The Second Bodhicitta: The Ground of Stainlessness
Having explained the first bodhicitta, we now proceed to the second. The verse states:
Because their precepts are perfected and their virtues purified,
Even in dreams they remain free from the stain of transgression.
All the grounds are characterized by supreme wisdom; here, however, the distinctive features of the second bodhicitta are revealed through the supporting qualities—such as the perfection of ethical discipline (śīla-pāramitā)—that arise from it. Ethical discipline (śīla) is so named because: (1) it arises from an inability to tolerate afflictions; (2) it prevents the arising of suffering; (3) it extinguishes the blazing fire of sorrow and remorse, thereby bringing coolness and peace; or (4) it constitutes the cause of happiness and is practiced by noble beings. Śīla is defined by its seven faculties of abandonment—the three factors of non-attachment, non-aversion, and right view serve as the initiators of these seven faculties. Thus, śīla is described both in terms of what it abandons and what initiates that abandonment—namely, the ten wholesome courses of action. “Perfected precepts” means precepts brought to their utmost fulfillment. “Purified virtue” refers to virtues fully cleansed of defilement. The term “purified” also applies to precepts themselves, meaning that precepts are both perfectly fulfilled and immaculately pure. Because the bodhisattva’s own virtuous qualities are thus purified, their ethical discipline becomes supremely excellent. Having attained such purity of precept and virtue, this bodhisattva remains unstained even in dreams by the defilement of transgression.
How then does this bodhisattva attain the perfection of śīla and the purity of virtue? It is precisely when this bodhisattva abides on the second bodhisattva ground—the Ground of Stainlessness. The verse states:
Their bodily, verbal, and mental conduct is entirely pure;
They fully gather and practice all ten wholesome courses of action.
As stated in the Sūtra on the Ten Grounds concerning the second ground: “O sons of the Buddha! When a bodhisattva abides on the Ground of Stainlessness, by nature they have already completely renounced all killing. They do not keep weapons or knives; they harbor no resentment or hatred; they possess shame and moral dread; and they embody kindness, compassion, and forbearance. Toward all sentient beings possessing life, they constantly generate beneficial, compassionate, and caring thoughts. Even maliciously harming sentient beings is unthinkable for them—how much less would they deliberately kill any being whom they conceive as ‘other’? By nature they refrain from stealing. The bodhisattva is always content with their own possessions and never covets or seeks to damage others’ property. If something belongs to another, they regard it clearly as ‘belonging to another,’ and never entertain even the slightest thought of theft—not even a blade of grass will they take without permission, let alone other necessities of life. By nature they abstain from sexual misconduct. The bodhisattva remains content with their own spouse and never seeks another’s spouse. Even toward another’s wife, concubine, ward, female relative under familial protection, or woman safeguarded by Dharma, they never arouse even a trace of lustful desire—how much less would they engage in actual misconduct, or indulge in unnatural acts? By nature they avoid false speech. The bodhisattva consistently speaks truthfully, authentically, and at the appropriate time—even in dreams, they cannot bear to utter words intended to conceal or obscure the truth, nor do they ever intend to lie, let alone deliberately commit falsehood. By nature they avoid divisive speech. The bodhisattva harbors no intention to separate others, no wish to harm, and never repeats one person’s words to another to provoke discord, nor vice versa. They prevent unbroken relationships from fracturing and stop broken ones from worsening. They neither delight in nor enjoy causing separation. Whether true or false, they neither create nor speak divisive words. By nature they avoid harsh speech. This includes: poisonous, cruel, painful, or anger-provoking speech; speech directed face-to-face or behind someone’s back; vulgar, base, disagreeable, unpleasant, wrathful, heart-burning, grudge-bearing, feverish, unlovable, displeasing, destructive speech—speech that harms oneself and others. All such speech they utterly abandon. Instead, they habitually use soothing, gentle, pleasing, agreeable, joyful, deeply penetrating, elegant, widely admired, harmoniously delightful, and body-and-mind-uplifting speech. By nature they avoid idle chatter. The bodhisattva delights in thoughtful, timely, truthful, meaningful, Dharma-based, reason-guided, skillfully pacifying, and context-appropriately decisive speech. Even in jest, they remain continually mindful and deliberate—how much more so would they ever utter scattered, frivolous words? By nature they abandon greed. The bodhisattva feels no craving for others’ wealth or resources, nor does he desire or seek them. By nature they abandon ill-will. The bodhisattva constantly cultivates loving-kindness, beneficence, compassion, joy, gentleness, and affection toward all sentient beings. They permanently relinquish hatred, enmity, and mental agitation, always aspiring to harmonious conduct, benevolent care, and benefit. Furthermore, they abandon wrong views. The bodhisattva abides firmly in the right path: they do not practice divination, adopt improper precepts, hold distorted views, deceive, or flatter. They place unwavering faith in the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha.”
Through the body, the first three wholesome courses of action are fully realized; through speech, the next four; and through mind, the final three—thus enabling full cultivation of the ten wholesome courses of action.
Do beginners on the bodhisattva path not cultivate these ten wholesome courses of action? Though they do practice them, the verse states:
These ten wholesome courses of action
Are most exalted and pure upon this ground.
Beginners cannot yet achieve such excellence.
The verse states:
Like the autumn moon, ever pure and clean,
Tranquil and radiant, supremely adorned.
“Tranquility” refers to guarding the sense faculties; “radiance” denotes manifest luminosity.
Even though their ethical discipline is thus pure, the verse states:
If one clings to a notion of self while upholding pure precepts,
Then such precepts are not truly pure.
As stated in the Ratnakūṭa Sūtra: “Kāśyapa, suppose a bhikṣu possesses pure precepts, abides diligently in the Prātimokṣa, observes impeccable conduct and deportment, fears even minor infractions, thoroughly masters all training rules, maintains pure physical, verbal, and mental conduct, and sustains pure livelihood—but still holds the view of a self. Kāśyapa, this is called the ‘first breach of precepts disguised as proper observance.’ Likewise, Kāśyapa, suppose a bhikṣu fully practices the twelve dhūta (ascetic) practices, yet still clings to notions of ‘I’ and ‘mine.’ Kāśyapa, this is called the ‘fourth breach of precepts disguised as proper observance.’”
The verse states:
Therefore, they constantly distance themselves from both extremes
Within the three spheres of action.
The three spheres refer to: (1) the sentient being upon whom the practice is performed; (2) the specific antidote applied; and (3) the agent performing the practice. In all three spheres, the bodhisattva avoids clinging to either extreme—existence or non-existence.
Thus, the bodhisattva’s perfect ethical discipline has been explained. Next, we shall discuss how the merit of pure ethical discipline surpasses that of generosity and other perfections, and serves as the foundation for all virtuous qualities. The verse states:
Sentient beings who lose the ‘foot’ of ethical discipline
Experience the fruits of generosity in unfortunate realms.
Those who practice generosity—if simultaneously upholding pure precepts—will reap the most complete and excellent wealth and status in human and celestial realms. Yet some fall into unfortunate realms while enjoying abundant wealth and status—such as solitary hells, animals like dragons, elephants, horses, cattle, monkeys, and powerful spirits—due precisely to having cultivated generosity while losing the ‘foot’ of ethical discipline.
