eternal self as agent,
They understand the agent is mind alone.
As previously quoted:
“Observing dependent origination in accordance with its characteristic mode, one sees only a vast mass of suffering, a vast tree of suffering—within which no agent or experiencer exists. Then one reflects: ‘Only by grasping an agent does activity arise; since no agent exists, activity is ultimately unfindable.’ Further, one reflects: ‘Thus, the three realms are nothing but mind; the Buddha expounds the twelve links of dependent origination—all founded upon a single mind.’”
And so on, extensively. Thus, rejecting the eternal self as agent, one sees only inner mind as agent in conventional terms—thereby realizing the three realms as mind-only. “Bodhi” means omniscience; “sattva” means thought. Possessing such thought, one is called a bodhisattva. Or one with unwavering aspiration toward bodhi is called a bodhisattva. Or one destined to attain bodhi is called a bodhisattva—the intermediate phrase is omitted. “Realization” means direct insight; “direct realization” means personally experiencing the Dharmadhātu. “Present” refers to the sixth ground. These are explanatory glosses.
Having thus explained the sūtra’s meaning, further sūtras clarify it. A verse states:
To enhance the wisdom of intelligent beings,
The Omniscient One, in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra,
With diamond-like words crushing the mountain-peaks of non-Buddhist views,
Explains this meaning.
This refers to the verses cited here. As the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra states:
“Others speak of sentient beings, continua, aggregates, conditions, dust-particles, intrinsic nature, autonomy, and agency; I declare: all is mind alone.”
To explain this: A verse states:
As various non-Buddhist schools assert sentient beings, etc.,
The Buddha, seeing they are not agents, declares:
Only mind is the agent of the world.
“Non-Buddhists” is used comparatively, since some Buddhist groups also provisionally posit persons (pudgalas), etc.; or perhaps such groups are not truly Buddhist, as non-Buddhists cannot correctly understand the Buddha’s teachings. As the treatise states:
“Whoever speaks of persons and aggregates—worldly Sāṃkhyas, owl-like naked ascetics—asked whether they exist apart from existence and non-existence, reveal that only the Buddha’s teaching expounds the nectar-like Dharma, transcending existence and non-existence—the profound, supreme Dharma.”
Know that those clinging to aggregates, etc., are exclusively non-Buddhists. “Each” indicates each school. Thus, non-Buddhist schools posit aggregates, etc., as agents—since saṃsāra is beginningless, what distorted view has never arisen? What distorted view will not arise? Even presently, white-purified cessation, etc., are taken as real aggregates acting as agents. The Buddhas, seeing that persons, etc., are not agents, declare mind alone as the world’s agent—this is the sūtra’s meaning.
Having thus refuted other agents, the textual and literal meaning is complete; thus, the word “only” does not negate objects of cognition. Another approach clarifies that external objects are not negated. A verse states:
Just as one who realizes ultimate truth is called Buddha,
So too, mind is declared most essential.Since the sūtra states “the world is mind alone,”
Negating form is not the sūtra’s intent.
One who awakens to ultimate truth is called Buddha—omitting the first clause. Similarly, mind is most essential. Rejecting other phenomena as essential, the sūtra declares “the three realms are mind alone”—merely rejecting form, etc., as primary, not denying their existence altogether. Thus, only our interpretation accords with the sūtra’s meaning.
If your view holds, a verse states:
If knowing “only mind exists” entails rejecting external forms,
Why does the Buddha, in that sūtra, state:
“Mind arises from ignorance and karmic formations”?
The Daśabhūmika Sūtra states that consciousness arises from ignorance and karmic formations—not from intrinsic nature. If consciousness existed intrinsically, it would not depend on ignorance and formations; yet it does depend on them—hence, consciousness is ultimately devoid of intrinsic nature. Like a person with cataracts seeing hairs, consciousness arises only with distorted causes; without them, it does not arise. As the sūtra states:
“Bodhisattvas, observing dependent origination in accordance with its characteristic mode, reflect: ‘Ignorance is not knowing the truths; the karmic formations produced by ignorance are their result; the initial consciousness arising from formations; name-and-form co-arising with consciousness; the growth of name-and-form as the six sense-bases; contact arising from the union of sense-base, object, and consciousness; feeling co-arising with contact; craving arising from attachment to feeling; grasping arising from craving’s growth; karmic formations arising from grasping; rebirth arising from karmic formations; aging arising from rebirth; death arising from aging; sorrow arising from death’s separation, confusion, and clinging; lamentation arising from sorrow; bodily suffering arising from senses’ decline; mental suffering arising from consciousness’s decline; and increased suffering and distress.’ Thus, only a vast mass of suffering, a vast tree of suffering, arises—within which no agent or experiencer exists. Ignorance has two functions: causing confusion about objects, and serving as the causal condition for formations. Formations have two functions: ripening future results, and serving as the causal condition for consciousness. Consciousness has two functions: perpetuating existence, and serving as the causal condition for name-and-form. Name-and-form has two functions: mutual support, and serving as the causal condition for the six sense-bases. The six sense-bases have two functions: each apprehending its own domain, and serving as the causal condition for contact. Contact has two functions: apprehending objects, and serving as the causal condition for feeling. Feeling has two functions: experiencing pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral objects, and serving as the causal condition for craving. Craving has two functions: clinging to pleasant objects, and serving as the causal condition for grasping. Grasping has two functions: perpetuating afflictions, and serving as the causal condition for karmic formations. Karmic formations have two functions: producing rebirth in other realms, and serving as the causal condition for rebirth. Rebirth has two functions: generating aggregates, and serving as the causal condition for aging. Aging has two functions: altering faculties, and serving as the causal condition for death. Death has two functions: destroying formations, and serving as the causal condition for continued ignorance.”
This shows consciousness arises only with distorted causes. Thus, “without cause, effect ceases.” As the sūtra states:
“With ignorance’s cessation, formations cease—because lacking ignorance as condition, formations cease without support. With formations’ cessation, consciousness ceases—because lacking formations as condition, consciousness ceases without support.”
And so on, extensively. Again:
“One reflects: conditioned phenomena turn only when assembled; disassembled, they do not turn. Conditions gathered, they turn; uncollected, they do not turn. Knowing conditioned phenomena harbor many faults, one resolves to abandon assembling conditions. Yet, to mature sentient beings, one does not utterly abandon formations. Sons of the Buddha! Bodhisattvas, observing conditioned phenomena as faulty and devoid of intrinsic nature—neither arising nor ceasing—thus proceed.”
Who, possessing mind, upon seeing this teaching, asserts consciousness truly exists? Such an assertion stems solely from self-deception.
Hence, the sūtra’s “mind-only” declaration reveals mind as primary—not denying form—to highlight mind’s primacy. A verse states:
Sentient and environmental worlds, with their myriad differences,
Are established by mind.The sūtra states sentient beings arise from karma;
Where mind is severed, karma is nonexistent.
The sentient world comprises beings’ individual karma and afflictions; the environmental world comprises the collective karma of sentient beings—from the wind-wheel up to the Heaven of Ultimate Form. Like peacocks’ feathers displaying varied colors due to their individual karma, or lotuses’ varied colors due to collective karma—similarly, all should be understood. As the sūtra states:
“According to sentient beings’ karma, black mountains arise at appropriate times—like hells and heavenly palaces, sword-forests and jewel-trees.”
Thus, all beings arise from karma; karma depends on mind—where mind exists, karma exists; where mind is absent, karma is absent. Hence, mind is the primary cause of saṃsāric流转; other factors are not. Thus, the sūtra establishes mind as primary—not external forms.
A verse states:
If you grant forms exist, yet deny they are agents like mind,
Then rejecting other agents apart from mind
Does not entail rejecting forms themselves.
“Form” refers to aggregates of particles. Some posit intrinsic nature, etc., as agents; others posit inner mind as agent. That forms are not agents is uncontroversial. Thus, we examine intrinsic nature, etc., as agents. To refute their status as non-agents, the sūtra declares mind alone—possessing the functional capacity of an agent—as the agent. By refuting intrinsic nature, etc., as agents, mind naturally occupies the contested ground. Like two kings vying for one kingdom, expelling the rival king grants sole sovereignty. Citizens are needed by both kings—hence, citizens remain unharmed. Similarly, forms are needed by both sides—hence, forms remain unharmed. Thus, forms must be acknowledged as existent.
From the above reasoning, a verse states:
If abiding by worldly convention,
The five aggregates are conventionally existent.If genuine wisdom arises,
Practitioners’ five aggregates are ultimately nonexistent.
Thus, it should be understood. A verse states:
Without forms, one should not cling to mind;
With mind, one should not deny forms.
When valid reasoning establishes forms as nonexistent, one must likewise establish mind as nonexistent—both lack valid grounds. When mind is established as existent, one must likewise establish forms as existent—both are conventionally accepted.
Scriptural authority confirms this. A verse states:
In the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, the Buddha negates both;
In Abhidharma texts, both are affirmed.
The five aggregates—form, etc.—are explained as existent in Abhidharma texts via intrinsic and common characteristics. In the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, the Buddha negates all five aggregates. As stated:
“Subhūti, form is empty of intrinsic nature…”
And so on, up to “consciousness is empty of intrinsic nature.”
A verse states:
Even if the two truths’ sequence is disrupted,
Your “real entities” remain unestablished.
Your view—denying forms while asserting inner consciousness alone—disrupts the sequence of conventional and ultimate truths established by scripture and reasoning. Even disrupting this sequence, your “real entities” remain unestablished. Why? Since we have already refuted real entities, your efforts yield no result.
A verse states:
Thus, sequentially understanding all phenomena:
They do not arise ultimately, yet arise conventionally.Question: Although the meaning of this sutra is explained as such, other sutras definitively establish the doctrine of “Mind-Only.” For instance, it states: “External objects are entirely nonexistent; mind transforms itself into various appearances—resembling bodies, sense-objects, and environments—hence I declare ‘Mind-Only.’” Here, “body” refers to the six sense-faculties (e.g., eyes); “sense-objects” refer to the six sense-data (e.g., forms); and “environment” refers to the physical world (the container-world). Since external objects do not exist apart from the inner mind, when consciousness arises, it transforms itself to appear as faculties (roots), sense-objects (enjoyments), and environments (locations). Thus, although phenomena such as body and environment appear to exist externally, independent of internal cognition, in reality, the three realms are solely mind.
Answer: This sutra too is taught with a hidden intent. As stated in the verse:
The sutra declares external objects entirely nonexistent;
Mind alone transforms itself into manifold phenomena.
This teaching is intended for those attached to beautiful forms,
To counteract attachment to form—it is not definitive meaning.
Know that this sutra is provisional (non-definitive), not ultimate. Sentient beings, driven by attachment to beautiful forms, become enslaved to craving, aversion, pride, and other afflictions, losing freedom. Due to such attachment, they commit grave misdeeds and forfeit accumulations of merit and wisdom. Thus, the Buddha’s hidden intent is to eliminate afflictions arising from attachment to form; therefore, he teaches “Mind-Only.” Similarly, to sentient beings dominated by craving, he prescribes the contemplation of the skeleton—a method to dispel craving for form—even though skeletons are not literally present; yet he speaks of them thus.
Moreover, this sutra is provisional, not definitive—how is this determined? By scriptural authority and logical reasoning. As stated in the verse:
The Buddha declares this to be provisional;
If this were definitive, its logic would collapse.
Not only this sutra but also others are provisional. As stated in the verse:
Other sutras exhibiting similar characteristics
Also explicitly reveal their provisional nature.
What kind of sutras exhibit such characteristics? For example, the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra teaches the three natures: the imagined (parikalpita), the dependent (paratantra), and the perfected (pariniṣpanna). It asserts that the imagined nature lacks intrinsic existence, whereas the dependent nature possesses conventional existence. Likewise, it states: “The ālayavijñāna is profoundly subtle; all seeds flow like a torrential river. I do not expound it to ordinary beings and foolish ones, fearing they will mistakenly grasp it as a self.” Further, it says: “Just as a physician prescribes different medicines for different illnesses, so too the Buddha teaches ‘Mind-Only’ for sentient beings afflicted by different conditions.” Such teachings reveal their provisional nature. Similarly, the Buddha teaches in sutras the tathāgatagarbha—the inherently luminous, originally pure nature endowed with the thirty-two marks—present within every sentient being. He further explains: “Like an invaluable gem wrapped in filthy rags, this tathāgatagarbha is enveloped by the ‘garments’ of aggregates, elements, and sense-spheres, obscured by craving, aversion, and ignorance, and stained by conceptual defilements—yet it remains eternally abiding, indestructible, and unchanging.” Then a question arises: “World-Honored One! How does the tathāgatagarbha you teach differ from the ‘Self’ (ātman) posited by non-Buddhist schools?” The Buddha replies: “Mahāmati! My teaching of the tathāgatagarbha differs entirely from the non-Buddhist concept of ātman. Mahāmati! The Buddhas, Tathāgatas, and Fully Enlightened Ones designate the tathāgatagarbha using terms such as emptiness (śūnyatā), suchness (tathatā), nirvāṇa, non-arising (anutpāda), signlessness (animitta), and wishlessness (apraṇihita)—all synonymous expressions. This teaching is introduced to alleviate the fear of ‘no-self’ experienced by ignorant beings, and to guide them toward the signless, non-discriminative realm via the door of tathāgatagarbha. Mahāmati! Present and future bodhisattva-mahāsattvas must not cling to ‘self.’ Mahāmati! Just as a potter, using clay, his hands, tools, water, rope, and effort, fashions diverse vessels, so too the Tathāgata, abiding in the non-self-nature of phenomena, free from all signs, employs skillful means—various words, phrases, and approaches—to teach either the tathāgatagarbha or ‘no-self.’ Mahāmati! Therefore, my teaching of tathāgatagarbha differs from the non-Buddhist ātman. Mahāmati! To attract and guide non-Buddhists clinging to the notion of ātman, the Buddha teaches tathāgatagarbha. Hence, the teaching of tathāgatagarbha aims to swiftly lead sentient beings entrenched in views of inherent selfhood—those who have already cultivated the Three Gateways to Liberation—to perfect, complete enlightenment.”
That sutra further states: “Mahāmati! Emptiness is non-arising, non-dual, and devoid of intrinsic characteristics; it pervades all Buddhist scriptures.” Therefore, sutras exhibiting such characteristics—which proponents of Yogācāra consider definitive—are revealed by this very teaching to be entirely provisional.
Next, we clarify their provisional nature through valid reasoning. As stated in the verse:
If knowables do not exist, then knowers are easily negated too.
Since the absence of knowables negates knowing,
the Buddha first negates knowables.
The Buddhas gradually guide sentient beings into realizing non-intrinsic existence. Since those cultivating merit readily realize the true nature of phenomena, merit-cultivation serves as a skillful means to enter such realization—thus, practices such as generosity are taught first. Similarly, negating knowables serves as a skillful means to enter realization of no-self. Therefore, the Buddhas first negate knowables, because once one realizes knowables lack self-nature, it becomes easy to realize knowers likewise lack self-nature. Among those realizing knowables lack self-nature, some achieve realization of knowers’ lack of self-nature independently; others attain it merely through brief instruction by others—thus, the Buddha first teaches the negation of knowables.
Wise persons should interpret other sutras similarly. As stated in the verse:
Having understood this hermeneutical principle,
any sutra whose meaning is not explicitly definitive
should be interpreted as provisional.
Only teachings on emptiness are definitive.
Any sutra failing to clearly elucidate dependent origination—such as non-arising—is to be understood as a cause guiding one into realizing non-intrinsic existence. For example: “Great elements cannot be seen by the eye; how can the eye see what they produce? The Buddha, to refute attachment to form, speaks thus about form.” Another sutra states: “The meaning of impermanence is precisely ‘meaninglessness.’”