Hence the verse states:
When the root of life is entirely exhausted,
No further wealth or resources can arise.
Just as someone who sees that a small seed yields a large fruit plants many seeds to ensure continuous abundant harvests, a foolish person ignorant of sowing consumes the seeds themselves—as a result, once the root of life is utterly depleted, how could abundant fruit ever arise again? Similarly, the most foolish people, lacking pure ethical discipline, enjoy wealth and status where they ought not. Once their prior karmic fruits are exhausted and no new merits are cultivated, they thereafter find it exceedingly difficult to generate conditions for future wealth.
Moreover, those who lack the ‘foot’ of ethical discipline not only rarely attain complete wealth and status but even struggle to escape unfortunate realms altogether. The verse states:
When one enjoys freedom and favorable conditions,
Yet fails to restrain oneself,
One falls into perilous places, subject to others’ control—
What cause will later liberate one from there?
When one freely dwells in favorable human or celestial realms without dependence on others—like a courageous warrior dwelling unbound in favorable terrain—if one fails to practice self-restraint at such a time, one is like a warrior bound and cast into a mountain ravine: after falling into unfortunate realms, by what cause could one possibly emerge? One thus remains trapped indefinitely in miserable existences. As the sūtra states: “Even if reborn later among humans, one still suffers two kinds of retributive results.”
Since breaking precepts is the root of all misfortunes, the verse states:
Therefore, the Victorious Ones, after teaching generosity,
Immediately expound the teachings on ethical discipline.
Thus, the Conqueror—who has triumphed over all afflictions—teaches ethical discipline immediately after generosity, ensuring that merits such as generosity remain intact and uncorrupted.
The verse states:
Ethical discipline is the fertile field where merit grows;
Its fruits and benefits are inexhaustible.
Because ethical discipline serves as the basis for all virtues, it is likened to fertile soil. When generosity and other virtues are cultivated upon this field, their causes and effects mutually reinforce each other endlessly, yielding vast accumulations of merit and prolonged enjoyment of their fruits.
Hence the verse states:
Ordinary beings, disciples of the Buddha’s word,
Self-realized Buddhas, and bodhisattvas—
Both higher rebirths and definitive liberation
Arise solely from ethical discipline, with no other cause.
As the sūtra states: “The ten unwholesome courses of action lead to rebirth in hell (upper), animal realm (middle), or hungry ghost realm (lower). Among these, killing leads sentient beings to fall into hell, animal, or hungry ghost realms; if reborn as humans, they suffer two results: short life and frequent illness. Stealing similarly leads to hell, etc., resulting in poverty and inability to control shared resources. Sexual misconduct likewise leads to hell, etc., resulting in an unfaithful spouse and inability to obtain desired companionship. False speech leads to hell, etc., resulting in frequent slander and deception by others. Divisive speech leads to hell, etc., resulting in estranged relatives and degenerate kinship. Harsh speech leads to hell, etc., resulting in constant exposure to unpleasant sounds and frequent disputes. Idle chatter leads to hell, etc., resulting in speech that others ignore and unclear articulation. Greed leads to hell, etc., resulting in insatiable desires and endless craving. Ill-will leads to hell, etc., resulting in others constantly scrutinizing one’s faults and repeatedly harming one. Wrong views lead to hell, animal, or hungry ghost realms; if reborn as humans, they suffer two results: birth in a family holding wrong views and a deceitful, crooked mind. The ten unwholesome courses of action thus produce countless, immeasurable masses of suffering.”
It further states: “The ten wholesome courses of action constitute the cause for rebirth among humans, gods, and even the highest celestial realm—the Peak of Existence. Moreover, when the upper-level ten wholesome courses are cultivated with wisdom but with narrow-mindedness, fear of saṃsāra, lack of great compassion, and reliance on hearing teachings from others, they become the cause for the Śrāvakayāna. When the upper-level ten wholesome courses are cultivated purely without external instruction, arising from autonomous realization, yet lacking full skillful means and great compassion, and grounded in deep insight into dependent origination, they become the cause for the Pratyekabuddhayāna. When the upper-level ten wholesome courses are cultivated purely, with vast and boundless mind, full compassion, skillful means, great vows, non-abandonment of sentient beings, purification of all bodhisattva grounds, and cultivation of all perfections, they become the cause for the Mahāyāna—the vast conduct of bodhisattvas.”
For these reasons, it is declared that apart from the ten wholesome courses of action, no other method enables ordinary beings, śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, or bodhisattvas—according to their respective capacities—to attain either higher rebirths (saṃsāric happiness) or definitive liberation (non-suffering, non-blissful emancipation).
The verse states:
Just as the ocean rejects corpses,
And auspiciousness shuns ‘Black-Ear,’
So too do disciplined great beings
Refuse to dwell alongside transgressors.
‘Black-Ear’ is an alternate name for inauspiciousness.
We now turn to the distinctions of the perfection of ethical discipline (śīla-pāramitā). The verse states:
By whom, toward whom, and what is abandoned—
If these three spheres are apprehended as real,
It is called the worldly pāramitā;
Only when all three attachments are empty is it transcendent.
If the practitioner apprehends the three spheres (agent, object, and act) as substantially real, it is termed the worldly pāramitā. If, however, none of these three spheres is apprehended as real, it is termed the transcendent pāramitā.
By elucidating the qualities of this ground, the perfection of śīla-pāramitā is shown to be complete. The verse states:
The Buddha’s son, the moon, radiates stainless light—
Not part of saṃsāra, yet auspicious within it.
Like the autumn moon’s light,
It dispels sentient beings’ mental heat.
“Stainless” signifies purity achieved through the ten wholesome courses of action—hence the second ground’s true designation. Like the autumn moon radiating stainless light, it dispels sentient beings’ mental heat. Similarly, the stainless light radiated by the bodhisattva-moon dispels the mental heat generated by transgression. Since this is beyond saṃsāra, it is not included within the three realms; yet within the three realms it is auspicious—because all perfect virtues revolve around it, making it the cause for becoming a universal monarch ruling over the four continents.
The Third Bodhicitta: The Ground of Luminosity
We now explain the third bodhicitta. The verse states:
The fire of wisdom utterly consumes the fuel of knowables—
Thus, this third ground is named ‘Luminosity.’
‘Luminosity’ is the name of the third-ground bodhisattva. To demonstrate that this name accurately reflects reality, it is said that this ground is characterized by the fire of wisdom burning away the fuel of knowables, emitting tranquil light—hence its name.
Regarding the awakening of the third bodhicitta, the verse states:
Upon entering this ground, the Buddha’s son
Radiates golden-red light, like the rising sun.
Just as the red-golden light appears before sunrise, so too does the bodhisattva of this ground radiate wisdom-light.
To illustrate the bodhisattva whose light shines forth, patience-pāramitā is especially enhanced here. The verse states:
Even if, in an impossible situation, anger arises,
They offer their flesh and bones, section by section,
Cut and severed over a long duration—
Yet their patience toward the cutter increases further.
Moreover, since this bodhisattva skillfully guards others’ minds and possesses profound wisdom, others are in fact not legitimate objects of anger across past, present, or future. Thus, harmful physical, verbal, and mental actions toward others simply do not occur. Hence the phrase: “Even if, in an impossible situation, anger arises.” Suppose such a vicious being gradually cuts the bodhisattva’s flesh and bones over a long period—yet the bodhisattva, far from feeling anger toward the cutter, recognizes that due to this karma the cutter will suffer in hell and other realms, and thus generates even greater patience.
Next, the verse states:
Bodhisattvas who have realized non-self—
At what time, by whom, and in what form is cutting done?
Seeing all phenomena as mere reflections,
They thereby abide in excellent patience.
Not only does patience increase due to recognizing the cutter’s future suffering in hell, but also because they see all phenomena as illusory reflections, free from notions of self and possession—thus generating profound patience. The word “thereby” encompasses the causes of patience.
Furthermore, this patience is not merely a quality corresponding to the bodhisattva; it is also the cause protecting others’ merits—hence one must suppress anger. The verse states:
If one becomes angry at another who has already harmed one,
Will anger remove the harm already done?
Thus, anger is certainly useless,
And contradicts the welfare of future lives.
If another has already inflicted harm, becoming angry at them accomplishes nothing, since the harm is already done. Moreover, anger is not only futile now but contradicts future welfare, as it inevitably ripens into undesirable results.
Some foolish people, currently experiencing the painful results of their own past misdeeds, wrongly blame others for harming them, thus directing anger and seeking revenge—wishing the harm to fail. To counteract this misconception, the verse states:
If you accept that this present suffering exhausts
The ripened results of past evil deeds,
Why then direct anger at others,
Thereby planting seeds for future suffering?
If one endures intense pain now—such as severe cutting—this arises from past acts like killing, which previously caused immense suffering in hell, animal, or hungry ghost realms; the present residual effect is the remaining karmic fruit. This final suffering exhausts all previous karma, just as a final medicine cures residual illness. Why then generate anger and seek to harm others, thereby planting causes for future suffering vastly worse than what one has endured—like a recovering patient consuming unsuitable food? Just as physicians perform painful procedures like surgery to cure serious illness, one must endure present suffering.
Moreover, intolerance not only creates undesirable karmic results but also destroys the merit accumulated over eons. The verse states:
If a bodhisattva harbors anger toward another bodhisattva
Who has already aroused bodhicitta,
Even a single moment of anger
Can instantly destroy merit accumulated over a hundred eons—
Merit from generosity and ethical discipline.
Thus, no sin exceeds intolerance.
If a bodhisattva—unaware of another’s inner qualities, or even aware yet overcome by habitual afflictions—exaggerates perceived faults (whether true or false) and develops anger for even a single instant, this destroys merit accumulated over a hundred eons from generosity and ethical discipline. How much more so if a non-bodhisattva becomes angry at a bodhisattva—whose karmic consequences are incalculable, like the ocean. Thus, no transgression surpasses intolerance in its capacity to produce undesirable results and destroy roots of virtue. As the sūtra states: “Mañjuśrī, because it destroys merit accumulated over a hundred eons, anger is so named.”
Furthermore, intolerance harms only oneself if powerless; if powerful yet devoid of compassion, it harms both self and others. The verse states:
It spoils one’s appearance, invites misfortune,
And robs one of wisdom discerning right and wrong.
After the body perishes and life ends,
Intolerance swiftly propels one into unfortunate realms.
Having thus described the faults of intolerance, what are the virtues of patience? The verse states:
Patience brings the opposite of these faults:
It attracts beautiful appearance and the joy of noble beings,
Makes one skilled in discerning right and wrong,
And leads to rebirth among humans and gods after death.
All accumulated misdeeds are thereby exhausted.
The virtues of patience are simply the opposites of the aforementioned faults of intolerance.
Hence the verse states:
Understanding the faults of anger toward ordinary beings and bodhisattvas,
And the virtues of patience,
One should forever abandon intolerance
And constantly practice the patience praised by the Buddhas.
Having explained the faults of anger, its opposite—patience—is its virtue; therefore, one must permanently abandon intolerance and practice patience at all times.
We now explain the distinction of the perfection of patience (kṣānti-pāramitā). The verse states:
Even if dedicated to perfect enlightenment,
If the three spheres remain apprehensible, it remains worldly.
Even if one dedicates patience to Buddhahood, if one perceives the practice, the practitioner, and the object of practice as substantially real, this patience is termed the worldly kṣānti-pāramitā.
The verse states:
The Buddha teaches that if no apprehension arises,
It is the transcendent pāramitā.
The patience-pāramitā of bodhisattvas on this ground is supremely pure—and similarly, they attain concentration (dhyāna), etc. The verse states:
Bodhisattvas on this ground attain meditative absorptions and psychic powers,
And thoroughly eradicate all attachment and aversion.
They constantly subdue
All worldly attachments.
“Meditative absorption” also includes samādhi, immeasurables, etc. As the Sūtra on the Ten Grounds states regarding the third ground: “When a bodhisattva abides on the Ground of Luminosity, they abandon sensual desire and unwholesome states, enter the first dhyāna—accompanied by initial application and sustained application, born of seclusion, accompanied by joy and bliss. Then, by abandoning initial and sustained application, they enter the second dhyāna—internally purified, one-pointed, without initial or sustained application, born of concentration, accompanied by joy and bliss. Then, by abandoning joy, they abide in equanimity, mindful and clearly aware, experiencing bodily bliss—described by the noble ones as ‘equanimous, mindful, blissfully experiencing.’ This is the third dhyāna. Finally, by abandoning bliss and pain, sorrow and joy, they abide in the fourth dhyāna—neither-painful-nor-pleasurable, with pure mindfulness and equanimity. Regarding the four formless absorptions: transcending all perceptions of form, eliminating perceptions of opposition, not attending to various perceptions, they enter infinite space and abide in the sphere of infinite space. Transcending the sphere of infinite space, they enter infinite consciousness and abide in the sphere of infinite consciousness. Transcending the sphere of infinite consciousness, they enter ‘nothingness’ and abide in the sphere of nothingness. Transcending the sphere of nothingness, they enter ‘neither-perception-nor-non-perception’ and abide in that sphere. These are the four formless absorptions. Regarding the four immeasurables: the bodhisattva’s mind rests in loving-kindness—vast, boundless, undivided, free from enmity, opposition, obstruction, or affliction, pervading everywhere throughout the entire Dharma-realm and虚空, extending universally to all worlds. Similarly, they abide in compassion, joy, and equanimity. Regarding the five supernatural powers: the bodhisattva attains immeasurable psychic power—causing the earth to shake, transforming one body into many, many bodies into one, appearing or disappearing at will; passing unhindered through walls, mountains, and barriers as if through empty space; traveling through the sky seated cross-legged like a bird; entering earth as if water, walking on water as if land; emitting smoke and flames like a great fire; raining water like a great cloud; extinguishing the raging conflagration of a thousand-world system; touching and stroking the sun and moon, which possess great power while suspended in space; and moving freely even to the Brahmā realm—this is the divine-foot power. Moreover, the bodhisattva’s divine ear is purer than the human ear, hearing all sounds of gods and humans near or far—even the buzzing of mosquitoes and flies. This is the divine-ear power. Further, with the power of knowing others’ minds, the bodhisattva directly knows others’ minds: if a mind is greedy, they know it is greedy; if free from greed, they know it is free; similarly for anger, delusion, affliction, non-affliction, narrowness, expansiveness, greatness, boundlessness, conciseness, non-conciseness, concentration, non-concentration, liberation, non-liberation, faultiness, non-faultiness, coarseness, non-coarseness. Thus, they know sentient beings’ minds through the power of knowing others’ minds. This is the power of knowing others’ minds. Also, the bodhisattva remembers countless past lives: one life, two, three, four, up to ten, twenty, thirty, a hundred, a thousand, countless hundreds, thousands, hundreds of thousands, kalpas of formation, dissolution, formation-and-dissolution, countless formation-and-dissolution kalpas—recalling names, clans, foods, lifespans, durations, joys and sorrows; recalling deaths and rebirths between realms; forms, appearances, voices, and countless differences—all remembered clearly. This is the power of recollecting past lives. Furthermore, the bodhisattva’s divine eye is purer than the human eye, seeing sentient beings’ births and deaths, good and bad appearances, fortunate and unfortunate realms, and their karmic destinations. If a being commits bodily, verbal, and mental unwholesome actions, slanders saints and sages, and holds wrong views and their karmic causes, upon death they will surely fall into unfortunate realms and be reborn in hell. If a being commits bodily, verbal, and mental wholesome actions, does not slander saints and sages, holds right views and their karmic causes, upon death they will surely be reborn in fortunate realms among the gods. The bodhisattva’s divine eye knows all this clearly. This bodhisattva enters and emerges from all meditative concentrations and samādhis, yet does not take rebirth according to their meditative power alone, but rather chooses rebirth wherever it best fulfills the factors of enlightenment, propelled by aspiration and volition. Because this bodhisattva skillfully trains the mind through expedient means, they accomplish all this.” Thus, we understand that bodhisattvas on this ground attain meditative concentration and psychic powers.