Know that teachings on emptiness constitute the truly definitive meaning. As stated: “Know that the Sugata’s proclamation of emptiness distinguishes definitive sutras; if a teaching affirms sentient beings, persons, or ‘stream-enterers,’ know that teaching is provisional.” Also: “Across a thousand worlds, I have spoken countless sutras; though wording varies, their meaning is singular. Practicing even one teaching fully encompasses practicing all; exhausting all the Buddhas’ immeasurable teachings, all point to ‘no-self.’ One who skillfully understands meaning can learn here without difficulty—and will swiftly attain the Dharma.” Know that the Amitāyus Sūtra and others similarly expound at length.
Now, briefly explain a small portion. Just as a snake is falsely imputed onto a coiled rope—a case of the imagined nature—since the snake is utterly nonexistent there, while the rope itself is the perfected nature, not imagined. Likewise, intrinsic nature (svabhāva) is the imagined nature when imputed upon dependently originated phenomena. As the treatise states: “Intrinsic nature is unproduced, requiring no other condition for its establishment.” Thus, intrinsic nature is not a produced phenomenon. Likewise, when the imagined nature is falsely imputed onto illusory, dependently originated phenomena directly perceived, that very falsity constitutes truth in the Buddha’s domain—not imagined—because truth is realized solely by directly apprehending intrinsic nature, untouched by production. Realizing such truth is called Buddhahood. Thus, one must understand the three natures—the imagined, the dependent, and the perfected—and thereby elucidate the sutras’ hidden intent.
Since subject and object (grāhya-grāhaka) have no separate existence apart from the dependent nature, both are designated as the imagined nature within the dependent nature. This requires careful reflection. Having completed this digression, we now return to the main argument.
Madhyamakāvatāra, Chapter Three—End
Madhyamakāvatāra, Chapter Four
Having refuted production from another, we now refute production from both self and other. As stated in the verse:
Asserting production from both self and other is also illogical,
as it incurs all the faults previously established.
Those asserting production from both self and other claim phenomena arise both from themselves and from others. For example, a pot arises from a lump of clay, a stick, a wheel, rope, water, and the potter. Since the pot and clay are not distinct entities, the pot must already exist within the clay’s nature to arise—hence production from self. Yet the potter’s effort and other factors also produce the pot—hence production from other. Thus, they assert joint production. Similarly, for internal phenomena, they claim production occurs only jointly from self and other. Their system posits nine categories—life-force (jīva), non-life-force (ajīva), merit (puṇya), demerit (pāpa), influx (āsrava), restraint (saṃvara), etc.—as ultimately real. For instance, Maitreya arises from life-force since life-force existed in his past life; hence, production from self. Since Maitreya and life-force are not distinct, and life-force is said to traverse rebirth realms (e.g., heaven), Maitreya also arises from parents, dharma, adharma, influx, etc.—hence, production from other. Our earlier refutations of production-from-self and production-from-other do not conflict with our position, as we reject production exclusively from self or exclusively from other.
Refutation: This assertion is also illogical, as it incurs all the faults previously established. All faults raised against the two prior positions equally apply to joint production—hence joint production is certainly impossible. If a pot already exists within the clay’s nature, it cannot arise—since it already exists. As previously refuted: “Arising from itself brings no benefit; arising again after having arisen is illogical.” Similarly, claiming Maitreya arises only because life-force already contains him is untenable. Since water, rope, and wheels intrinsically lack pots, pots cannot arise from them. As previously refuted: “If dependence on another implies production from another, fire should produce darkness; everything should produce everything else—since all non-producing entities share identical non-producing natures.” The same applies to claiming Maitreya arises from parents, etc.
As previously shown, asserting production-from-self or production-from-other is illogical in both conventional and ultimate contexts. Likewise, joint production is certainly impossible, based on the same reasoning. As stated in the verse:
This is neither conventional nor ultimate;
if individual production fails, joint production is even less plausible.
Not only do prior logical arguments show joint production is illogical, but worldly observation confirms it too.
For example, one sesame seed yields oil; many sesame seeds yield oil—but gravel, however abundant, yields no oil. Thus, if each entity individually produced oil, abundance would ensure production; therefore, joint production is illogical.
Some assert spontaneous production (without cause): If phenomena arose from causes, then cause and effect would either be identical or distinct—or both—leading to the faults previously cited. Since we reject causal production, these faults do not apply. Thus, all phenomena arise spontaneously. For instance, lotus stems are coarse and hard, petals soft—no creator is observed. Petals, stamens, and pistils display varied colors and shapes—no maker is seen. Similarly, differences between jackfruit and pomegranate occur naturally. External phenomena are thus; internal phenomena likewise. Peacocks, tit-birds, and cranes display intricate shapes and colors—no human agent forces these. Hence, all phenomena arise spontaneously.
Refutation verse:
If phenomena arise without cause,
everything would eternally arise from everything.
People seek fruit, yet collect seeds through multiple methods—
this contradicts spontaneous production.
If phenomena arise spontaneously, then the jackfruit tree—being no cause of jackfruit—is no more causally related than teak or mango trees; thus, teak trees too should produce jackfruit. Moreover, since jackfruit arises from the jackfruit tree (a non-cause), it should arise from all phenomena across the three realms—since all are equally non-causes. Similarly, mangoes and rose-apples ripen only seasonally (temporal phenomena), yet if spontaneous, they should exist eternally—unaffected by seasonal conditions. Likewise, crows should produce peacock feathers, since crows are no cause of peacock feathers; peacocks should produce parrot feathers constantly—even in the womb. Thus, all sentient beings should arise eternally—but they do not. Hence, spontaneous production is illogical.
Having refuted this irrational view, we now cite contradictions with direct perception. Thus: “People seek fruit, yet collect seeds through multiple methods”—yet they do collect them thus, proving spontaneous production false.
Further flaws: As stated in the verse:
Sentient beings without cause would be ungraspable,
like the color and fragrance of a sky-flower.
Yet this vibrant world is graspable—
know that the world has causes, just as the mind does.
If sentient beings lacked causes, they would be as ungraspable as the color and fragrance of a sky-flower. Yet they are graspable—thus, all sentient beings arise from causes, like the mind. If your view held, the mind cognizing blue would not arise from the presence of a blue object. But the mind cognizing blue arises solely from perceiving blue—not spontaneously—hence spontaneous production is illogical.
Others posit that mind arises from the four great elements (earth, water, fire, wind), citing observable causality—denying this would incur prior faults. Conventional consensus holds these four elements as the sole causes for all sentient beings. Their transformations explain lotuses, pomegranates, peacocks, and cranes. Even the inner mind—capable of realizing ultimate truth—arises solely from these four elements. For example, alcohol’s intoxicating power arises from elemental transformations, causing drunkenness and stupor. Similarly, elemental transformations in embryonic stages (kalala, etc.) generate consciousness—eventually enabling cognition of all phenomena. Thus, all internal and external phenomena arise solely from present-life causes—not past-life karma maturing now, nor present-life karma maturing later. Hence, future lives do not exist. As one desiring a woman’s company once declared to convince her of no future life: “Fair lady! Perform good deeds and enjoy fine food and drink! Your beautiful body has departed—you possess it no longer. This body is merely a composite illusion; once gone, it never returns—fear it not!”
Now we ask: What reasoning establishes your claim that future lives do not exist?
If you reply: “Because they are not directly perceived.”
Question: Is your statement “future lives are not directly perceived” itself directly perceived—or not?
If directly perceived: You admit future lives are not directly perceived, yet call this admission “directly perceived”—then all non-existent things become directly perceived. Thus, your system renders non-existent things existent—and directly perceived, like existent things. With no non-existents, existents too vanish—lacking contrast. Without non-existents and existents, your assertions about the four elements and non-existence of future lives both collapse.
If not directly perceived: Since it is not directly perceived, it cannot be observed. How then can non-perception prove future lives do not exist?
If you claim inference establishes this:
Though inference may validly establish something, it contradicts your own position. As stated: “Only what sense-faculties perceive defines a person; learned people’s statements deceive like wolf-tracks.” As we refuted mind arising from elements, similarly all denials are refuted thus.
Moreover, just as those with visual distortions see a second moon (though none exists), or perceive hairs, flies, and mosquitoes (though none exist), so too your denial of future lives—and other distorted perceptions—are equally erroneous. To clarify: As stated in the verse:
The nature of the great elements you assert
is not even present within your own mental objects.
You remain deluded regarding even this—
how can you correctly know future lives?
The four elements’ ultimate nature, as asserted in your system, does not even exist within your own mental objects. Since you are deluded about even present phenomena, how can you correctly know future lives—subtlest of all, accessible only to divine sight?
Further, as stated in the verse:
When refuting future lives, your own body
becomes a distorted cognition of knowable reality.
Since you hold this distorted view, sharing the same basis,
just as when asserting the four elements possess intrinsic nature.
“Same” means equality in meaning; “basis” means the supporting ground; “body” means physical form; “this view” means the view denying future lives. Since the basis is identical, the distinguishing term is omitted—thus “sharing the same basis” means “body.” Stating “sharing the same basis” provides the valid reason. If the basis—until one even doubts or suspects a future-life mind arising from elements—serves as the shared basis for the wrong view denying future lives, then materialists asserting the four elements possess intrinsic nature also possess bodies sharing this basis. This occurs in two stages: (1) asserting elements possess intrinsic nature; (2) denying future lives. When establishing either stage as thesis, the other serves as the analogous example. Thus: “Just as when asserting elements possess intrinsic nature”—at that time, one possesses a body sharing this basis and holds a distorted cognition of knowable reality.
Suppose one argues: “When I assert elements possess intrinsic nature, I hold no distorted view—thus the analogy lacks the property to be proven.”
Refutation: False! Because non-arising is established, your mistaken belief that intrinsically nonexistent elements arise and exist is itself a distorted view—already proven.
If you insist elements do not arise, yet still require proof:
Answer: Unnecessary! Already proven. As stated in the verse:
Elements’ non-existence was established earlier,
by comprehensively refuting self-, other-, joint-, and causeless production—
thus, no unmentioned elements remain.
Having comprehensively refuted self-, other-, joint-, and causeless production of all phenomena, we have already refuted production from elements. Since nothing arises, elements lack intrinsic nature—thus the analogy holds. Similarly, denying omniscience, asserting phenomena possess/intrinsically lack existence, asserting Īśvara, time, atoms, svabhāva, spontaneity, and other attachments—all are established as distorted views, as previously shown. As stated: “When denying the Perfectly Awakened One, your own body becomes a distorted cognition of knowable reality, sharing the same basis as when asserting elements possess intrinsic nature.” Thus, views of existence/non-existence are all refuted. Yet our own position is faultless. Hence, wise persons should slightly modify this verse to refute all opposing systems—thereby dismantling the net of conceptual proliferation and establishing ultimate wisdom.
Suppose one objects: “You too commit this error.”
Answer: False! Because no analogy proves our view distorted; rather, ours aligns with valid reasoning. As stated: “When I realize future lives exist, this becomes correct view and knowledge of reality, sharing the same basis as when accepting realization of no-self.” Similarly: “When I realize omniscience exists, this becomes correct view and knowledge of reality, sharing the same basis as when accepting realization of no-self.” This applies to all phenomena. Thus, the prior statement—“It does not arise from itself, nor from another, nor jointly, nor causelessly”—is perfectly established.
Question: If phenomena do not arise from self, other, both, or causelessly—how do they arise?
Answer: If phenomena possessed intrinsic nature, they would necessarily arise either from self, other, both, or causelessly—no other options exist. Those asserting Īśvara creates phenomena must likewise claim Īśvara arises from self, other, or both—thus remaining within prior faults. No fifth productive cause exists, as no alternatives remain. By refuting these four conceptual fabrications, we establish phenomena arise without intrinsic nature. To clarify: As stated in the verse:
Since no self-, other-, joint-, or causeless production exists,
phenomena are declared free from intrinsic nature.
Question: If phenomena lack intrinsic nature, how are non-intrinsically arising phenomena like blue visible?
Answer: Blue’s intrinsic nature is not an object of any cognition—hence blue’s intrinsic nature is entirely invisible.
Then what is the nature of blue, repeatedly perceived directly?
Answer: This is distortion—not true intrinsic nature. Only the ignorant perceive it; the liberated do not. To clarify: As stated in the verse:
Thick ignorance, like dense clouds,
causes all phenomena’s nature to appear distorted.
“Dense clouds” means thick, overcast clouds. Heavy ignorance, like dense clouds, obscures blue’s intrinsic nature—preventing its perception. Thus, ordinary beings cannot directly perceive blue’s intrinsic nature; their mistaken grasping of it as intrinsic nature appears only to those holding reified views.
As stated in the verse:
Just as distorted vision makes one grasp hair,
a second moon, peacock feathers, flies, etc.
Just as those with visual distortions grasp hairs (though none exist) due to distortion.
Further, as stated in the verse:
Likewise, the ignorant, due to ignorance’s flaw,
view conditioned phenomena through various intellects.
As the Buddha stated: “Ignorance conditions volitional formations.” Also: “Sentient beings, led by ignorance, create wholesome, unwholesome, and immovable formations.” Also: “With ignorance’s cessation, volitional formations cease.”
Thus, as stated in the verse:
Ignorance produces karma; without ignorance, karma ceases—
only the ignorant comprehend this.
The sun of wisdom dispels all darkness;
the wise, realizing emptiness, attain liberation.
The wise, hearing “ignorance conditions volitional formations,” not only realize volitional formations lack intrinsic nature but also use this wisdom to eradicate ignorance—ceasing attachment to volitional formations (the cause of attachment). Thus, they liberate themselves from saṃsāra.
Question: If phenomena like form lack intrinsic nature even ultimately, then—like the daughter of a barren woman—they lack intrinsic nature ultimately; thus, they should also lack intrinsic nature conventionally. Yet form possesses intrinsic nature conventionally—so it should possess intrinsic nature ultimately too. As stated in the verse:
If phenomena are ultimately nonexistent,
they should be like the daughter of a barren woman—
nonexistent even conventionally;
hence, they must possess intrinsic nature.
We now respond: As stated in the verse:
The objects seen by those with distorted vision—
hairs, etc.—do not arise.
Debate this first with those whose eyes are distorted,
then challenge those whose wisdom-eye is clouded by ignorance.
First debate with those whose eyes are distorted by cataracts: “Why do you see nonexistent hairs but not the daughter of a barren woman?” Then challenge those whose wisdom-eye is clouded by ignorance: “Why do you see form—which lacks intrinsic nature—yet not the daughter of a barren woman?” This poses no difficulty for us. As the sūtra states: “Yogis perceive phenomena thus; others seeking yogic wisdom should similarly believe and understand the Dharma’s nature.” We rely on the Buddha’s word—not personal insight—to state yogis’ wisdom perceives all phenomena as lacking intrinsic nature. We too suffer ignorance’s distortion—clouding our wisdom-eye. As the sūtra states: “Knowing aggregates’ nature is empty and quiescent; buddhahood’s nature is empty and distant; the practice being cultivated is empty and without nature; the wise understand this—not ordinary beings. Wisdom’s nature is empty; the known’s nature is empty and distant; the knower’s nature is likewise empty—such a person cultivates the path to buddhahood.” Thus, even yogis face no such criticism—they perceive no phenomena possessing intrinsic nature conventionally or ultimately.
First, do not criticize those with distorted vision—criticize yourself. As stated in the verse:
If you see dreams, gandharva-cities, mirages, illusions, reflections, etc.,
all sharing the daughter-of-a-barren-woman’s nonexistence—
your seeing some but not others is illogical.
Dreams and the daughter of a barren woman are equally nonexistent. Yet you see dreams but not the daughter of a barren woman. Gandharva-cities are likewise. A mirage appears as water. Illusions are likewise. “Reflections” include echoes and magical transformations—all equally empty of intrinsic nature. Yet you see these but not the daughter of a barren woman. Thus, first criticize yourself—then criticize ordinary beings.
Further, as stated in the verse:
Though ultimately non-arisen,
these differ from the daughter of a barren woman—
not being objects of worldly perception—
thus your claim is indeterminate.
As the Bhagavān stated: “Saying realms resemble dreams is not speaking of ultimate reality; dreams contain no objects—deluded minds mistakenly grasp them. Though gandharva-cities are visible, they exist nowhere in the ten directions; they are merely nominally established. The Buddha views realms similarly. Those imagining water see water in mirages—but no water exists there. Likewise, those disturbed by discrimination see purity in impurity. Like images appearing in a clean mirror—devoid of intrinsic nature—know, O great tree, that all phenomena are likewise.” This teaching states phenomena like form—though intrinsically non-arisen—are commonly perceived; the daughter of a barren woman is not. This creates an indeterminate fault in your system—not ours—since we do not assert form possesses intrinsic nature conventionally, then negate it ultimately.
Why? As stated in the verse:
Like the daughter of a barren woman’s intrinsic arising—
nonexistent both ultimately and conventionally—
so too phenomena’s intrinsic arising
is nonexistent both ultimately and conventionally.
Thus, as stated in the verse:
Hence the Buddha declares all phenomena
originally quiescent, free from intrinsic arising—
and intrinsically nirvāṇic;
thus, arising is eternally nonexistent.
Due to such authoritative teachings, arising is eternally nonexistent. As stated: “The Buddha turns the sublime Dharma-wheel, proclaiming all phenomena are originally quiescent, non-arisen, and intrinsically nirvāṇic.” This declares phenomena quiescent because they are the object of quiescent wisdom. Why are they its object? Because they are non-arisen. Being non-arisen makes them the object of quiescent wisdom. Why non-arisen? Because they are intrinsically nirvāṇic. If phenomena possessed intrinsic nature, arising would be possible. Since intrinsic nature is absent, how can arising occur? This clarifies arising is eternally nonexistent—not that non-arisen things later arise, nor that arisen things arise again. Rather, they are intrinsically nirvāṇic. “Originally” indicates phenomena are non-arisen not only upon attaining yogic wisdom—but even during ordinary worldly convention. “Originally” is a synonym for “primordially”—referring to worldly conventional time. This is the Bodhisattva Sarvanīvaraṇaviṣkambhin praising the Buddha’s superior qualities—stating the Buddha, turning the Dharma-wheel, teaches thus.
Proponents of our own school should not raise such objections—they accept this too. As stated in the verse:
Though jars, etc., are ultimately nonexistent,
they are conventionally accepted by the world—
thus all phenomena are likewise,
differing from the daughter of a barren woman.
Suppose one argues: “Jars, etc., are nominally established only upon bases like earth, water, fire, wind, color, smell, taste, and touch. If—as you claim—all such bases are merely nominal, with no underlying substance—your position inevitably suffers the same flaw as the daughter of a barren woman.”
Answer: This is illogical—since no substantial basis can be established. As stated: “Without form, etc., jars certainly cannot exist; likewise, without wind, etc., form cannot exist.” Also: “Earth, water, fire, and wind all lack intrinsic nature; without the three, no single one remains; without the one, no three remain. If without the three, no one remains; without the one, no three remain—since individually nonexistent, how can they collectively arise?” Just as permanent phenomena cannot produce impermanent ones, asserting truly existent phenomena produce falsely existent ones is also illogical. As stated: “How can the permanent produce the impermanent? Cause and effect differ in nature—this is never observed.” Just as illusory forms combine to produce an illusory image in a mirror, and illusory pillars produce an illusory house, and trees collectively produce a forest, and dream-seeds (intrinsically non-arisen) produce dream-sprouts (intrinsically non-arisen)—so too all illusory phenomena arise only from illusory phenomena, conforming to valid reasoning. As the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “Like the Buddha’s supernatural powers…” up to “…all like gandharva-cities, mirages, and dreams.” Thus, your objection fails.
Question: If you refute self-, other-, joint-, and causeless production in both truths, how is conventional production—e.g., ignorance and formations producing consciousness, or seeds producing sprouts—established?
Answer:
Phenomena do not arise causelessly,
nor from Īśvara, time, atoms, svabhāva, puruṣa, Nārāyaṇa, etc.,
nor from self, other, or both—
thus, know they arise solely dependently.
By prior reasoning, phenomena’s arising is neither spontaneous nor from Īśvara, time, atoms, svabhāva, puruṣa, Nārāyaṇa, etc., nor from self, other, or both—hence, they arise dependently. Only this mode of arising preserves worldly convention. As the Bhagavān stated: “Worldly conventions state: ‘Because this exists, that exists; because this arises, that arises’—namely, ignorance conditions formations.” The Ratnāvalī states: “Because this exists, that exists—e.g., long implies short; because this arises, that arises—e.g., a lamp’s lighting produces light.” The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “Formations produce agents; agents produce formations. Beyond this dependent origination, no other cause produces formations. Just as we refute formations and agents, so too recipients and what is received—and all other phenomena—must likewise be refuted.”
Thus, declaring dependent origination’s nature avoids falling into causeless production and other extremes—including permanence/impermanence, existence/non-existence, etc. To clarify: As stated in the verse:
By stating phenomena arise dependently,
they escape scrutiny by conceptual proliferations.
Thus, this dependent origination reasoning
destroys the entire net of evil views.
Only through this dependent origination reasoning are conventional phenomena established—not through other reasonings. Thus, this reasoning destroys the aforementioned net of evil views. Only dependent origination’s nature is accepted as dependent origination—no phenomenon possesses intrinsic nature. As stated: “If arising depends on this or that, intrinsic nature does not arise; if intrinsic nature does not arise, how can it be called ‘arising’?” The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “Phenomena arising from causes and conditions—I declare them empty; they are also mere designations; they are the Middle Way.” The sūtra also states: “If arising depends on conditions, it does not arise; here, no intrinsic arising exists. If phenomena depend on conditions, they are declared empty; knowing emptiness is non-negligence.”
Without intrinsic nature, the prior modes of arising cannot occur. Intrinsic nature is required for spontaneous, self-, other-, joint-, or Īśvara-production. Likewise, arising followed by abiding (permanence) or destruction followed by annihilation (nihilism) require intrinsic nature—other extremes do not. To clarify: As stated in the verse:
Intrinsic nature enables all proliferations;
having examined intrinsic nature as nonexistent,
without intrinsic nature, those proliferations cease—
like fire without fuel.
By prior reasoning, all phenomena lack intrinsic nature. Thus, when yogis realize the noble path, they see ultimate reality through non-perception—perceiving not even a speck of intrinsic nature in phenomena. Thus, beginningless habitual proliferations—regarding form, feeling, virtue, non-virtue, existence, non-existence, etc.—all subside. Like applying collyrium to cure visual distortion—eliminating hair-proliferations—the result is not transforming hairs into other objects.
Thus, as stated in the verse:
Ordinary beings are bound by proliferations;
extinguishing proliferations is liberation.
Wise ones say extinguishing proliferations
is the fruit of investigation.
Since ordinary beings fail to know reality thus, they remain bound by proliferations. Noble ones, realizing reality thus, attain liberation. Thus, destroying all proliferative views is the fruit of investigation in Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, etc. As stated: “If phenomena possessed intrinsic nature, what virtue lies in seeing emptiness? Deluded proliferations bind—these are what we refute.”
Thus, as stated in the verse:
Investigation in treatises is not for debate—
to reveal truth for liberation.
Nāgārjuna extensively investigates in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā—not to win debates or defeat others. His investigation reveals truth: “How can sentient beings correctly realize reality and attain liberation?” Thus, he teaches accordingly.
Question: Do you not extensively list and refute opponents’ positions in your treatise—thus composing it for debate? How can you claim extinguishing proliferations is the sole fruit?
Answer: Though this investigation is not undertaken for debate, revealing truth naturally undermines fragile opposing systems—like darkness vanishing near light—thus we incur no fault. As stated in the verse:
If explaining true meaning causes opposing systems to collapse,
this incurs no fault.
As stated: “Buddhas, though without intention, speak Dharma to crush others’ views—yet others’ views self-destruct, like wildfire consuming fuel.”
If one speaks Dharma for debate, one certainly harbors hatred for opponents’ faults and attachment to one’s own reasonable position—thus cannot extinguish craving/aversion proliferations. Why? As stated in the verse:
Attachment to one’s own view and hatred for others’ views
are proliferations—
proliferations unextinguished mean bondage—
liberation is impossible.
But if one teaches Dharma without debate, as stated in the verse:
Thus, eliminating craving and aversion
leads swiftly to liberation through investigation.
As stated: “The wise engage in no debate; they hold no position—
even their own position does not exist; how could others’ exist?” Also: “If you love your own position, you dislike others’—
you cannot realize nirvāṇa; dual conduct brings no peace.” The sūtra states: “Hearing this Dharma, one develops craving; hearing non-Dharma, one develops aversion; pride overwhelms one into distortion; by pride’s power, one suffers greatly.” Thus, using both scriptural authority and valid reasoning, we have clarified phenomena’s lack of self.
Now we clarify persons’ lack of self. As stated in the verse:
Wisdom sees afflictions’ faults—
all arise from the view of personality (satkāyadṛṣṭi).
Knowing “I” is its object,
yogis first refute “I.”
The view of personality is a defiled wisdom taking “I” and “mine” as its object. Since afflictions arise from it, they are “born from the view of personality.” What arises from it? Afflictions (e.g., craving) and faults (e.g., birth, aging, sickness, death, sorrow). All arise from the view of personality. As the sūtra states: “The view of personality is fundamental, the cause, the accumulation.” This states all afflictions arise from the view of personality—since uneliminated, it generates volitional formations, leading to suffering like birth—hence all afflictions arise from it. Its object is “I,” since self-grasping takes only “I” as object. To eliminate all afflictions and faults, one must eliminate the view of personality. Since realizing no-self eliminates it, yogis first realize no-self. Once no-self is realized, the view of personality ceases immediately—afflictions and faults vanish. Since investigating “I” is the skillful means for liberation, yogis first investigate: What is the “I” that the view of personality takes as object?
What is the “I” taken as object by the view of personality? First, describe non-Buddhist positions. As stated in the verse:
Non-Buddhists posit “I” as the permanent experiencer,
attributeless, unproduced, and non-agent.
Based on partial distinctions among these meanings,
non-Buddhist schools multiply into many factions.The Sāṃkhya school states: “The fundamental nature (prakṛti) is unchanging in its intrinsic essence; the seven entities—mahat (cosmic intellect), ahaṃkāra (ego), and the five subtle elements (tanmātras)—are subject to change; the remaining sixteen entities are exclusively mutable; the puruṣa (spiritual self) is neither nature nor mutable.”
That which gives rise to effects is termed “nature” (prakṛti).
At what time does it arise?
It arises when the puruṣa perceives itself and develops desire. Specifically, when the puruṣa desires to experience objects such as sound, prakṛti—having cognized this desire—immediately unites with the puruṣa and thereby produces sound and other objects.
The sequence of emergence is as follows: prakṛti gives rise to mahat; mahat gives rise to ahaṃkāra; and ahaṃkāra gives rise to the sixteen entities. From among these sixteen, the five subtle elements—sound, touch, form, taste, and smell—give rise to the five gross elements—earth, water, fire, wind, and space.
“Unchanging” means solely capable of producing effects, unlike mahat and the other six entities, which are both productive and themselves mutable. These seven entities—mahat, ahaṃkāra, and the five tanmātras—are simultaneously both prakṛti (in relation to their own effects) and mutable (in relation to prakṛti itself). The sixteen entities—including the five sense faculties—exclusively undergo mutation; hence it is stated: “The sixteen are exclusively mutable.” The puruṣa neither produces nor mutates; thus it is said: “The puruṣa is neither nature nor mutable.” All mutation arises precisely through this sequential process.
How then does the puruṣa experience objects?
Answer: Through the empowerment of manas (mind), the five sense faculties—ear, skin, eye, tongue, and nose—appropriately apprehend the five sense objects—sound, touch, form, taste, and smell. Consciousness then generates attachment toward those objects; the puruṣa reflects upon the meaning apprehended by consciousness. Since the puruṣa’s intrinsic nature includes the capacity for reflection, it is said that the puruṣa experiences objects.
When the puruṣa, having cultivated few desires through habitual practice, becomes dispassionate toward objects and progressively cultivates meditative absorption (dhyāna), it attains the divine eye (divyacakṣus). Thereupon, using the divine eye, it observes prakṛti—and prakṛti, ashamed like another’s wife, immediately withdraws from the puruṣa. All mutations reverse and dissolve back into prakṛti, disappearing entirely from manifestation. At that point, only the puruṣa remains independently—this state is called liberation (mokṣa). Though mutations cease, the puruṣa remains unceasing, ever independent—hence it is called eternal (nitya).
Prakṛti is the agent (kartṛ); among all mutations, some portion also belongs to the agent. Yet the puruṣa, being minimally engaged, is not an agent. Rather, it is the experiencer (bhoktṛ), as previously explained. Because it lacks the three guṇas—sattva (purity), rajas (activity), and tamas (inertia)—it is devoid of qualities (guṇa); because it pervades everything, it has no function (kriyā). These constitute the distinctive characteristics of the puruṣa.
Earlier we stated that prakṛti is the agent, and that some portion of the mutations also belongs to the agent—but which among the mutations belong to the agent, and which do not?
We shall now briefly explain: The three guṇas—sattva, rajas, and tamas—are so named. Rajas is characterized by agitation and motion; tamas by heaviness and obscuration; sattva by lightness and clarity. The three afflictions—duḥkha (suffering), sukha (pleasure), and moha (delusion)—are alternate names for these three guṇas. When the three guṇas are in perfect equilibrium, this state is called pradhāna (the primordial state), wherein the qualities are predominant and the state is supremely tranquil. Before any transformation occurs, this unmanifest state is called sat (existence). From prakṛti arises mahat; mahat is synonymous with buddhi (intellect). From mahat arises ahaṃkāra; ahaṃkāra manifests in three forms: sāttvika ahaṃkāra (sattvic ego), rājasa ahaṃkāra (rajasic ego), and tāmasika ahaṃkāra (tamasic ego). From sāttvika ahaṃkāra arise the five subtle elements—form, sound, smell, taste, and touch. From these five subtle elements arise the five gross elements—earth, water, fire, wind, and space. From rājasa ahaṃkāra arise the eleven faculties: the five action faculties—mouth, hands, feet, anus, and genitals; the five sense faculties—eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin; and the mind (manas), which functions in both capacities. Tāmasika ahaṃkāra activates the other two types of ahaṃkāra. Among these, mahat, ahaṃkāra, and the five subtle elements partake of both prakṛti and mutation; whereas the ten faculties (including manas) and the five gross elements are exclusively mutable; prakṛti itself does not participate in mutation.
Based on partial distinctions within the Sāṃkhya system, numerous non-Buddhist schools emerged. For instance, the Vaiśeṣika school posits that the self (ātman) possesses nine attributes: cognition (buddhi), pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha), desire (icchā), aversion (dveṣa), effort (prayatna), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), and volition (saṃskāra). Cognition refers to the capacity to apprehend objects; pleasure, to experiencing desired objects; pain, the opposite of pleasure; desire, the aspiration for desired things; aversion, the repulsion from unwanted objects; effort, the skillful deliberation applied to accomplish tasks; merit, that which leads to higher rebirth and ultimate liberation; demerit, its opposite; and volition, that which arises from cognition and further serves as a cause for cognition. When these nine attributes unite with the ātman, the ātman performs wholesome or unwholesome actions and thus transmigrates through saṃsāra. Conversely, when the ātman employs genuine wisdom to eradicate the root of these attributes—including cognition—it abides alone and attains liberation. This ātman is described as eternal, agent, experiencer, endowed with qualities, and all-pervasive—yet therefore devoid of functional activity. Another school asserts that the ātman possesses extension and contraction.