How do they thoroughly eradicate worldly attachment and aversion? The “and” also includes eradication of ignorance. As the sūtra states: “This bodhisattva contemplates all phenomena as dependently arisen—neither arising nor ceasing—and sees the bonds dissolving first; thus, all bonds of desire, form, existence, and ignorance become progressively weaker. While the wrong attachment, wrong aversion, and wrong ignorance of this bodhisattva would require countless eons to eliminate through ordinary means, they are all completely eradicated in this ground.” Thus, we understand that the bodhisattva’s afflictions—greed, hatred, and delusion—are fully eliminated.
How do they subdue worldly attachment? As the sūtra states: “O sons of the Buddha! This is called the bodhisattva’s third ground—the Ground of Luminosity. Bodhisattvas abiding here frequently become kings of the Thirty-three Heavens, skillfully guiding sentient beings to abandon attachment.” Thus, we understand that this bodhisattva subdues worldly attachment.
Having thus explained how bodhisattvas on the third ground attain pure patience-pāramitā, meditative concentration, immeasurables, absorptions, psychic powers, and eradication of afflictions, we now explain the distinct bases, intrinsic natures, and resultant fruits of the first three pāramitās. The verse states:
Such practices as generosity and so forth
The Buddha often taught primarily to householders.
These same practices constitute the accumulation of merit,
And also serve as causes for the Buddhas’ Rūpakāya.
Although all bodhisattvas rely on generosity and so forth, they fall into two categories: householders and renunciants—hence the distinction. Householder bodhisattvas more easily practice generosity, ethical discipline, and patience; renunciant bodhisattvas more easily practice diligence, concentration, and wisdom—though they are not incapable of practicing the others. The two accumulations required for Buddhahood are the accumulation of merit and the accumulation of wisdom. The first three pāramitās constitute the accumulation of merit; concentration and wisdom constitute the accumulation of wisdom; and diligence serves as the common cause for both accumulations. The accumulation of merit becomes the cause for the Buddha’s Rūpakāya—adorned with a hundred marks of excellence and subtle physical form; the accumulation of wisdom becomes the cause for the Dharmakāya—beyond all signs of birth.
Now, summarizing the third ground’s distinctive qualities—its basis, etc.—the verse states:
The luminous bodhisattva abides like the sun,
First dispelling darkness within themselves,
Then wishing to destroy others’ darkness—
Thus, this ground is supremely potent yet free from anger.
The bodhisattva of the Ground of Luminosity abides like the sun: the ignorance and darkness obstructing attainment of this ground are dispelled at the very moment of entering it. Furthermore, wishing to destroy others’ darkness—which obstructs attainment of the third ground—they expound the conduct of this ground.
Since this bodhisattva has already eradicated the darkness of faults obstructing virtue, their light is supremely brilliant, like the sun. Yet they feel no anger toward those who err, having thoroughly trained in patience and moistened their continuum with great compassion.
The Fourth Bodhicitta: The Ground of Blazing Wisdom
We now clarify the fourth bodhicitta, emphasizing how the perfection of diligence (vīrya-pāramitā) surpasses generosity, ethical discipline, and patience. The verse states:
All virtues follow diligent effort—
The cause of both merit and wisdom accumulations.
Where diligence blazes most intensely,
That is the fourth ground—the Ground of Blazing Wisdom.
Without vigorous enthusiasm for virtuous activity, one cannot practice generosity and so forth, and no virtues whatsoever arise. By diligently cultivating the aforementioned virtues, one attains what was unattained and enhances what is already attained—hence diligence is the cause of all virtues. As previously stated, diligence is the common cause of both accumulations. Through the lens of self-purification, the ground where one achieves blazing diligence is called the fourth ground—the Ground of Blazing Wisdom.
Why is this ground called the “Ground of Blazing Wisdom”? To clarify the rationale behind this name. The verse states:
Bodhisattvas on this ground, through diligent practice
Of the thirty-seven aids to enlightenment, ignite the flame of wisdom—
Surpassing even the preceding golden-red light.
Bodhisattvas on this ground ignite the flame of correct wisdom through practicing the thirty-seven aids to enlightenment—surpassing even the golden-red light previously mentioned—hence this ground is named the Ground of Blazing Wisdom. The thirty-seven aids comprise: the four establishments of mindfulness, four right efforts, four bases of psychic power, five faculties, five powers, seven factors of enlightenment, and eightfold noble path.
The four establishments of mindfulness are described in the sūtra: “O sons of the Buddha! When a bodhisattva abides on the Ground of Blazing Wisdom, they contemplate the body internally, diligently, mindfully, and clearly—abandoning worldly craving and sorrow. They contemplate the body externally, diligently, mindfully, and clearly—abandoning worldly craving and sorrow. They contemplate the body internally and externally, diligently, mindfully, and clearly—abandoning worldly craving and sorrow. Similarly, they contemplate feelings, mind, and phenomena internally, externally, and both internally and externally, diligently, mindfully, and clearly—abandoning worldly craving and sorrow.”
The four right efforts, as stated in the sūtra: “This bodhisattva strives diligently and resolves correctly to prevent the arising of unwholesome, unvirtuous states not yet arisen; to abandon unwholesome, unvirtuous states already arisen; to generate wholesome states not yet arisen; and to maintain, strengthen, and expand wholesome states already arisen.”
The four bases of psychic power, as stated in the sūtra: “This bodhisattva practices desire-concentration, effort-concentration, mind-concentration, and investigation-concentration—achieving psychic powers, grounded in disenchantment, detachment, cessation, and oriented toward relinquishment.”
The five faculties, as stated in the sūtra: “This bodhisattva practices the faculties of faith, effort, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom—grounded in disenchantment, detachment, cessation, and oriented toward relinquishment.”
The five powers refer to the ability to overcome opposing factors, as previously explained.
The seven factors of enlightenment, as stated in the sūtra: “This bodhisattva practices the factors of mindfulness, investigation of phenomena, effort, joy, tranquility, concentration, and equanimity—grounded in disenchantment, detachment, cessation, and oriented toward relinquishment.”
The eightfold noble path, as stated in the sūtra: “This bodhisattva practices right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration—grounded in disenchantment, detachment, cessation, and oriented toward relinquishment.”
Bodhisattvas on this ground do not merely practice the aids to enlightenment. The verse states:
They completely transcend all self-grasping.
Bodhisattvas on this ground also fully transcend self-grasping, as the sūtra states: “O sons of the Buddha! When a bodhisattva abides on the Ground of Blazing Wisdom, they relinquish all grasping arising from the view of self—such as notions of ‘I,’ ‘person,’ ‘sentient being,’ ‘life-span,’ aggregates, elements, and sense bases—including all arising thoughts, reflections, and investigations related to ownership, possessions, or attachment.”
The Fifth Bodhicitta: The Ground of Difficult-to-Conquer
We now explain the fifth bodhicitta. The verse states:
The great being abides on the Ground of Difficult-to-Conquer—
All māras throughout the world cannot overcome him.
When a bodhisattva abides on the fifth ground, even all celestial māras in the universe cannot overcome him—let alone their retinues. Hence this ground is named the Ground of Difficult-to-Conquer.
Moreover, this bodhisattva, the verse states:
Concentration is most enhanced, profoundly understanding
The subtle nature of the noble truths.
Among the ten pāramitās, concentration-pāramitā is most enhanced here. “Profoundly understanding” refers to the noble ones; their truths are called the “noble truths.” “Nature” means essence; the essence understood by subtle wisdom is called the “subtle nature”—i.e., thorough comprehension of the subtle essence of the noble truths. The four noble truths are suffering, origin, cessation, and path.
Someone might object: The Buddha taught only two truths—the conventional and ultimate truths—as stated in the Meeting of Father and Son Sūtra: “Worldly wise ones naturally comprehend ultimate reality without hearing from others—namely, the conventional and ultimate truths; apart from these, there is no third truth.” The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “Buddhas teach the Dharma to sentient beings based on two truths: the conventional truth and the ultimate truth.” Are there really four truths beyond these two?
Answer: Yes—because to clarify what should be adopted and abandoned, each with its own causes and effects, the four truths are taught. The abandoned category comprises defiled phenomena: their effect is the truth of suffering; their cause is the truth of origin. The adopted category comprises pure phenomena: their effect is the truth of cessation; their cause—the means of realization—is the truth of the path. Among these, the truths of suffering, origin, and path belong to the conventional truth; the truth of cessation itself is the ultimate truth. Although other truths may be mentioned, they are all ultimately subsumed within these two truths.
Question: Are there truths beyond the four noble truths?
Answer: Yes. As stated in the Sūtra on the Ten Grounds concerning the fifth ground: “They truly know: this is the noble truth of suffering; this is the noble truth of the origin of suffering; this is the noble truth of the cessation of suffering; this is the noble truth of the path leading to the cessation of suffering. They skillfully know the conventional truth, the ultimate truth, the truth of characteristics, the truth of distinctions, the truth of establishment, the truth of affairs, the truth of birth, the truth of exhaustion and non-arising wisdom, the truth of entering the path-wisdom, and the truth of the progressive accomplishment of all bodhisattva grounds—up to the truth of the Buddha’s wisdom accomplishment. This bodhisattva knows the conventional truth to delight sentient beings according to their inclinations; realizes the ultimate truth by penetrating the single ultimate reality; understands the truth of characteristics by comprehending phenomena’s individual and common characteristics; discerns the truth of distinctions by understanding the differentiated stages of phenomena; distinguishes the truth of establishment by analyzing the aggregates, elements, and sense bases; realizes the truth of affairs by perceiving the suffering and distress of body and mind; understands the truth of birth by perceiving the continuity of rebirth across realms; realizes the truth of exhaustion and non-arising wisdom by completely extinguishing all mental afflictions; understands the truth of entering the path-wisdom by realizing non-duality; and fully comprehends the truth of the progressive accomplishment of all bodhisattva grounds—and ultimately the Buddha’s wisdom accomplishment—by perfectly realizing all phenomena’s characteristics.”
Introduction to the Middle Way, Volume I—End
Introduction to the Middle Way, Volume II
The Sixth Bodhicitta: The Ground of Manifestation
We now explain the sixth bodhicitta. The verse states:
Abiding in profound meditative equipoise,
All qualities of perfect enlightenment manifest.
Seeing the authentic nature of dependent origination,
They attain cessation through abiding in wisdom.
Having already purified concentration-pāramitā on the fifth ground, bodhisattvas on the sixth ground, abiding in superior meditative equipoise, perceive the profound authentic nature of dependent origination. Only through pure prajñā-pāramitā can one attain cessation—previously unattainable due to insufficient superior wisdom. Merely enhancing generosity and other pāramitās cannot yield cessation.
Because they realize phenomena’s nature as illusory, having seen the path-truth on the fifth ground, and actively approaching realization of the Buddhas’ qualities, this ground is named the Ground of Manifestation.
This illustrates that all other virtues and accumulations depend upon prajñā-pāramitā. The verse states:
Like a sighted person guiding countless blind people
To their desired destination,
So too does wisdom guide merit—blind to the path—
Toward the sacred fruit of Buddhahood.
Just as a sighted person guides all blind people to their destination, so too does prajñā-pāramitā—whose nature is discerning the correct and incorrect path—guide all other pāramitās’ merits to establish the Buddha’s universally illuminating ground.
Question: Earlier it was stated: “Seeing the authentic nature of dependent origination, they attain cessation through abiding in wisdom.” How do bodhisattvas see the authentic nature of dependent origination?
Answer: This authentic nature of dependent origination lies beyond the reach of our obscured wisdom, veiled by thick ignorance—it is accessible only to bodhisattvas of the sixth ground and above. Therefore, this question should not be asked of us, but rather of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas—who have applied the excellent ointment of insight into emptiness to remove ignorance’s veil and attained the eye of wisdom.