The Vedānta school holds that, just as space appears divided due to differences in containers (e.g., pots), the one ātman appears manifold due to bodily differences. Thus, merely on account of minor distinctions attributed to the ātman, various non-Buddhist schools proliferate.
Different non-Buddhist schools posit different conceptions of the self. A verse states:
Like the daughter of a barren woman, who cannot be born,
The self postulated by them is utterly nonexistent.
Nor is this self the basis for the innate clinging to “I”;
We do not even accept its conventional existence.
Your postulated self is certainly nonexistent, since you yourself admit it is unproduced—just like the daughter of a barren woman. Nor is this self the object of the innate “I-clinging,” since you likewise admit it is unproduced. Moreover, it is not merely nonexistent ultimately, nor merely outside the scope of “I-clinging”—even conventionally, it lacks both of these properties.
This reason does not merely refute the notions of inherent existence and of being the object of “I-clinging” as unreasonable. Another verse states:
In each of their respective treatises,
Non-Buddhists posit various distinctions of the self.
But since they themselves admit it is unproduced,
All such distinctions are utterly invalid.
In Sāṃkhya, the self is distinguished as eternal, non-agent, experiencer, devoid of qualities, and inactive. Refutation proceeds: That self is not eternal, nor non-agent, nor inactive—since it is admitted to be unproduced, like the daughter of a barren woman. Likewise, the Vaiśeṣika conception is refuted similarly: The self is not eternal, nor agent, etc., since it is admitted to be unproduced—like the daughter of a barren woman. Know that this tradition broadly refutes every non-Buddhist assertion about the self’s intrinsic nature and distinctions, employing the reasoning of “unproducedness” and the analogy of the daughter of a barren woman.
Hence, a verse states:
Therefore, apart from the aggregates, there is no distinct self;
For no self can be found outside the aggregates.
Therefore, there is no self distinct from the aggregates, since no self whatsoever can be found external to the aggregates. As stated: “If a self existed apart from appropriation, that would be impossible; for if separated from appropriation, it should be observable—but in fact it is not observable.” Again: “If the self were distinct from the five aggregates, it would lack the characteristics of the five aggregates.”
Not only is there no self apart from the aggregates, but further logical defects arise. A verse states:
It is not accepted as the basis for worldly “I-clinging,”
Since ignorance of such a self still gives rise to “I-view.”
Those who do not cling to a self possessing such characteristics nevertheless, due to clinging to other distinguishing features, still generate “I-view” and conceive of “I” and “mine.” Hence, a self existing apart from the aggregates cannot reasonably serve as the basis for “I-clinging.”
Suppose someone objects: “Though ordinary people do not understand the self’s distinctions—such as eternality and unproducedness—they nonetheless possess ‘I-view’ due to habitual tendencies accumulated over past lives.”
Refutation: This is incorrect. Not only followers of such philosophical systems hold “I-view”; even those completely untrained in philosophy are observed to cling to “I.” A verse states:
Beings reborn as animals for many eons,
Who have never seen an eternal, unproduced self—
Yet still exhibit “I-clinging.”
Therefore, there is absolutely no self apart from the five aggregates.
Some sentient beings are reborn in the animal realm for many eons and remain trapped there indefinitely; they have never perceived a self possessing such characteristics. The word “also” includes those fallen into hell and other realms. Even those who have never seen such a self still display “I-clinging.” Then who, possessing wisdom, would regard such a self as the basis for “I-clinging”? Thus, there is absolutely no self apart from the aggregates.
Within Buddhist teachings, certain schools hold views. A verse states:
Since no self exists apart from the aggregates,
The object of “person-view” (satkāyadṛṣṭi) is solely the aggregates.
From the foregoing reasoning, since a self apart from the aggregates is untenable, the object of satkāyadṛṣṭi is solely the aggregates; therefore, what is called “I” is merely one’s own aggregates. This is the position of the Sautrāntika school—the “School of Valid Cognition.”
Other views differ. A verse states:
Some posit that “I-view” depends on the five aggregates;
Others assert it depends solely on the mind.
Some posit that the five aggregates—form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness—are all objects of satkāyadṛṣṭi, asserting that this “I-clinging” arises from the five aggregates. As the Buddha stated: “Monks, know that all the I-clinging of śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas arises solely from seeing these five appropriated aggregates.” To clarify that this view arises from impermanent, composite phenomena—not from “I” or “mine”—the Buddha designated such a view, which takes the appearance of “I” and “mine,” as satkāyadṛṣṭi.
Others posit that only the mind is the self. Scriptural passages state: “I am my own refuge; who else could be my refuge? By well-taming the self, the wise attain heaven.” Here, “self” refers to the inner mind. How do we know this? Because no self apart from the aggregates exists. Other sūtras likewise speak of taming the mind: “One should well tame the mind; a tamed mind leads to happiness.” Thus, the mind—the basis of “I-clinging”—is termed “self.”
This view must be refuted:
If the five aggregates themselves are the self,
Then since aggregates are multiple, the self should be multiple.
Further, the self would become a substantial entity,
And “I-view” would not be erroneous, since it would apprehend a real object.
Those who posit the five aggregates as the self must accept that, since the aggregates are multiple, the self too must be multiple. Those who posit only the mind as the self must likewise accept multiplicity—either due to the distinction among visual consciousness, auditory consciousness, etc., or due to momentary arising and ceasing generating many consciousnesses. Or other inconsistencies may arise accordingly. Such flaws apply equally to both positions—that the aggregates are the self and that only the mind is the self. Subsequent flaws also apply to both. The sūtra states: “When a being is born into the world, only one sentient being is born.” Thus, other schools also reject multiple selves.
Moreover, if the self were a substantial entity, only physical phenomena—due to distinctions such as past, present, and future—are called “aggregates”; therefore, calling them the self implies the self must be a substantial entity. Yet the sūtra states: “Monks, know that there are five phenomena which are merely names, mere expressions, mere conventions: past time, future time, space, nirvāṇa, and sentient being (pudgala).” Another verse states: “Just as, by gathering together parts, one conventionally designates a chariot, so too, conventionally, sentient beings are designated by gathering the aggregates.” Since the posited self incurs the fault of substantiality, the five aggregates cannot be the self.
Furthermore, satkāyadṛṣṭi, apprehending a substantial entity, would not be erroneous—just as visual cognition apprehending blue or yellow is not erroneous. Thus, eliminating satkāyadṛṣṭi would not involve uprooting it, but merely severing craving and attachment toward that object—as is the case with visual cognition apprehending blue or yellow.
Further faults arise. A verse states:
At parinirvāṇa, the self would certainly be severed;
Before parinirvāṇa, in each moment,
Arising and ceasing without agency, there would be no result;
Another’s actions would yield results for yet another.
If the self were identical to the five aggregates, then at parinirvāṇa—when the aggregates cease—the self too would cease. Yet it is unacceptable to say the self ceases at parinirvāṇa, since that would entail the extreme view of annihilation. Hence, the self cannot be identical to the five aggregates. Moreover, before parinirvāṇa, in each moment, since the aggregates arise and cease moment by moment, the self too would arise and cease—because it is identical to the aggregates. Thus, one could not think: “My body today existed previously,” nor think: “At that time, I was King Mahāsudarśana,” since that former “I” would have perished along with the body, and one would be reborn elsewhere. As the treatise states: “That which is not the apprehender cannot be the self, since it arises and ceases; how could what is apprehended serve as the apprehender?” Again: “If the five aggregates are the self, the self should arise and cease.”
Even granting arising and ceasing, without an agent, there would be no resultant effect. If an agent existed, it would be impermanent. Without an agent, actions would lack support; thus, actions and their results would bear no relation. If one claims actions performed in a prior moment yield results in a subsequent moment, then others’ actions would produce results for others—since others perform actions while others receive retribution. Thus, one incurs the faults of actions losing efficacy and unperformed actions yielding results. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “If you posit difference, then apart from that, there should exist a present [self]; the self abides in the past, and the present self is born before death. Thus, annihilation occurs, karmic retributions collapse, others’ actions yield results for this person—such faults arise.” Therefore, positing the five aggregates as the self is unreasonable.
An objection: “Although successive moments differ, they constitute a single continuum—thus no fault arises.”
Refutation: A verse states:
If a truly singular continuum were free from fault,
Its defect was already examined earlier.
Earlier it was stated: “As dependent on Maitreya and close proximity to the Dharma…”—its defect was already explained. The treatise states: “If a deva differs from a human, then that is impermanent; if a deva differs from a human, then no continuum exists.” Therefore, claiming mutually distinct phenomena constitute a single continuum is unreasonable—the many faults enumerated earlier remain unavoidable.
To further demonstrate that neither the aggregates nor the mind is the self, a verse states:
Hence, neither aggregates nor mind is the self;
Since the world’s finitude, etc., are indeterminate.
Because the scriptures declare the world’s finitude, infinitude, etc., as indeterminate topics. The fourteen indeterminate questions are recited identically across all Buddhist schools: whether the world is eternal, non-eternal, both, or neither, etc.—the Buddha declared these questions indeterminate. The East Mountain Dweller School’s sūtra states: “If a monk holds the view that the world is eternal, he should be expelled. If he holds the view that the world is non-eternal, he should be expelled. If he holds the view that the world is both eternal and non-eternal, he should be expelled. If he holds the view that the world is neither eternal nor non-eternal, he should be expelled.” Similarly, for all fourteen indeterminate points, cohabitation is prohibited. If “world” here refers to the five aggregates—which are impermanent and subject to arising and ceasing—then the world’s non-eternality could be determinately affirmed. After parinirvāṇa, the aggregates no longer exist, so the world’s finitude could be determinately affirmed. Likewise, the Tathāgata’s post-mortem existence could be determinately denied. Yet the sūtras refute views concerning the world’s finitude, etc.; thus, positing the five aggregates as the self is unreasonable.
Further faults arise. A verse states:
If your yogi directly perceives non-self,
Then certainly he perceives the non-existence of all phenomena.
If either the five aggregates or the mind were the self, then when yogis realize the truth—specifically, perceiving the non-self nature of the suffering truth—they would perceive the non-existence of the five aggregates as perceiving non-self. Yet this is not accepted; therefore, the five aggregates are not the self.
Suppose one objects: “The ‘self’ referred to in discussions of karmic causality has no other referent—hence it merely signifies the five aggregates. When perceiving non-self, one negates the non-Buddhist concept of the eternal spiritual self. Thus, perceiving non-self means rejecting the spiritual self and seeing only conditioned phenomena—thereby avoiding the fault of perceiving the non-existence of all phenomena.”
Refutation:
If you claim that at that time one rejects the eternal self,
Then your mind and aggregates cannot be the self.
If you fear the fault of perceiving the non-existence of all phenomena and thus posit the term “self” as referring to the eternal spiritual self—while refusing to allow the five aggregates or mind to be the self—you abandon your own position.
Suppose one objects: “Since the spiritual self is not admitted in this context, no fault arises.”
This too is incorrect. Here it is asserted to be the spiritual self, yet elsewhere it is asserted to be the aggregates—how can such arbitrary, inconsistent assertions lack fixed principle?
If you claim “non-existent,” then this designation does not apply to the aggregates either—this has already been explained. Therefore, if, when stating “all phenomena are devoid of self,” you refuse to let “self” signify the aggregates, then at other times you should also refuse. Conversely, if at other times you permit “self” to signify the aggregates, then you should permit it here as well.
Further faults arise. A verse states:
In your school, the yogi perceives non-self,
Yet fails to comprehend the true nature of form, etc.
Because cognition arises in dependence on form, attachment, etc., arise—
Since the intrinsic nature of form, etc., remains unapprehended.
Just as one who has never tasted honey in a flower, seeing only a bird resting on the flower, cannot know its sweetness—whereas one who has tasted it knows its sweetness even when no bird is present on the flower, and cannot relinquish attachment to its sweetness—so too, although yogis see phenomena such as form as devoid of an eternal self, since they have not realized their intrinsic nature, how can they know? If they perceive form, etc., as possessing inherent existence, how can they eliminate attachment to form, etc., upon seeing the absence of that self? If merely realizing the absence of that self suffices to eliminate attachment to objects, then no sentient being seeks pleasant objects to gratify the spiritual self, nor avoids unpleasant objects out of fear for it. Since attachment to form, etc., arises without realizing the intrinsic nature of form, etc., it cannot be eliminated—just like non-Buddhists.
Suppose one objects: “We rely on the Buddha’s authoritative teachings as our criterion; rational analysis cannot undermine them. The Buddha taught that only the aggregates constitute the self. As the Buddha stated: ‘Monks, know that all the I-clinging of śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas arises solely from seeing these five appropriated aggregates.’” This is analogous.
A verse states:
If you claim the Buddha said the aggregates are the self,
Therefore you posit the aggregates as the self—
Yet that sūtra merely refutes the self apart from the aggregates;
Other sūtras explicitly state form is not the self.
That sūtra does not establish the aggregates as the self for us to believe and accept. The Buddha’s implicit intent is to assert that no self exists apart from the aggregates—both to refute non-Buddhist theories relative to conventional truth and to correctly reveal conventional truth.
How do we know this sūtra refutes the self apart from the aggregates?
Because other sūtras explicitly refute form, etc., as the self. How is this refutation carried out? A verse states:
Since other sūtras state form is not the self,
Feeling, perception, formations—all are not the self;
Consciousness too is not the self—
Thus, it is briefly indicated that the aggregates are not the self.
Hence, that sūtra’s phrase “solely seeing these five appropriated aggregates” serves only to refute the self apart from the aggregates.
Since other sūtras refute form, etc., as the self, we understand those sūtras also refute the object of satkāyadṛṣṭi—the conventionally imputed self that apprehends the aggregates—because those sūtras speak from the perspective of ultimate reality. If no apprehender exists, then the apprehended must also certainly not exist. Therefore, abandoning attachment to form, etc., is thoroughly reasonable. Since other sūtras state this, the earlier sūtra’s brief indication confirms it does not permit the aggregates as the self.
Moreover, even if that sūtra expresses an explicit meaning, it still does not state the aggregates are the self. Why? A verse states:
When the sūtra says the aggregates are the self,
It refers to the aggregate-collection, not the aggregates’ intrinsic nature.
Just as saying “a forest” when referring to a collection of trees means the collection is called “forest,” not that each individual tree is a forest. So too, only the collection of aggregates is called “self,” yet even that collection is entirely nonexistent. A verse states:
Not a basis, not a tamed object, not an object of realization—
Since that [collection] does not exist, neither does the collection.
As the Buddha stated: “I am my own refuge; I am also my own enemy; whether I act virtuously or non-virtuously, I myself am the witness.” Here, “self” is the basis and the witness. Again: “By well-taming the self, the wise attain heaven.” Here, “self” is tamed. But a collection lacks substantial reality; thus, calling it “refuge,” “witness,” or “tamed object” is unreasonable. Hence, the collection too is not the self.
If you argue that since no separate collection exists apart from its constituent factors, the collection’s result must be the constituent factors’ result—thus making it a basis, tamed object, and witness reasonable—this too is flawed, as previously explained.
Further faults arise. A verse states:
At that time, the collection of parts should be called “chariot,”
Since “chariot” and “self” are analogous.