Question: Do the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras and the Daśabhūmika Sūtra, etc., not explicitly state that bodhisattvas practicing prajñā-pāramitā see the nature of dependent origination? Therefore, we should simply follow those authoritative teachings.Answer: The profound and esoteric meaning of the Holy Teachings is likewise difficult to comprehend. By our own power alone, even when relying upon the Holy Teachings, we cannot correctly expound their true meaning. However, treatises composed by great masters who are valid cognizers—those fully qualified to ascertain truth—can accurately interpret the intended meaning of the sutras without error. Thus, only by relying upon such treatises can one genuinely understand the profound and esoteric meaning of the Holy Teachings. As stated in the verse:
Just as one who thoroughly realizes the profound Dharma
Relies upon the scriptures and sound reasoning,
So too, in the treatises of Nāgārjuna and others,
Whatever is established therein, I shall now explain.
Just as a bodhisattva practicing the Perfection of Wisdom directly perceives the ultimate nature (tathatā) of all phenomena, so too did the Venerable Nāgārjuna, having perfectly understood the meaning of the sutras without distortion, faithfully reveal the ultimate nature of all phenomena—their lack of intrinsic existence (niḥsvabhāvatā)—in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, relying upon the authoritative scriptures and valid reasoning. Now, I shall expound solely upon the ultimate nature of all phenomena as taught in Nāgārjuna’s scriptural and logical system.
Question: How do we know that the Venerable Nāgārjuna correctly interpreted the meaning of the sutras?
Answer: This is known through scriptural authority (āgama-pramāṇa). As stated in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra:
“In the southern land of Vidarbha, there dwells an auspicious śramaṇa named Nāgārjuna, who shatters the extremes of existence and non-existence, widely propagates my teachings in the world, skillfully expounds the unsurpassed vehicle, attains the Joyful Ground (Pramuditā-bhūmi), and is reborn in the Pure Land of Ultimate Bliss.”
And as stated in the Mahāmegha Sūtra:
“Ānanda, this child, beloved by all sentient beings—the Vaiśālī youth named ‘Always-Seen’—will, four hundred years after my parinirvāṇa, be reborn as a śramaṇa named Nāgārjuna, who will extensively propagate my Dharma, and later attain Buddhahood in the Pure Radiance World, becoming the Buddha ‘Wisdom-Born Light,’ a Fully Enlightened One, Perfect in Knowledge and Conduct.”
Therefore, this great bodhisattva is certainly capable of interpreting the sutras without error.
Treatises that authentically elucidate dependent origination should be taught exclusively to those who have previously planted the seeds of emptiness; they must not be taught to others. For if others hear of emptiness, they may fall into wrong views and thereby incur grave misfortune. Some ordinary beings, lacking skillful means, slander emptiness and thereby fall into miserable realms. Others, misunderstanding emptiness as mere absolute non-existence, slander all phenomena and thus intensify their wrong views. Hence, the teacher must carefully discern the differences in faith and understanding among listeners before teaching the correct view of emptiness.
Question: Since it is difficult to determine precisely for whom emptiness may be taught and for whom it must not be taught, how then can one know to whom it should be taught?
Answer: This can be known from external signs. As stated in the verse:
If, while still an ordinary being, one hears of emptiness
And repeatedly feels inner joy,
Tears well up spontaneously from that joy,
And one’s body hairs stand erect—
Then that person already possesses the seed of the Buddha’s wisdom,
And is a suitable vessel for hearing the ultimate nature.
Thus, the ultimate truth should be taught to such a person;
Its nature is explained below.
For such a listener, diligent exposition of the ultimate meaning yields no fruitless effort. As stated in the verse:
Such a vessel gradually accumulates many virtues:
Consistently upholding pure precepts,
Diligently practicing generosity and cultivating compassion,
Cultivating patience for the sake of benefiting sentient beings,
Dedicating virtuous roots toward supreme enlightenment,
And revering bodhisattvas with deep respect.
Moreover, such a listener does not misapprehend emptiness nor incur meaningless harm; rather, hearing the correct view of emptiness gives rise to merit. Upon hearing this view of emptiness, they feel as though having discovered a precious treasure, which they safeguard diligently.
They think: “If I break the precepts, I shall certainly fall into miserable realms due to this cause, thereby interrupting my realization of emptiness; hence, I must always uphold and guard the precepts without violation.”
They further think: “Even if I maintain the precepts and are reborn in favorable realms, if I am born into poverty, I shall constantly struggle to obtain food, clothing, medicine, and other necessities for survival, and thus my hearing of emptiness will inevitably be interrupted; therefore, I must continually practice generosity.”
They also think: “Only when emptiness is held together with great compassion can it lead to full Buddhahood; therefore, I must continuously cultivate great compassion.”
They further think: “Anger leads to miserable realms, causes ugliness of form, and makes noble beings displeased; therefore, I must continually cultivate patience.”
They also recognize that if virtuous roots such as ethical conduct are not dedicated toward omniscience, they cannot become causes for Buddhahood or yield boundless results; thus, they dedicate their virtuous roots toward enlightenment for the benefit of all sentient beings.
Furthermore, seeing that others cannot expound dependent origination as skillfully as bodhisattvas do, they develop profound reverence and devotion toward bodhisattvas.
Having thus continuously accumulated vast stores of virtue without interruption, the following verse states:
Those skilled in profound and extensive Dharma,
Step by step, will attain the Joyful Ground.
Those seeking this attainment should listen to this path.
“Seeking this” refers to seeking attainment of the Joyful Ground. This specifically points to the ultimate nature of all phenomena, as explained subsequently.
Moreover, as stated in the sūtras, the Daśabhūmika Sūtra says:
“Sons of the Buddha! When a bodhisattva-mahāsattva has perfected the Fifth Ground and wishes to enter the Sixth Ground—the Present Ground—he must contemplate ten kinds of equality inherent in all phenomena. What are these ten?
- Equality arising from the fact that all phenomena are signless (animitta);
- Equality arising from the fact that all phenomena lack intrinsic nature (anātman);
- Equality arising from the fact that all phenomena are unborn (anutpāda);
- Equality arising from the fact that all phenomena are unarisen (anutthāna);
- Equality arising from the fact that all phenomena are inherently distant (apratisthita);
- Equality arising from the fact that all phenomena are primordially pure (prabhāsvara);
- Equality arising from the fact that all phenomena are free from conceptual elaboration (niḥprapañca);
- Equality arising from the fact that all phenomena involve neither grasping nor rejecting (anupādāna-anapahāra);
- Equality arising from the fact that all phenomena are like illusions, dreams, reflections, echoes, moonlight on water, images in mirrors, or magical creations;
- Equality arising from the fact that all phenomena transcend the duality of existence and non-existence (bhāvābhāva-dvaya-atikrama).
When a bodhisattva thus thoroughly comprehends the intrinsic nature of all phenomena, he attains sharp, lucid, and compliant forbearance (kṣānti), and thereby enters the Sixth Present Ground.”
Since logical reasoning here establishes the equality of all phenomena as unborn, the remaining nine equalities become readily understandable. Therefore, the Ācārya begins the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā by stating:
“Phenomena do not arise from themselves, nor from another, nor from both, nor without cause.”
Here, “finally” (antaḥ) means “ultimately”; “from whatever” (yatra) indicates the temporal, spatial, or doctrinal basis upon which arising is posited; and “phenomena” (dharmāḥ) refers to all internal and external phenomena—the dependents. Thus, this verse should be interpreted as follows: “Internal and external phenomena do not arise from themselves, under any time, place, or philosophical system.” The negation “not” (na) applies only to the claim of self-arising, not to existence itself; thus, the refutation of existence is also implicitly established. Likewise, the other three positions—arising from another, from both, and without cause—should be interpreted analogously. All four positions are thus refuted in this treatise. As stated in the verse:
That phenomenon does not arise from itself, nor from another,
Nor from both, nor without cause.
The meaning of “not arising from itself” is expressed here as “that phenomenon does not arise from itself”; similarly, the meanings of the other three positions should be understood in the same way.
How do we know that phenomena do not arise from themselves? As stated in the verse:
There is no benefit whatsoever in something arising from itself.
Here, “that” (tat) refers to the sprout presently undergoing the process of arising; “from that” (tatas) means “from its own present self”; thus, the sprout’s own essence does not arise from the sprout’s own essence—this is the meaning of this position. Since the essence of the sprout already exists, for it to arise again from its already-existing essence brings no additional benefit—it was already present.
This theory of self-arising contradicts valid reasoning. As stated in the verse:
It is illogical for something already arisen to arise again;
If one asserts that something already arisen arises again,
Then sprouts and so forth would never arise at all.
If one claims that the seed, having already arisen, arises again, then what prevents the seed from producing the sprout? Since no obstacle impedes the seed’s repeated arising, sprouts, stems, and leaves would perpetually arise endlessly in this world.
There is yet another flaw. As stated in the verse:
Until the end of saṃsāra, only seeds would arise.
The reasoning is as previously explained.
Suppose someone objects: “Water, seasonal conditions, and other cooperative conditions cause the seed to decay and the sprout to emerge. Since the sprout and seed cannot coexist, the seed perishes just as the sprout arises—thus, there is no contradiction.” Furthermore, the seed and sprout are not different, nor do they arise apart from self-arising.
This is illogical. As stated in the verse:
How could that destroy that?
Since the sprout and seed are not different, it is unreasonable for the sprout to destroy the seed—just as one’s own nature cannot destroy itself.
There is yet another flaw. As stated in the verse:
If the sprout differs from the seed in form, color, taste, potency, and ripening,
You should not assert that it lacks these.
“Form” refers to roundness, length, etc.; “color” refers to blueness, yellowness, etc.; “taste” refers to sourness, sweetness, etc.; “potency” refers to functional capacity—for instance, applying a hemorrhoid ointment near the body cures hemorrhoids, or holding a divine medicine enables flight. “Ripening” refers to transformational change—e.g., long pepper becoming sweeter in taste. If the sprout and seed were identical, then the sprout would possess no features differing from those of the seed. Yet observable differences exist—for example, garlic seeds produce watery stalks—so asserting their identity is unreasonable.
Suppose one argues: “The seed abandons its prior state and assumes a new state—that is, the seed transforms into the sprout.”
This too is illogical. As stated in the verse:
If it abandons its prior nature and assumes another,
How can one say that ‘that’ is ‘this’?
The proponent intends to claim that the nature remains unchanged; but according to this reasoning, the sprout’s sameness of nature is definitively untenable, and thus the claim of identical nature fails. Even if one argues that although form and other attributes differ, the underlying substance is the same, this too is illogical, since no substance apart from form and other attributes exists.
There is yet another flaw. As stated in the verse:
If you accept that the seed and sprout are not different,
Then the sprout, like the seed, should be ungraspable.
Or, since they share one nature, the seed, like the sprout, should be graspable—
But this is unacceptable.
If the seed’s essence is ungraspable at the stage of the sprout, then the sprout’s essence too should be ungraspable, since it shares no difference from the seed’s essence—as with the seed’s nature. Alternatively, if the sprout is graspable, then the seed too should be graspable, since it shares no difference from the sprout—as with the sprout’s nature. To avoid the above contradictions, one must reject the assertion that the seed and sprout are identical.
We have now refuted the erroneous view of self-arising, which falsely claims direct access to reality. Next, we show that even within conventional worldly language—unaffected by such erroneous views—self-arising is likewise illogical. As stated in the verse:
Because the effect appears even after the cause has ceased,
Even the world does not accept them as identical.
The seed (cause) has ceased, yet the sprout (effect) remains visible; thus, even worldly perception does not regard the seed and sprout as identical. If they were truly identical, then when the cause disappeared, the effect too would vanish—but in fact, the effect remains visible; therefore, they cannot be utterly identical.
Thus, self-arising is illogical both ultimately and conventionally. As stated in the verse:
Hence, asserting that phenomena arise from themselves
Is illogical both ultimately and conventionally.
Therefore, Ācārya Nāgārjuna, without qualification, straightforwardly refutes self-arising. Some qualify the statement: “Phenomena do not arise from themselves ultimately, because they exist—like sentient beings.” But adding the qualifier “ultimately” is entirely unnecessary.
Self-arising entails further flaws. As stated in the verse:
If one asserts self-arising, agent and action become identical;
Since they are not identical, self-arising must be rejected,
To avoid the numerous faults previously described.
The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “That cause and effect are identical is impossible; if cause and effect were identical, the act of producing and the thing produced would be one.” Since identity is untenable, father and son, eye and visual consciousness, would all be identical. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā also states: “If fuel and fire were identical, the agent and action would be one.” Therefore, fearing these manifold faults, anyone wishing to correctly understand both truths should reject self-arising.
Since phenomena definitely do not arise from themselves, the view of self-arising is illogical. Yet someone might ask: “Do they arise from another?” This too is illogical. Although the sūtras teach that phenomena arise from four conditions—causal condition (hetu-pratyaya), object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya), immediate antecedent condition (samanantara-pratyaya), and dominant condition (adhipati-pratyaya)—even if undesirable, one must accept other-arising. Some hold: “The causal condition consists of the five causal factors, excluding the efficient cause (kāraṇa-hetu).” Whatever is the object of cognition is the object-condition—i.e., all phenomena cognized by the six consciousnesses constitute the object-condition. Except for the mind entering nirvāṇa without remainder, all other minds and mental factors constitute the immediate antecedent condition. The efficient cause is the dominant condition. Others say: “What produces is the cause.” According to this definition, if one phenomenon possesses the capacity to produce another, it is the causal condition for that other. For example, an elderly person relies on a staff to stand; similarly, the mind and mental factors currently arising rely upon the staff-like object-condition for their arising—this is the supporting basis for the presently arising phenomena. When the cause ceases, its immediate successor is the immediate antecedent condition—for example, when the seed ceases, the sprout immediately succeeds it as its immediate antecedent condition. If one phenomenon’s existence depends upon another, the former is the dominant condition for the latter. There are also other conditions—simultaneous conditions, subsequent conditions, etc.—all subsumed herein. Since Great Īśvara and others are not conditions, there is no fifth condition.
This notion of other-arising cannot be established, as it contradicts both scripture and reasoning. We now address its logical flaws. As stated in the verse:
If other-arising is posited based on dependence upon another,
Fire should produce darkness too.