The sūtra states: “You have fallen into wrong views; in the empty collection of phenomena, you falsely cling to sentient beings—wise ones realize their non-existence. Just as, by gathering together parts, one conventionally designates a chariot, so too, conventionally, sentient beings are designated by gathering the aggregates.”
From the foregoing reasoning, a verse states:
Since the sūtra states the self is established in dependence on the aggregates,
Only the aggregate-collection is not the self.
Whatever is established in dependence on another phenomenon cannot be merely the collection of its supporting parts, since it is established dependently. For example, material phenomena—such as blue color and the eye faculty—are established in dependence on the four great elements (mahābhūtas), with the elements serving as causal conditions. Yet those two phenomena are not merely collections of the great elements. Similarly, establishing “self” in dependence on the aggregates does not mean it is merely the aggregate-collection.
If you argue that jars, etc., are indeterminate—this too is incorrect, since asserting jars are merely collections of color, etc., is equally untenable; the reasoning is identical.
If you argue that merely piling up wheels, etc., does not constitute a chariot; rather, wheels, etc., must possess a specific shape to be called a chariot—then such shape of form, etc., is the self.
This too is incorrect. A verse states:
If you claim shape is the self, then form alone should be the self;
Collections of mind, etc., should not be the self—
Since they lack shape.
They lack shape.
Further faults arise. A verse states:
The apprehender and the single apprehended cannot coherently relate;
Action and agent would also become identical.
Since it apprehends, it is called the apprehender—i.e., the agent. Since it is apprehended, it is called the apprehended—i.e., the action. The apprehender is the self; the apprehended is the five aggregates. If the collection of form, etc., is the self, then agent and action would become identical. You do not accept this, since fire and fuel, potter and pot, would also become identical. The treatise states: “If fuel were identical to fire, agent and action would be one.” Again: “Applying the logic of fuel and fire to self and the apprehended, and to pot and cloth, all cases are similar.” Just as fire and fuel are not identical, neither should self and the apprehended be considered identical.
Suppose one argues: “There is no agent at all who apprehends; only the apprehended collection exists here.”
This is unreasonable. A verse states:
If you claim there is action without an agent,
That is impossible—action cannot exist apart from an agent.
If you deny the agent, you must also deny action without cause. The treatise states: “Just as action and agent are refuted, so too is apprehension refuted; and all other phenomena should likewise be refuted.” Here, regarding phenomena, the verbal suffix “-la” (Sanskrit: -la, indicating action) is applied; since it apprehends, it is called the apprehender. Without function, that phenomenon would not exist. Thus, the function applies to both apprehender and apprehended. The meaning of “apprehension” (grahaṇa) is explained in the Vyākaraṇa Śāstra: “Jita and loṭa denote multiple meanings.” Thus, applying the suffix -la to action also applies to the apprehended action. Just as action is established in dependence on the agent, the agent is established in dependence on action. Similarly, the apprehender is established in dependence on the apprehended, and the apprehended is established in dependence on the apprehender. As the treatise states: “The self is not different from the apprehended, nor is it identical to the apprehended; nor is it without the apprehended, nor is it necessarily without the apprehended.” Therefore, know that action cannot exist apart from the agent. If the sūtras state action and result exist without an agent, understand that this refutes an agent possessing inherent existence—not the conventionally imputed, nominally designated self. As the sūtra states: “Sentient beings, under the influence of ignorance, perform meritorious deeds.”
Further faults arise. A verse states:
The Buddha states the self is conventionally designated
In dependence on the six elements—earth, water, fire, wind, consciousness, and space—
And in dependence on the six sense bases—eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind—
Thus, it is not identical to those elements or bases.
Since it is designated in dependence on mind and mental factors,
It is not identical to them.
Their collection is also not the self;
Therefore, they are not the object of “I-clinging.”
The sūtra states: “Great King, the six elements, the six sense bases, and the eighteen mental proliferations constitute the sentient being (pudgala).” The six elements are earth, water, fire, wind, consciousness, and space; the self is conventionally designated in dependence on these six. The six sense bases are the eye-base, ear-base, nose-base, tongue-base, body-base, and mind-base; the self is conventionally designated in dependence on these six. The eighteen mental proliferations are the six joy-proliferations, six sorrow-proliferations, and six equanimity-proliferations—each arising in dependence on the six objects: form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and mental objects. The self is conventionally designated in dependence on these proliferations and on mind and mental factors. Since the sūtra states the self is designated in dependence on the six elements, etc., it is not identical to them—meaning it is not wholly different. Nor is it merely their collection, since all the aforementioned phenomena are not the self; therefore, none of them is the object of “I-clinging.” If the five aggregates are not the object of “I-clinging,” and no object exists outside the aggregates, then the object of “I-clinging” lacks inherent existence. Yogis, realizing the self is unfindable, also realize “mine” lacks solidity, thereby extinguishing all conditioned phenomena and entering parinirvāṇa without remainder. Hence, this investigation is supremely profound.
End of Chapter Four of the Madhyamakāvatāra
Madhyamakāvatāra Chapter Five
Some posit the object of “I-clinging” is the five aggregates; others posit only the mind. If, according to their view, the aggregates arise, then “I-clinging” should arise simultaneously—since “I-clinging” depends on the aggregates. A verse states:
Upon realizing non-self, the eternal self is severed;
Yet you do not accept this as the basis of “I-clinging.”
Hence, realizing the meaning of non-self
Is most extraordinary in permanently severing “I-clinging.”
If the eternal self were the object of “I-clinging,” its nonexistence would suffice to sever “I-clinging.” Yet you posit other phenomena—the five aggregates—as the object of “I-clinging,” and thus sever “I-clinging” by realizing the nonexistence of that other thing—the eternal self. Alas, this only holds within your own school’s framework; in reality, it bears no relation.
Let us clarify with an analogy. A verse states:
Seeing a snake dwelling on one’s own wall,
One says, “There is no elephant”—and believes fear is dispelled.
If this too dispels fear of the snake,
Indeed, others would laugh.
Suppose a foolish person, unaware of a terrifying venomous snake in his room, lives carelessly without seeking remedy, merely thinking, “There is no elephant”—can this possibly prevent snake-bite? Similarly, those who posit the five aggregates or only the mind as the object of “I-clinging” cannot eliminate “I-clinging” based on the aggregates merely by knowing the nonexistence of the eternal self—and thus certainly cannot achieve liberation from saṃsāra.
Having thus refuted that the self is identical to the aggregates, we now refute the relationship of dependence between “that which depends” and “that upon which it depends”—showing the self lacks intrinsic nature. A verse states:
Within the aggregates, there is no self;
Nor is there any aggregate within the self.
Only if they were distinct could such dependence exist;
Since they are not distinct, this is merely conceptual distinction.
Dependence between “that which depends” and “that upon which it depends” is reasonable only if they are distinct—like yogurt in a dish, where the world accepts the dish and yogurt as distinct, thus constituting dependence. Yet the aggregates are not distinct from the self, nor is the self distinct from the aggregates; hence, no dependence exists between aggregates and self.
Nor does the self “possess” the aggregates. A verse states:
The self is not colored, since the self does not exist;
Therefore, the notion of “possession” is entirely meaningless.
Unlike “a cow is colored,” where “cow” and “colored” are distinct,
Neither “self” nor “color” exists, nor are they one or distinct.
The oneness or distinctness of self and aggregates has already been refuted. If one posits the self “possesses” the aggregates, then either: (1) they are non-distinct yet possessed—like “Devadatta is colored”; or (2) they are distinct and possessed—like “Devadatta has a cow.” Yet self and color are neither non-distinct nor distinct; therefore, positing “self is colored” is unreasonable.
We now summarize the preceding refutations, clarifying satkāyadṛṣṭi through the lens of distorted cognitive appearances. A verse states:
The self is not colored; color is not the self;
Color does not contain the self; the self does not contain color.
Know that these four modes apply to all five aggregates,
Constituting twenty types of “I-view.”
The five aggregates are devoid of self; yet satkāyadṛṣṭi clings to the aggregates as self through four modes—thus generating twenty types of satkāyadṛṣṭi.
If you ask why only five modes of analysis are not employed: The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “Not the aggregates, not apart from the aggregates, neither mutually contained, nor is the Tathāgata possessed of aggregates—where then is the Tathāgata?” This yields five modes. Why then only twenty views?
Answer: The twenty types of satkāyadṛṣṭi are established in the sūtras. If this view did not take the aggregates as its object, it would not cling to “I.” It operates solely through these four modes upon the aggregates—no fifth mode exists. Since nothing apart from the five aggregates can be grasped as “self,” satkāyadṛṣṭi comprises exactly twenty types. The fifth mode mentioned in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā serves to refute non-Buddhist schools.
The sūtra states: “One who, wielding the adamantine wisdom-staff, shatters the mountain of twenty types of satkāyadṛṣṭi, attains the fruit of stream-entry.” A verse states:
By wielding the adamantine wisdom-staff of non-self realization,
One shatters the mountain of “I-view” in the same manner.
That is, all such towering peaks belonging to the mountain of satkāyadṛṣṭi.
Before the mountain of satkāyadṛṣṭi is shattered by the noble adamantine wisdom-staff, it rises from the foundation of beginningless ignorance, extending vertically through the three realms and horizontally throughout the ten directions, daily increasing the precipitous crags of afflictions. Once shattered by the direct realization of non-self—the adamantine wisdom-staff—all its highest peaks collapse simultaneously; know that this peak is precisely the one being discussed.
We now refute the Sautrāntika school’s assertion of a substantially existent sentient being (pudgala). A verse states:
Some posit an existent sentient being,
Indescribable as one or many, eternal or non-eternal, etc.,
Known by the six consciousnesses,
And the object of “I-clinging.”
Since no self can be found apart from the aggregates, there is no pudgala distinct from the aggregates. Nor is it identical to the aggregates’ intrinsic nature—since that incurs the fault of arising and ceasing. Therefore, the self and aggregates cannot be described as one or distinct; similarly, it cannot be described as eternal or non-eternal. Yet it is known by the six consciousnesses. Furthermore, this pudgala may be described as substantially existent, since it is said to be agent and experiencer—bound and liberated, tied to saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. It is also accepted as the object of “I-clinging.”
This view is unreasonable. A verse states:
You do not accept mind or form as indescribable;
All substantial entities are describable—none are indescribable.
If you claim the self is a substantial entity,
Like mind, it should not be indescribable.
This verse shows that what is indescribable cannot be a substantial entity.
Next, we clarify conventional existence. A verse states:
As you assert the jar is not a substantial entity,
So too, it is indescribable as identical to or distinct from form, etc.
Since self and aggregates are likewise indescribable,
One should not posit intrinsic existence.
Just as you accept the jar and form, etc., are indescribable as identical or distinct—yet conventionally existent—so too, the self should be conventionally existent, like the jar. These two verses have clarified refutation and establishment.
Now we further clarify that oneness and distinctness are attributes of substantial entities—and refute the substantially existent self by showing the self is not the basis for such attributes. A verse states:
You do not accept consciousness as distinct from itself,
Yet you accept it as distinct from form, etc.
Substantial entities are observed only in these two modes;
Since the self is not a substantial entity, it does not exist.
If, as you claim, the self were substantially existent, it would necessarily be non-distinct from itself (like consciousness) yet distinct from form, etc. Yet this is not the case. Know that since it is not the basis of substantial entities, the self is not substantially existent—like the jar.
Through this analysis, positing the self as substantially existent is unreasonable. A verse states:
Hence, the basis of “I-clinging” is not a substantial entity;
It is neither apart from the five aggregates nor identical to them;
It is neither the basis of the aggregates nor possesses the aggregates.
If one analyzes the object of “I-clinging,” positing it as substantially existent is unreasonable—since it is neither distinct from the aggregates, nor identical to their intrinsic nature, nor the basis of the aggregates, nor depends on the aggregates as its basis. To clarify dependence relationships, the concise phrasing encompasses mutual dependence. Positing the self as “possessing” the aggregates is also unreasonable.
Therefore, whether one posits a conventionally existent self or asserts the self is unfindable, one should not accept the self described earlier. A verse states:
This self is established in dependence on the aggregates.
Just as, to preserve conventional truth, we merely accept that phenomena arise in dependence on causes and conditions, so too, accepting a conventionally existent self—while refuting the flawed modes previously discussed—is necessary to establish worldly conventional language. We observe the conventional usage of “I” in everyday speech.
To establish the meaning of the conventionally existent self, we now clarify it through external analogies. A verse states:
Just as one does not accept the chariot as distinct from its parts,
Nor as non-distinct, nor as possessing parts,
Nor as depending on parts, nor as that upon which parts depend,
Nor as merely a collection, nor as shape.
Here, the five categories—distinctness, non-distinctness, dependence, being depended upon, and possession—have already been explained.
The categories of collection and shape require further clarification. To elucidate this, a verse states:
If you claim the collection is the chariot,
Then scattering the parts and piling them up should yield a chariot.
Although this was previously addressed, we restate it to reveal further faults. Hence, a verse states:
Since parts cannot exist apart from the chariot,
Taking shape alone as the chariot is also unreasonable.
If parts cannot exist apart from the chariot, then parts themselves do not exist. Then, what collection constitutes the chariot? The word “also” includes the claim that shape alone is the chariot—which is unreasonable, as is claiming collection alone is the chariot. Why? Because parts cannot exist apart from the chariot. Hence, taking shape alone as the chariot is unreasonable. The nonexistence of parts is accepted in your own school.
Furthermore, if you posit shape alone as the chariot: Is that shape the shape of the parts, or the shape of the collection? If you posit it as the shape-difference of the parts, is that shape-difference retained without abandoning the original part-shape—or is the original shape abandoned, replaced by a new shape-difference?
If you claim the original shape is retained, this is unreasonable. Why? A verse states:
Your shape-difference already existed in each part before assembly;
When the chariot is assembled, it remains unchanged.
As scattered parts contain no chariot,
So too, the chariot does not exist even now.
If, before assembly, the shape-differences of wheels, etc., remain unchanged during assembly, then just as scattered parts contain no chariot, the assembled chariot also contains no chariot—since the parts’ shapes undergo no change.
If you adopt the second interpretation—that a new shape-difference of wheels, etc., arises upon assembly—this too is unreasonable. A verse states:
If you claim that, when the chariot is assembled,
Wheels, etc., acquire a new shape-difference,
This should be observable—but it is not.
Therefore, shape alone is not the chariot.
The shape-differences of the chariot’s parts—wheels, axle, yoke, etc.—include square, long, round, etc. If you claim that, upon assembly, wheel-shape-differences newly arise apart from their original shapes, then these should be observable—but they are not. For instance, a wheel with rim, spokes, and hub—whose shape-differences include roundness—shows no variation in shape upon assembly; similarly, the axle’s shape shows no variation. Hence, positing the parts’ shapes as the chariot is unreasonable.
If you posit the shape-difference of the collection of parts as the chariot—this too is unreasonable. A verse states:
Since your collection is entirely nonexistent,
That shape cannot depend on the collection of parts.
Therefore, depending on what is nonexistent,
How can shape arise here?
If the claimed collection possessed even minimal substantial reality, one could conventionally posit shape depending on it. Yet the claimed collection of parts is entirely nonexistent—how then can shape be conventionally posited depending on what is nonexistent? You accept that conventional positing requires a substantial basis.
If you argue that although the collection is not substantially existent, one can still conventionally posit an insubstantial shape depending on it—a verse states:
As you accept this conventional positing,
So too, depending on an insubstantial cause,
One can produce an insubstantially existent effect—
Know that all causation is thus.
Depending on inherently insubstantial ignorance, inherently insubstantial formations arise. Depending on inherently insubstantial seeds, inherently insubstantial sprouts arise. Thus, know that all causes and effects are inherently insubstantial. What purpose is served by exhausting oneself in futile labor, clinging to the illusory shadow of a deer—a mirage offering no meat?
A verse states:
Some claim that when form, etc., abide thus,
The perception of a jar arises—yet this too is unreasonable.
Here it is stated: When form, etc., abide thus, the perception of a jar arises. This is likewise refuted using the chariot analogy.
Another verse states:
Since form, etc., do not arise,
They cannot be that shape.
Form, etc., do not arise—as previously explained. Since they do not arise, form, etc., do not exist. Positing their nonexistence as the cause for conventionally positing jars, etc., or positing jars, etc., as caused by substantially existent phenomena—both are unreasonable. Hence, jars, etc., are not the shape-differences of form, etc.Question: If, through the analysis of the seven modes of reasoning presented above, we find that the chariot is ultimately non-existent, then the chariot must be utterly nonexistent. Consequently, all worldly conventional designations dependent upon the chariot—such as “taking a chariot,” “buying a chariot,” or “building a chariot”—should be completely severed. Yet, in everyday experience, people clearly say, “Take a chariot,” “Buy a chariot,” “Build a chariot,” etc. Since these expressions are universally accepted by the world, it follows that the chariot truly exists.
Answer: This fault applies solely to you—not to us. According to our earlier analysis via the seven modes of reasoning, the chariot cannot be established as valid. However, you hold that only what is found through reasoned analysis can be legitimately posited; you do not accept any other method of establishment. Therefore, how, within your own system, can such worldly expressions as “taking a chariot” even arise? In contrast, we have no such fault whatsoever.
Why is this so? As stated in the verse:
Although examined through the seven modes,
The chariot is ultimately unreal, even conventionally.
Yet without scrutiny, purely on the conventional level,
It may be nominally established in dependence upon its parts.
As previously explained—“The chariot is not distinct from its parts,” etc.—the chariot is analyzed through the seven modes. Whether examined from the perspective of ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya) or conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), the chariot cannot be established as intrinsically existent. However, when left unexamined and viewed merely conventionally—as with the designation of “blue” or “feeling”—it arises dependently. Likewise, the term “chariot” may be conventionally imputed in dependence upon its parts—wheels, axle, frame, etc. Since we accept that such imputation is purely dependent and nominal, our system incurs no fault of undermining worldly conventions. Even your own opponents should concede this point.
Moreover, within our system, not only can worldly expressions dependent upon the chariot be established via the criterion of universal worldly consensus, but also all the various specific designations related to it—such as “possessor of parts,” “possessed of parts,” “agent,” and “experiencer”—can likewise be accepted without scrutiny, solely on the basis of universal worldly consensus. As stated in the verse:
One may tell sentient beings of that chariot,
Calling it “possessor of parts” and “possessed of parts,”
Also “agent” and “experiencer.”
Here, “possessor of parts” refers to the chariot’s dependence upon its parts—e.g., wheels; “possessed of parts” refers to the dependence of each part—e.g., wheel—upon its own subcomponents; “agent” denotes dependence upon functional capacity—e.g., the wheel’s ability to roll; and “experiencer” indicates dependence upon what is experienced—e.g., the chariot being ridden.
Some misinterpret the Buddha’s teachings, claiming that only the collection of parts exists, while there is no possessor-of-parts at all—since the possessor-of-parts cannot be found apart from the collection. Similarly, they claim that only the parts exist, but no possessed-of-parts; only actions exist, but no agent; only experiences exist, but no experiencer—since the experiencer cannot be found apart from the experience. Holding such a view renders all worldly conventional speech utterly inverted. Yet if one accepts this position, then, by the very same reasoning used earlier, even the parts themselves would be undermined. Hence, this view is rejected.
As stated in the verse:
Do not undermine worldly conventional reality.
From the standpoint of worldly convention, although the chariot is found to be ultimately unfindable when subjected to rigorous analysis, it remains fully valid when left unexamined and accepted merely on the basis of worldly consensus. Thus, a yogi, proceeding step-by-step as outlined earlier, swiftly attains direct insight into the ultimate nature. As stated in the verse:
When the seven modes yield nothing, what else could there be?
The practitioner finds nothing real—and yet,
That very realization swiftly enters the ultimate meaning.
Therefore, such a nominal establishment is rightly accepted.
If the chariot possessed even the slightest intrinsic nature (svabhāva), then during careful yogic analysis, at least one of the seven modes would reveal that intrinsic nature. Yet no such nature is ever found. Therefore, the notion of “chariot” is merely a mistaken fabrication arising from ignorance obscuring the eye of wisdom; it possesses no intrinsic nature whatsoever. Yogis who gain this definitive understanding thereby swiftly realize the ultimate meaning. The word “also” (ca) here indicates that worldly conventions remain intact. Thus, we rightly accept that the chariot is nominally established solely through universal consensus, without scrutiny. All wise persons should recognize that this view alone possesses merit and is entirely free of faults.
Question: Although yogis do not perceive the chariot, they do perceive its collection of parts—surely these parts must truly exist.
Answer: Your search for threads within the ashes of burned cloth is indeed laughable. As stated in the verse:
When the chariot itself does not exist,
There is no possessor-of-parts, hence no parts either.
One might object: “When a chariot is dismantled, surely its parts—wheels, axle, etc.—are still found. How, then, can you claim that ‘with no possessor-of-parts, parts too are nonexistent’?”
Answer: This objection is invalid. Such a thought arises only because one has previously perceived the wheels and other parts as belonging to the chariot. Others, who have never seen them thus related, perceive only wheels, axles, etc., and consider each to be a possessor-of-its-own-subparts. Since they have never perceived the wheels as belonging to the chariot, they do not regard them as parts of the chariot.
Furthermore, this point should be understood through the following analogy. As stated in the verse:
Just as when the chariot is burned, its parts are also destroyed,
So too, when wisdom burns away the possessor-of-parts, no parts remain.
Just as fire consumes the chariot—which is a possessor-of-parts—and thereby necessarily destroys its parts as well, so too, when the fire of wisdom—arising from analytical meditation on interdependent origination—burns away the notion of “chariot,” the parts themselves, now serving as fuel for that wisdom-fire, are likewise consumed and cannot persist independently. Thus, in order to preserve worldly conventional truth and enable yogis to swiftly realize ultimate truth, the chariot is correctly designated as merely nominal.
As stated in the verse:
Thus, as universally accepted by the world,
The chariot is nominally established in dependence upon
The aggregates, elements, and sense bases.
Likewise, “I” is accepted as the apprehender.
Just as the chariot is nominally imputed upon wheels, axle, etc., with those parts serving as objects apprehended and the chariot as the apprehender, so too, within conventional truth, to avoid severing worldly language, “I” is likewise accepted as the apprehender—like the chariot—while the five aggregates, six elements, and six sense bases are what is apprehended. Since “I” is imputed in dependence upon the aggregates, just as wheels are imputed as belonging to the chariot, so too the aggregates are imputed as belonging to “I.” Just as worldly language establishes the distinction between apprehended and apprehender, so too the distinction between action and agent is similarly accepted—just as with the chariot. As stated in the verse:
The apprehended is action; this is the agent.
The aggregates, etc., serve as the apprehended and are therefore designated as “action”; “I” is designated as the agent.
If “I” is accepted as merely dependently imputed, then it cannot serve as the basis for distinctions such as permanent/impermanent, solid/insubstantial, etc. Hence, such distinctions—including eternal/non-eternal—are also negated. As stated in the verse:
Since it lacks intrinsic nature, it is neither solid nor insubstantial,
Neither arising nor ceasing,
Neither eternal nor non-eternal,
Neither singular nor multiple.
The “I” imputed upon the aggregates is neither solid nor insubstantial. If “I” were insubstantial, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “What is experienced is not the ‘I’; since experience undergoes arising and cessation, how could experience serve as the experiencer?” And again: “If something did not exist before but now exists, this entails error: the ‘I’ becomes an effect, and moreover, an uncaused effect.” If the aggregates were the “I,” then the “I” would undergo arising and cessation. Yet you do not accept that the “I” arises and ceases. Therefore, the aggregates cannot be the “I.” To posit an insubstantial “I” is unreasonable. Likewise, to posit a solid “I” is also unreasonable. As the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “An ‘I’ existing in the past is unattainable; the ‘I’ of the past does not create the ‘I’ of the present. If the ‘I’ were identical [to the body], yet the body exhibits different characteristics—if the ‘I’ existed apart from the body, where would another ‘I’ exist?” Nor does the “I” possess any enduring or other such nature. As the treatise states in the “Chapter on the Tathāgata”: “In the state of quiescence, there is no eternal, no non-eternal, no four extremes; in the state of quiescence, there is no bounded, no boundless, no four extremes. Those with deep wrong views declare there is no Tathāgata; yet the Tathāgata’s quiescent nature is not graspable as existent or nonexistent. Likewise, in such emptiness, one should not speculate whether the Tathāgata, after nirvāṇa, exists or does not exist.” Neither identity nor difference holds between “I” and the aggregates. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “If the five aggregates are the ‘I,’ then the ‘I’ undergoes arising and cessation; if the ‘I’ differs from the five aggregates, then it lacks the characteristics of the five aggregates.” And again: “Fuel is not identical to fire,” etc.
Why can no distinctions such as solid/insubstantial be applied to the “I”?
The treatise states: “Because it lacks intrinsic nature.” Only if the “I” possessed even the slightest intrinsic nature could such distinctions apply. But since the “I” is entirely devoid of intrinsic nature, such distinctions are baseless. As stated in scripture: “The World-Honored One, the Protector of the World, declared that four things are inexhaustible: sentient beings, space, bodhicitta, and Dharma. If those phenomena truly existed, would they not eventually be exhausted? Since they are unreal, they cannot be exhausted; therefore, they are said to be inexhaustible.”
If analyzed via the seven modes, the “I” is definitively found to be neither eternal nor non-eternal. Yet those who fail to see its lack of intrinsic nature, due to the dominance of ignorance, cling to it as inherently existent. Then, through the view of personal identity (satkāyadṛṣṭi), they grasp it as “I,” thereby perpetuating endless saṃsāric existence. As stated in the verse:
Sentient beings continually grasp at “I,”
And upon that, grasp at “mine.”
Know that this “I” arises from ignorance,
Without scrutinizing worldly consensus.
When analyzing the “I,” non-Buddhist schools, finding the “I” untenable as identical to the aggregates, wrongly grasp an intrinsic self distinct from them. Within Buddhist schools, some, seeing no self distinct from the aggregates, mistakenly assert the aggregates themselves are the self. Those who correctly understand the Buddha’s teaching see that neither exists, and thereby attain liberation. Moreover, all sentient beings—gods, humans, hungry ghosts, animals—due to ignorance, continually grasp at “I” and generate the view of self. They also grasp at “mine”—that which is under their control or belongs to them—such as the internal faculties (eyes, ears, etc.) or external phenomena. Yet this “I” is fabricated by ignorance and possesses no intrinsic nature. Though unreal, it is nonetheless nominally imputed due to ignorance. Thus, yogis, upon searching thoroughly, find no “I” whatsoever. Since no “I” is found, even the apprehended objects—eyes, etc.—do not arise. Yogis, seeing that no phenomenon possesses intrinsic nature, thereby become liberated from saṃsāra. As the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “When both ‘I’ and ‘mine’ are extinguished in all internal and external phenomena, all grasping ceases; with the cessation of grasping, birth ceases.”
How is it that both “I” and “mine” are absent? As stated in the verse:
Without an agent, there is no action;
Hence, without “I,” there is no “mine.”
When yogis see both “I” and “mine” as empty,
They attain liberation.
Just as without a potter, there is no pot; so too, without an “I,” there is no “mine.” Thus, by realizing that both “I” and “mine” are unfindable, one directly sees the absence of saṃsāra, and yogis thereby attain liberation. If one does not see form, etc., then craving and other afflictions arising from attachment to form do not arise. Hence, śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, having realized non-self, attain parinirvāṇa without further rebirth. Bodhisattvas, though realizing non-self, out of great compassion, continue to be reborn within the three realms until they attain unsurpassed perfect enlightenment. Therefore, all wise persons should diligently seek the non-self taught herein.
Both “I” and “mine” are merely nominal imputations, just like the chariot. As the chariot is found to be non-existent when analyzed via the seven modes, so too other phenomena—such as pots—should be understood analogously. Yet these are conventionally accepted based on universal worldly consensus, and the Buddha, without scrutiny, also accepts them as existent. As stated in the verse:
Pots, clothes, tents, armies, forests, garlands, trees,
Houses, small carts, guesthouses, etc.—
All should be known as conventionally asserted by sentient beings,
For the Buddha does not dispute with the world.
Scripture states: “The world disputes with me, but I do not dispute with the world.” Therefore, one must not contradict worldly conventions.
Further, how does the world establish conventional terms? As stated in the verse:
Qualities, parts, craving, characteristics, fuel, etc.;
The qualified, the part, the craved, the characterized, the fire—
Just as the chariot is found non-existent upon sevenfold analysis,
So too, other phenomena are conventionally established via worldly consensus.
A pot is a possessor-of-parts, with clay, etc., as its parts; a pot is a possessor-of-qualities, with bluishness, patterns, etc., as its qualities; a pot is the characterized, with bulging belly, flared mouth, long neck, etc., as its characteristics. Similarly, clothes, etc., should be understood. Craving is attachment; “possessor-of-craving” is the basis of craving. Fire is the burner; fuel is the burned. In all cases, parts serve as the basis for establishing the possessor-of-parts; the possessor-of-parts serves as the basis for establishing its parts; and similarly, fuel serves as the basis for establishing fire, and fire for establishing fuel—just as with the chariot analogy. These are purely worldly conventions, and no analysis is applied to them.
Not only are parts and wholes mutually dependent, but cause and effect are likewise interdependent. As stated in the verse:
A cause is called “cause” only because it produces an effect;
If it fails to produce an effect, it is not a cause.
An effect arises only if it has a cause;
So which arises first, and from which does which arise?
Cause and effect must mutually depend: the existence of one depends upon the existence of the other. Both cause and effect lack intrinsic nature. If, as you claim, cause and effect possessed intrinsic nature, then which arises first—the cause or the effect? Does the effect arise from the cause, or does the cause arise from the effect? Therefore, cause and effect are merely nominal imputations, mutually dependent, lacking intrinsic nature—just like the chariot.
Furthermore, if you claim that a cause possessing intrinsic nature produces an effect, does it do so while conjoined with the effect, or disjoined? As stated in the verse:
If cause and effect are conjoined when producing the effect,
They become one, and thus cause and effect would be indistinguishable.
If disjoined, the cause is no different from a non-cause;
Apart from conjunction and disjunction, no third alternative remains.
If cause and effect are conjoined when producing the effect, then their conjunction renders them indistinguishable—as when seawater mixes with river water—making it impossible to distinguish which is cause and which is effect, or to say which arises from which. If disjoined, then just as a disjoined entity does not produce non-effects, so too it should not produce this effect. Or if disjunction could produce effects, it would produce all effects indiscriminately. For those who assert causes and effects possess intrinsic nature, no third alternative beyond conjunction and disjunction remains. Hence, a cause possessing intrinsic nature cannot possibly produce an effect.
Therefore, as stated in the verse:
If the cause does not produce the effect, then the effect does not exist.
When the cause fails to produce the effect, the effect is nonexistent.
As stated in the verse:
Without the effect, the cause would not be a cause.
A cause is designated as “cause” precisely because it produces an effect. If something could be called a cause even without producing an effect, then the designation “cause” would lack any basis. Therefore, cause and effect lack intrinsic nature.
How does your own system fare? As stated in the verse:
These two—like illusions—are free from fault;
Conventional phenomena of the world remain fully valid.
If, as other schools claim, the cause and effect are intrinsically existent, then the above analysis applies. But in our system, all phenomena arise solely from mistaken conceptual proliferation; they do not arise intrinsically, just like magical illusions. Though lacking intrinsic nature, they remain objects of conceptual awareness—like the illusory circles seen by someone with cataracts. No analysis applies to such phenomena. Thus, we incur no fault of overstatement. Worldly phenomena, unexamined and conventionally established, remain fully valid—hence everything is perfectly accounted for.
Here, an opponent objects: “Just as you analyze whether cause and effect arise conjointly or disjunctively, you commit the same error.” As stated in the verse:
Does the refutation and the refuted coincide or not?
Does this fault not equally apply to you?
If the refutation and the refuted coincide, the fault is as previously stated. If they do not coincide, the fault is likewise identical. Apart from coincidence and non-coincidence, no third alternative remains. Thus, your refutation lacks the power to refute the refuted; rather, your refutation itself is refuted by others—thereby re-establishing cause and effect.
Hence, as stated in the verse:
Your words only undermine your own position;
Therefore, you cannot refute the refuted.
Further, as stated in the verse:
Your own statements commit the same error, appearing to refute,
Yet without reason, slander all phenomena.
Thus, you are not accepted by the wise;
You are a mere “refuter,” without any positive thesis.
Here, “your own statements commit the same error” has already been explained. “Without reason, slander all phenomena”: You claim, “Since both are disjoined, neither can produce the other.” What is your justification? Just as a magnet, though disjoined from iron, attracts iron only where possible—not all iron—so too the eye, though disjoined from visible forms, sees only those forms within its range—not all forms. Likewise, a cause, though disjoined from its effect, produces it only where possible—not all disjoined phenomena. Thus, your groundless slander of all phenomena is entirely unjustified; you are not accepted by the wise. Furthermore, you are a “refuter”—one who only refutes others’ positions without establishing any thesis of your own. Your analysis lacks any positive thesis; it only refutes others.
To answer this objection, as stated in the verse:
Previously, the faults arising from whether the refutation and the refuted coincide or not—
Who holds a fixed thesis incurs such faults;
Since I hold no such thesis, I incur no fault.
You say: “Your own statements commit the same error, appearing to refute.” This fault does not apply to our system. Why? Because in our system, whether the refutation and the refuted coincide or not, neither is established as intrinsically existent; hence, neither coincidence nor non-coincidence is applicable. Therefore, one should not analyze coincidence or non-coincidence. As stated in scripture: “Venerable Subhūti, is the unproduced attained by means of the produced? Or by means of the unproduced? Subhūti replied: Venerable Śāriputra, I do not accept attainment of the unproduced by means of the produced, nor by means of the unproduced. Śāriputra asked: Venerable Subhūti, does attainment and realization not occur at all? Subhūti replied: Venerable Śāriputra, though attainment and realization do occur, they are not established through duality. Venerable Śāriputra, attainment and realization are merely worldly conventions—stream-enterer, once-returner, non-returner, arhat, pratyekabuddha, bodhisattva—all are merely worldly conventions; in ultimate truth, there is no attainment and no realization.” This teaches that both extremes—produced and unproduced—are faulty, and thus both are rejected. Yet to deny them entirely is also unreasonable; therefore, unexamined, within worldly convention, attainment and realization are accepted. Likewise, though the refutation and the refuted—whether coinciding or not—are ultimately unfindable, within conventional language, the refutation does refute the refuted.
Further, as stated in the verse:
Just as eclipses and other features appear on the sun’s reflection,
Though the reflection’s conjunction or non-conjunction with the sun is unreasonable,
Yet it arises dependently and conventionally.
Just as a reflection, though unreal, serves to beautify the face,
So too, this reason—though unreal—purifies the face of wisdom and realizes the thesis.
Just as a reflection is utterly devoid of substance, and any analysis of whether it arises conjointly or disjunctively with the sun is entirely inappropriate, yet due to the presence of visual conditions, a reflection appears and serves to convey meaning. Likewise, a refutation, though intrinsically empty, refutes the refuted; a valid reason, though intrinsically empty, establishes its thesis—without falling into either extreme. Therefore, the claim that our own statements commit the same error is unfounded. Since wisdom is the “face,” “face of wisdom” is appropriate. “Purifying the face of wisdom” means purifying wisdom by eliminating ignorance. “Capable” means recognizing that this reason possesses such capacity. Since the reason is merely conventionally existent, applying dualistic analysis is inappropriate. Thus, whether proponents of the Middle Way refute or respond, they remain unassailable from either extreme. As Āryadeva states: “Existence, non-existence, both, neither—all views are pacified; whoever seeks objections against them cannot possibly succeed.” The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “When questioning about emptiness, if someone attempts to reply, such a reply is invalid—it matches the very position being refuted.” From this, the nature of a productive cause should also be inferred.
Some claim: “At this point, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā functions as a productive cause, not an elucidative cause. The objection regarding conjunction or non-conjunction is an elucidative cause, not a productive cause. Hence, my statements are not pseudo-refutations.”
This is not a valid reply. When one asserts a faulty position, others naturally reject it. If the productive cause is faulty, then the elucidative cause is likewise faulty. Therefore, this reply is unreasonable. Furthermore, to establish the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā’s thesis, one presents one’s own elucidative cause; the opponent counters with a refutation. Responding merely with a pseudo-refutation amounts to being refuted by others. Hence, only our response is truly impeccable.
Further, as stated in the verse:
If the cognizing cause were truly existent,
And the cognized thesis possessed intrinsic nature,
Then the logic of conjunction, etc., would apply;
Since this is not the case, your labor is in vain.
You falsely attribute the defects of an impure thesis to a pure one—thus exerting futile effort toward us, yielding no benefit. Just as refuting the singularity/multiplicity or roundness/blackness of hairs seen by a person with cataracts harms no one without cataracts, so too, analyzing the emptiness of cause and effect—while you cling to extremes and refute—causes no difficulty. Therefore, your examples—eye, magnet, etc.—though seemingly effective, must also be refuted, since they commit the same faults. You have abandoned the correct path of emptiness and clung instead to the crooked path of erroneous discrimination, fabricating false notions that obscure the true path—what use is such strenuous effort?
Further, as stated in the verse:
It is easy to realize that all phenomena lack intrinsic nature,
But difficult to make others believe they possess it—
Why then, with your net of erroneous discrimination,
Do you trouble the world?
Using widely accepted analogies—such as dream, illusion, etc.—from our own system, one easily realizes that all worldly phenomena lack intrinsic nature. Yet making others believe phenomena do possess intrinsic nature is exceedingly difficult, due to the absence of mutually accepted analogies. Thus, I can refute all objections, and none can reply. Who induced you to trouble the world? Worldly beings, like silkworms spinning cocoons, are already entangled by the cocoon of afflictions and erroneous discrimination; why do you now further bind them with threads of erroneous discrimination, forming a tight net all around—thus troubling the world? You should abandon such futile contention. All phenomena are like reflections—lacking both individual and common characteristics; how could they be established by direct perception or inference? Here, the sole direct perception is omniscience.
Further, as stated in the verse:
Having fully understood the preceding refutations,
We now re-refute the opponent’s answers regarding conjunction, etc.
How can you be a mere “refuter”?
From this, other refutations should be understood.
Having properly understood the prior establishment of dependent origination and conventional imputation, and the remaining refutations of opposing views, we now proceed to examine whether cause and effect arise conjointly or disjunctively. Opponents’ responses to this issue must be re-refuted. As previously stated, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā aims solely to dispel conceptual proliferation. Does the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā commit the fault of “refuting”? No—we do not refute others’ positions, since there is no intrinsic nature to refute. Hence, how could we be “refuters”? Moreover, who establishes the defining characteristic of a “refuter” without holding any thesis of their own, only refuting others? Thus, this characteristic of a “refuter” is entirely unreasonable. All other refutations should be understood accordingly.
From “That is not born from itself…” up to “Through observation, one swiftly attains liberation,” the text explains the lack of intrinsic nature of phenomena (dharmas). From “Wisdom perceives the afflictions’ manifold faults…” up to this verse, it explains the lack of intrinsic nature of the person (pudgala).
Now we shall explain the distinctions among types of emptiness. As stated in the verse:
Non-self is taught to liberate beings;
It is divided into person and phenomena.
Non-self is briefly classified into two types: the non-self of phenomena (dharma-anātman) and the non-self of the person (pudgala-anātman).
Why are two types of non-self taught?
Answer: “To liberate beings”—the Buddha, wishing to liberate all sentient beings, taught the two types of non-self. Specifically, to liberate śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, he taught the non-self of the person; to liberate bodhisattvas and enable them to attain omniscient wisdom, he taught both types of non-self. Though śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas also perceive dependent origination and its nature, they do not fully cultivate the non-self of phenomena; their methods suffice only to eliminate afflictions operating within the three realms. Nevertheless, they can be regarded as fully cultivating the meaning of the non-self of the person.
As stated in the verse:
The Buddha further expounds, according to the capacities of those to be tamed,
Various classifications of non-self.
Since those to be tamed possess diverse inclinations, the Buddha further elaborates the two types of non-self in numerous ways. As stated in the verse:
Having extensively taught the sixteen emptinesses,
He summarizes them into four—also accepted as Mahāyāna.
Scripture states: “Furthermore, Śubhūti! The characteristics of Mahāyāna are: inner emptiness, outer emptiness, inner-and-outer emptiness, emptiness of emptiness, great emptiness, supreme-meaning emptiness, conditioned-phenomena emptiness, unconditioned-phenomena emptiness, ultimate emptiness, limitless emptiness, non-scattered emptiness, essential-nature emptiness, all-phenomena emptiness, self-character emptiness, unobtainability emptiness, and nature-of-non-nature emptiness.” After extensively explaining the sixteen emptinesses, it continues: “Furthermore, Śubhūti! The existent is empty of existence; the nonexistent is empty of nonexistence; the essential nature is empty of essential nature; the other’s nature is empty of other’s nature.” It then teaches the four emptinesses and declares these emptinesses constitute Mahāyāna. If something were truly existent or truly nonexistent, no phenomenon could exist at all. Rather, all phenomena are spoken of conventionally, depending solely upon the capacities of those to be tamed—just as “form,” etc., are spoken of. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “If there were an unempty phenomenon, there would be an empty one; but since there is no unempty phenomenon, how could there be an empty one? Emptiness cannot be expressed; non-emptiness cannot be expressed; neither together nor separately can they be expressed—only through provisional names are they spoken.”
We now begin with inner emptiness. As stated in the verse:
Since it is by nature thus,
The eye is empty of eye-nature;
Likewise, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind—
All six inner faculties, being neither permanent nor destructible,
Are devoid of intrinsic nature—this is called inner emptiness.
Scripture states: “What is inner emptiness? ‘Inner’ refers to inner phenomena—namely, eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. Know that here the eye is empty of eye-nature, neither permanent nor destructible. Why? Because it is by nature thus.” Here, “permanent” means not abandoning its intrinsic nature; yet it momentarily arises and ceases, and is not utterly destroyed. This means: if a phenomenon possessed intrinsic nature, it would either be permanent or utterly destroyed. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “If intrinsic nature arose from causes and conditions, this would be contradictory: for intrinsic nature arising from causes and conditions would be a created phenomenon; and if intrinsic nature had a creator, how could it be intrinsic? Intrinsic nature is defined as uncreated, not dependent upon other phenomena.”
Do the distinctive characteristics described in the treatise correspond to this intrinsic nature? Does the treatise accept such intrinsic nature?
Answer: As the Bhagavān states: “Whether a Buddha appears in the world or not, the suchness (tathatā) of phenomena abides eternally.” Such suchness may be accepted as existent.
What is this suchness?
Answer: It is the intrinsic nature of the eye, etc.
What is the intrinsic nature of the eye, etc.?
Answer: It is the uncreated, non-dependent, fundamental nature, directly realized by wisdom freed from the cataract of ignorance.
Does this nature exist?
Answer: Who claims it does not? If it did not exist, for what purpose would bodhisattvas practice the pāramitās? Indeed, bodhisattvas diligently undertake countless difficult practices precisely to realize this suchness. As scripture states: “Good man, know that ultimate truth is unborn, unceasing, unabiding, non-coming, non-going. It transcends all verbal expression, all conceptual elaboration, all discursive thought. Good man, know that ultimate truth is ineffable—realized individually by noble wisdom alone. Good man, know that ultimate truth, whether a Buddha appears in the world or not, remains unchanged. For what purpose do bodhisattvas shave their heads, don monastic robes, renounce household life, and enter the path with firm faith? Having entered the path, they diligently strive, as if rescuing their heads from fire, unwaveringly abiding in the unshakable. Good man, if ultimate truth did not exist, spiritual practice would be futile and meaningless; even the Buddhas’ appearance in the world would be pointless. Because ultimate truth exists, bodhisattvas are called ‘skilled in ultimate truth.’”
Opponent: Alas! You deny that any phenomenon possesses intrinsic nature, yet suddenly assert an uncreated, independent intrinsic nature—surely you are self-contradictory!
Answer: You have failed to grasp the intent of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Its intent is this: if the intrinsic nature of the eye, etc., were identical to the eye as grasped by ordinary beings—the dependent, conditioned phenomenon—then spiritual practice would indeed be futile. But since that is not the eye’s intrinsic nature, practicing to realize this intrinsic nature is beneficial. Moreover, we speak of “uncreated” and “independent” only relative to conventional truth. If intrinsic nature were identical to what ordinary beings perceive, calling it “intrinsic nature” would be reasonable. Yet this intrinsic nature is neither ultimate truth nor sheer nonexistence—it is precisely quiescence (śānta). Furthermore, this intrinsic nature is not only accepted by the treatise but can also be accepted by others; thus, it is established as mutually agreed upon by both parties. Some claim heat is the intrinsic nature of fire, but such claims are entirely unreasonable: since fire is dependent and conditioned, it is created and dependent—hence, asserting it is “uncreated” and “independent” is contradictory. Here, “uncreated” means free from the extreme view of inherent existence; thus, it is conventionally established as intended. Having extensively clarified this, we now state the definitive meaning. When the verse says “the eye is empty of eye-nature,” it signifies emptiness of intrinsic nature (svabhāva-śūnyatā), not emptiness due to absence of an inner agent, nor emptiness of subject-object duality—i.e., not emptiness defined as “this phenomenon’s absence implies that phenomenon’s emptiness.”
Next, outer emptiness. As stated in the verse:
Since it is by nature thus,
Form is empty of form-nature;
Sound, smell, taste, touch, and phenomena likewise—
Form, etc., are devoid of intrinsic nature—this is called outer emptiness.
Scripture states: “What is outer emptiness? ‘Outer’ refers to outer phenomena—namely, form, etc. Form is empty of form-nature… phenomena are empty of phenomena-nature.” As previously explained—“neither permanent nor destructible, by nature thus”—the full meaning extends to all subsequent emptinesses.
As stated in the verse:
The two—inner and outer—lack intrinsic nature—this is called inner-and-outer emptiness.
Scripture states: “All inner and outer phenomena lack inner-and-outer intrinsic nature—this is called inner-and-outer emptiness.”
As stated in the verse:
All phenomena lack intrinsic nature;
The wise call this “emptiness.”
This emptiness itself is empty of emptiness-nature—
This is called “emptiness of emptiness.”
To eliminate those who cling to emptiness as real, this is taught.
Scripture states: “What is emptiness of emptiness? ‘Emptiness’ refers to the emptiness of all phenomena. This emptiness itself is empty of emptiness—this is called emptiness of emptiness.” Some cling to emptiness as a real phenomenon; to eliminate that clinging, “emptiness of emptiness” is taught. As stated: “To eliminate all conceptual proliferations, the nectar of emptiness is taught; but if one clings to emptiness, the Buddha declares it most blameworthy.”
As stated in the verse:
Since it pervades all sentient and environmental worlds,
And is likened to the boundless, it is called “great.”
There is no sentient world or environmental world outside the ten directions; since it pervades all sentient beings, it is called “great.” Since loving-kindness, etc., are cultivated pervading the ten directions, the ten directions serve as the metaphor for boundlessness—and since they are limitless, they are also called “great.” As stated in the verse:
Since it is the ten directions,
The ten directions are empty of ten-directions-nature—
This is called “great emptiness,” taught to eliminate clinging to “greatness.”
Scripture states: “What is great emptiness? The east is empty of east-nature.” Some cling to the ten directions as infinitely vast and develop a realist view of “greatness”; to eliminate that clinging, “great emptiness” is taught—just as the Vaiśeṣika school clings to direction as real.
As stated in the verse:
Since it is the supreme goal,
Nirvāṇa is called “supreme meaning”;
It is empty of its own nature—this is called “supreme-meaning emptiness.”
To eliminate those who cling to nirvāṇa as real,
Supreme-meaning emptiness is taught to those who understand supreme meaning.
Scripture states: “What is supreme-meaning emptiness? ‘Supreme meaning’ refers to nirvāṇa. Here, nirvāṇa is empty of nirvāṇa-nature.” Some cling to nirvāṇa as a real phenomenon; to eliminate that clinging, this emptiness is taught. “Supreme meaning” means “supreme goal” or “supreme object of knowledge.”
As stated in the verse:
Since the three realms arise from causes and conditions, they are called “conditioned.”
They are empty of their own nature—this is called “conditioned-phenomena emptiness.”
Scripture states: “What is conditioned-phenomena emptiness? ‘Conditioned phenomena’ refer to the three realms. Here, the desire realm is empty of desire-realm-nature.”
As stated in the verse:
If a phenomenon lacks arising, abiding, and cessation, it is called “unconditioned.”
It is empty of its own nature—this is called “unconditioned-phenomena emptiness.”
“The unconditioned” refers to the unconditioned. Scripture states: “What is unconditioned-phenomena emptiness? ‘Unconditioned’ refers to non-arising, non-ceasing, non-abiding, non-altering. Here, the unconditioned is empty of unconditioned-nature.”
As stated in the verse:
If a phenomenon lacks finality, it is called “ultimate.”
It is empty of its own nature—this is called “ultimate emptiness.”
Scripture states: “What is ultimate emptiness? ‘Ultimacy’ refers to constant ultimacy and complete ultimacy. If a phenomenon’s ultimacy is unattainable, it is called ‘ultimate.’ Here, ultimacy is empty of ultimacy-nature.”
As stated in the verse:
“Scattered” means capable of being released or discarded;
“Unscattered” means incapable of release, utterly irrelinquishable.
That unscattered phenomenon is empty of unscattered-nature—
Since it is by nature thus, it is called “non-scattered emptiness.”
Scripture states: “What is non-scattered emptiness? ‘Scattered’ means capable of being released, discarded, or relinquished. Here, the unscattered is empty of unscattered-nature.” “Scattered” means capable of being relinquished; “unscattered” means utterly incapable of being relinquished.
As stated in the verse:
The nature of conditioned phenomena, etc.,
Is neither created by śrāvakas,
Pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas, nor Buddhas—
Hence, the nature of conditioned phenomena, etc., is called “essential nature.”
It is empty of its own nature—this is called “essential-nature emptiness.”
Scripture states: “What is essential-nature emptiness? It refers to the essential nature of all phenomena—uncreated, unconditioned, not made by śrāvakas.”
As stated in the verse:
The eighteen dhātus, the six contacts, the six feelings born thereof,
Whether material or immaterial, conditioned or unconditioned—
All such phenomena are empty of their own nature—
This is called “all-phenomena emptiness.”
Scripture states: “What is all-phenomena emptiness? ‘All phenomena’ refers to conditioned and unconditioned phenomena.” The eighteen dhātus comprise the six internal sense bases, six external sense bases, and six consciousnesses. The six contacts are eye-contact through mind-contact. The six feelings arise dependent upon contact. All such phenomena are empty of their own nature.
As stated in the verse:
The lack of intrinsic nature of characteristics such as obstruction—this is called “self-character emptiness.”
What are the self-characters of form, etc.? To elaborate, as stated in the verse:
The character of form is change and obstruction;
Feeling is the character of reception;
Perception is the character of apprehending signs;
Volition is the character of volitional activity;
Distinct cognition of objects is the self-character of consciousness.
The self-character of the aggregates is suffering;
The character of the elements is like a venomous snake—
Since they share the function of support, elements are characterized by the snake.
As stated in the verse:
The Buddha taught the twelve sense bases as the gateway for the arising of all suffering—
Because they are the gateways from which all suffering arises.
As stated in the verse:
All dependently arisen phenomena have the character of combination—
Combination is the character of dependent origination,
Since dependent origination is revealed through combination.
As stated in the verse:
The perfection of generosity is the character of giving;
The character of ethical discipline is freedom from mental heat;
The character of patience is non-anger;
The character of diligence is freedom from fault—
Diligence is characterized by supporting wholesome phenomena.
As stated in the verse:
The character of meditative concentration is unification.
Because it unifies all wholesome phenomena.
As stated in the verse:
The character of wisdom is non-attachment—
Because it proceeds toward nirvāṇa and is unattached to all phenomena.
As stated in the verse:
The six pāramitās are taught with such characters;
The four meditative absorptions, the four immeasurables, and the remaining formless concentrations—
The Buddha declared their self-character to be non-anger.
The Buddha declared non-anger as their character, since they are attained only through freedom from anger.
As stated in the verse:
The thirty-seven factors of enlightenment have the self-character of liberation—
“Liberation” means freedom from bondage. Since they are the cause of liberation from saṃsāra and lead to liberation, they are called “liberation-capable,” i.e., their character is enabling liberation. The meanings of meditative concentration, etc., have already been explained.
As stated in the verse:
Emptiness has the self-character of non-apprehension and transcendence.Due to the non-acquisition of all phenomena, one is not defiled by the stain of discrimination. Thus, the “Door of Emancipation through Emptiness” has “distance” as its intrinsic characteristic.
Verse:
Formlessness is cessation;
The third characteristic is suffering.
Non-delusion and the eight liberations—
Their characteristic is the capacity for liberation.
The “Door of Emancipation through Formlessness” has cessation as its characteristic, since forms are unattainable. The “third door” refers to the “Door of Emancipation through Non-Aspiration,” whose characteristics are suffering and non-delusion: because one correctly observes all conditioned phenomena as suffering, and with right wisdom perceives their nature without aspiration or craving, this third door of emancipation has suffering and non-delusion as its characteristics. The eight liberations are as follows: (1) perceiving external forms while having internal form-perceptions; this is the first liberation. (2) Perceiving external forms while having no internal form-perceptions; this is the second liberation. (3) The pure liberation, which is of the nature of the fourth dhyāna; this is the third liberation. (4–7) The four formless liberations, as previously explained. (8) Cessation of perception and sensation; this is the eighth liberation. These liberations are so called because they effect liberation from the obstacles inherent in meditative absorption (samāpatti); thus, their characteristic is “capacity for liberation.”
Verse:
The sūtras declare that skillful discernment is the essential nature of the ten powers.
The ten powers discussed below should be understood as having “skillful discernment” as their characteristic. Since such discernment is unobstructed, it is termed “power.”
Verse:
The Buddha’s four fearlessnesses have “unshakable firmness” as their essential nature.
The four fearlessnesses refer to the Buddha’s self-proclamation: “I am a perfectly and fully awakened one.” Should any śramaṇa, brāhmaṇa, deva, Māra, Brahmā, or other being in the world raise a challenge grounded in Dharma, asserting that the Buddha is not perfectly and fully awakened regarding that Dharma, the Buddha clearly sees that such a challenge lacks any valid basis—this is elaborated at length in the sūtras. Alternatively, the Buddha declares: “I have completely eradicated all defilements.” Extending this, should anyone raise a challenge grounded in Dharma, asserting that the Buddha has not yet completely eradicated those defilements, the Buddha knows such a challenge is baseless. Or the Buddha proclaims: “All obstructive, defiling phenomena necessarily function as obstacles.” This is likewise elaborated extensively. Or the Buddha proclaims the correct path of complete emergence: when noble beings practice it, they assuredly emerge, assuredly attain full realization, fully exhaust all suffering, and bring suffering to its ultimate end. This too is elaborated at length. All these fearlessnesses have “supreme firmness” as their characteristic, since no one can disturb or shake them.
Verse:
The four unhindered knowledges have “unfailing eloquence” as their characteristic.
The four unhindered knowledges will be expounded later; their characteristic is “unfailing” or “inexhaustible.”
Verse:
Bestowing benefit upon sentient beings is called great compassion.
Rescuing sentient beings from suffering is great compassion’s heart.
Great joy’s characteristic is supreme delight;
Great equanimity’s characteristic is freedom from mixture (i.e., untainted by attachment or aversion).
Great compassion has “bestowing benefit” as its characteristic; great compassion has “rescuing sentient beings from suffering” as its characteristic; great joy has “supreme delight” as its characteristic; great equanimity has “freedom from mixture (of attachment and aversion)” as its characteristic.
Verse:
The Buddha’s eighteen unique qualities are admitted to be eighteen in number.
Since they cannot be seized or undermined, “non-seizability” is their intrinsic characteristic.
The Buddha’s eighteen unique qualities are stated in the sūtras: “Śubhūti, from the time the Tathāgata attains unsurpassed perfect enlightenment until his final entry into parinirvāṇa without remainder, the Tathāgata is always free from error, never utters abrupt or harsh speech, never forgets mindfulness, never lacks concentration, never entertains diverse or discursive thoughts, never abandons anything without proper discernment, never wavers in resolve, never slackens in diligence, never loses recollection, never falters in samādhi, never regresses in prajñā, never retreats from liberation. All bodily actions are guided by wisdom and follow wisdom. All verbal actions are guided by wisdom and follow wisdom. All mental actions are guided by wisdom and follow wisdom. His wisdom and vision regarding the past are unobstructed and unattached; his wisdom and vision regarding the future are unobstructed and unattached; his wisdom and vision regarding the present are unobstructed and unattached.” These eighteen unique qualities of the Buddha have “non-seizability” as their characteristic, because of the Buddha’s constant freedom from error and so forth, making it impossible for others to gain advantage over him. Their detailed explanation is found in the Dhāraṇī-Īśvara-Paripṛcchā Sūtra, and should be understood accordingly.
Verse:
Omniscient wisdom’s intrinsic characteristic is direct, immediate perception.
Other types of wisdom perceive only partial aspects, and therefore are not designated “direct perception.”
Whatever possesses an intrinsic characteristic—whether conditioned or unconditioned—
That very characteristic, being empty of itself, is called “emptiness of intrinsic characteristics.”
Thus, emptiness of intrinsic characteristics has already been explained.
Verse:
The present does not abide here; the past and future do not exist.
Within them, nothing whatsoever can be apprehended—this is termed “unattainability.”
That very unattainability, being empty of its own nature,
Is neither permanent nor annihilated—this is “emptiness of unattainability.”
Because the past has ceased and the future has not yet arisen, and because the present does not abide, none of the three times truly exists. As stated in the sūtras: “‘Unattainability’ means that within this [realm], the three times cannot be found; know that ‘unattainability’ arises from the ‘emptiness of unattainability.’”
Verse:
All phenomena arise from conditions; they possess no inherent nature of conjunction.
Conjunction itself is empty of that nature—this is “emptiness of non-nature.”
“Conjunction” refers to what arises from conjunction; since all things arise from causes and conditions, conjunction itself does not inherently exist. “Inherent nature” means “non-nature”; the emptiness of that nature is precisely “emptiness of non-nature” (i.e., the emptiness of inherent existence).
Thus, the sixteen kinds of emptiness have been extensively explained. Now we shall explain the remaining four. Verse:
The term “existent nature” collectively denotes the five aggregates.
That very “existent nature” is empty of its own nature—thus it is named “emptiness of existent nature.”
“Existent nature” refers to the five aggregates. This “existent nature” is empty of its own nature—this is “emptiness of existent nature.”
Verse:
The general term “non-existent nature” refers to unconditioned phenomena,
Such as space and nirvāṇa.
That very “non-existent nature” is empty of its own nature—thus it is named “emptiness of non-existent nature.”
“Non-existent nature” refers to unconditioned phenomena—space, nirvāṇa, etc. This “non-existent nature” is empty of its own nature—this is “emptiness of non-existent nature.”
Verse:
Since inherent nature itself lacks inherent existence, it is called “emptiness of inherent nature.”
This nature is not fabricated—it is therefore called “inherent nature.”
“Inherent nature” refers to fundamental nature, which is not created by śrāvakas or others. Inherent nature is empty of inherent nature—this is “emptiness of inherent nature.”
Verse:
Whether Buddhas appear in the world or do not appear,
The emptiness-nature of all phenomena is called “other-nature.”
Suchness and reality-limit are “emptiness of other-nature.”
“Other-nature” refers to the supreme nature—the nature that is eternally existent. Alternatively, “other-nature” refers to the nature realized by superior wisdom. That nature is empty of itself. Or “other-nature” refers to what belongs to the “other shore”—since it is supramundane, it is called “other-nature.” This is precisely the reality-limit, and because it is unchanging, it signifies “suchness.” Emptiness whose characteristic is emptiness itself is called “emptiness of other-nature.”
Verse:
The Perfection of Wisdom expounds extensively in this manner.
Now we shall set forth the unique qualities of bodhisattvas who have faith and understanding in the Perfection of Wisdom, concluding the chapter on Prajñāpāramitā. Verse:
Thus, this light of wisdom radiates brilliantly,
Thoroughly penetrating the three realms, whose fundamental nature is unborn.
Like viewing an āmalaka fruit in the palm of one’s hand,
One enters cessation-samādhi through conventional truth.
“Thus” indicates the contemplative reasoning previously described. Through such contemplation, the light of wisdom arises and radiates brilliantly, dispelling the darkness obscuring ultimate reality. Furthermore, empowered by the force of conventional truth, one enters the cessation-samādhi.
The intrinsic nature of cessation-samādhi is not abandonment of the aspiration to rescue sentient beings. Verse:
Although constantly abiding in cessation-samādhi,
One continually feels compassion for suffering sentient beings.
This bodhisattva’s active practice belongs to saṃsāra, whereas their superior aspiration belongs to nirvāṇa. Thus, toward sentient beings who rely on nothing, great compassion continually increases.
Verse:
Moreover, with the power of wisdom, one surpasses both śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.
From the sixth bhūmi onward—including the seventh and higher bhūmis—one surpasses the Buddha’s śrāvaka disciples and pratyekabuddhas through the power of wisdom.
Verse:
With broad wings of conventional and ultimate truth,
The swan-king guides the flock of sentient beings—swans.
Supported further by the favorable winds of wholesome power,
He flies across to the far shore—the ocean of the Buddhas’ virtues.
This bodhisattva’s worldly (conventional) merits also increase and blaze brightly, enabling him to guide the flock of sentient beings—swans—who have deeply planted roots of virtue. The two truths—conventional and ultimate—are precisely this bodhisattva’s broad white wings, by which he flies across to the far shore—the ocean of the Buddhas’ virtues.
End of Chapter Five of Madhyamakāvatāra.