Since fire is “other” relative to darkness. Yet this is not observed; therefore, such other-arising does not exist. As the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “That cause and effect are different is also impossible; if cause and effect are different, then the cause becomes indistinguishable from a non-cause.”
There is yet another flaw. As stated in the verse:
Then everything should arise from everything.
Everything—both causes and non-causes—should produce everything—both effects and non-effects.
Why? As stated in the verse:
All things incapable of producing are equally “other.”
Just as rice seeds, being “other” than rice sprouts, produce rice sprouts, so too fire, charcoal, wheat seeds, etc.—also “other”—should produce rice sprouts. Likewise, if rice sprouts arise from rice seeds, then pots, clothes, and other phenomena should also arise from rice seeds—but this does not occur.
Some commentators reply: “Although cause and effect are ‘other,’ not everything arises from everything, since experience shows definite relationships.” As stated in the verse:
What is produced by another is definitively called its effect;
Though ‘other,’ what produces it is still its cause.
Only a specific ‘other’—belonging to the same continuum and possessing productive capacity—produces effects;
Rice sprouts do not arise from wheat seeds, etc.
If a phenomenon is produced by another, it is definitively called that other’s effect. If a phenomenon produces that effect, although “other,” it is still that effect’s cause. Thus, only a special kind of “other”—one belonging to the same continuum and possessing productive capacity—is causally related; not every “other” qualifies. Only what belongs to one continuum and is capable of producing can generate an effect. If continua differ—as with wheat seeds—or if belonging to the same continuum yet lacking productive capacity—as with a preceding moment failing to produce the succeeding moment—then no effect arises. Thus, not everything arises from everything.
This reasoning is invalid. Let us question proponents of causality: “You claim rice seeds alone are causes of rice sprouts, and no others; only rice sprouts are effects of rice seeds, and no others. On what grounds do you make this determination?” If they answer, “Because we observe it to be so,” we must further ask: “Why do we observe it to be so?” If they merely respond, “Because we observe it to be so,” they fail to justify why we observe it thus—and thus cannot resolve the aforementioned flaws.
Moreover, it is universally accepted that “otherness” pervades everything uniformly, without distinction—this very universality undermines the opponent’s position. As stated in the verse:
Just as wheat seeds, lotus seeds, and Jātī flowers
Cannot produce rice sprouts—they lack the requisite capacity,
Belong to different continua, and are not of the same kind,
So too rice seeds lack the very distinctions claimed—since they are ‘other.’
Just as wheat seeds, lotus seeds, and Jātī flowers—being “other”—are not accepted as producers of rice sprouts, lack the capacity to produce rice sprouts, belong to different continua, and are not of the same kind, so too rice seeds lack the very distinguishing features claimed—since they are “other.”
Having thus refuted the “other” in other-arising, we now declare that the “other” between cause and effect does not exist. As stated in the verse:
Since sprout and seed never coexist,
What “otherness” can possibly exist in the seed?
Sprout arising from seed is ultimately impossible;
Hence, the view of other-arising must be abandoned.
Just as Maitreya and Upagupta appear distinct only through mutual dependence, seed and sprout are never simultaneously observable—since the seed has not yet decayed, no sprout exists. As sprout and seed never coexist, the seed contains no “otherness” separate from the sprout; without such “otherness,” claiming the sprout arises from an “other” is definitively illogical; thus, the view of other-arising must be abandoned. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “Just as the intrinsic nature of phenomena is absent from all conditions—whether cause, condition, their combination, or non-combination—if intrinsic nature remains unimpaired, the effect’s nature must be absent, since it has not yet arisen. If the effect’s nature is absent, then “otherness” cannot exist within the conditions, since ‘otherness’ implies the presence of one phenomenon indicating the presence of another—this is the seventh grammatical case (saptamī). If one posits the condition as the support, and the effect’s nature resides in the condition like a jujube in a plate—this too is untenable. If that nature is absent there, this cannot arise from that—just as oil does not arise from sand. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: ‘If conditions lack the effect, yet the effect arises from them, why does the effect not arise from non-conditions?’ The meaning of ‘support’ has been adequately clarified by Ācārya Nāgārjuna in this verse, so no further explanation is needed.”
An opponent objects: “Your claim that sprout and seed do not coexist is illogical. At the very instant the seed decays, the sprout arises—just as the two ends of a balance-scale move simultaneously: when one end descends, the other ascends. So when the seed decays, the sprout arises; thus, seed and sprout coexist, possessing ‘otherness,’ and your previous objections do not apply.” As stated in the verse:
Just as the two ends of a balance-scale descend and ascend simultaneously,
So too do the producer and produced arise simultaneously.
Though one may posit this. As stated in the verse:
Even so, simultaneity is impossible.
If one uses the balance-scale analogy to claim simultaneous arising and cessation of producer and produced, this is illogical. Though the scale’s ends move simultaneously, the phenomena they represent do not coexist—thus, the analogy fails.
How is simultaneity impossible? As stated in the verse:
“Arising” means moving toward birth; “ceasing” means moving toward dissolution.
How can these two be likened to the balance-scale?
“Arising” means moving toward birth, thus it belongs to the future; “ceasing” means moving toward dissolution, thus it belongs to the present. Hence, what has not yet arisen comes into being, and what already exists in the present dissolves—how can these be equated with the balance-scale? Both ends of the scale exist in the present, so their motion occurs simultaneously; yet seed and sprout—one present, one future—do not coexist, making the analogy invalid.
Suppose one argues: “Although phenomena are not simultaneous, their functions are.” This too is invalid, since function is not admitted as distinct from the phenomenon itself.
There is yet another flaw. As stated in the verse:
This arising has no agent—and that too is illogical.
The agent of arising is the sprout, which is still future and thus non-existent. If its support is non-existent, its dependent function must likewise be non-existent. If arising is non-existent, how can it be simultaneous with cessation? Thus, claiming simultaneous functions is illogical. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “If something not yet arisen is said to arise, and that thing does not exist, how can it arise?” If one claims that sprouts and so forth—though not yet arisen—must first exist before arising, this is untenable, since they have not yet arisen. If the phenomenon serving as the support for arising does not exist before arising, how can arising occur? Here, “this” refers to the distinctive feature of the phenomenon; “phenomenon” is in the seventh case; “non-existence” is also a distinctive feature—how can it connect with “arising”? That is, if this phenomenon does not exist, how can it arise? It simply cannot arise at all.
Someone might cite the Śālistamba Sūtra: “Just as the balance-scale’s ends descend and ascend, so too, at the very instant the seed ceases, the sprout arises.” Does this not use the balance-scale as an analogy?
Answer: Though the analogy is cited, it does not endorse other-arising, nor self-arising; rather, it illustrates simultaneous dependent origination, free from conceptual distinctions—like magical illusions. As stated: “Whether the seed ceases or does not cease, sprout-arising is impossible; thus, the Buddha teaches that all phenomena arise like illusions.”
Others argue: “If sprout and seed do not coexist, ‘otherness’ is absent, making other-arising illogical; if they do coexist, ‘otherness’ exists, validating other-arising. Just as visual consciousness arises simultaneously with its associated feeling, and eye and visible form arise simultaneously with feeling, so too eye and mind arise simultaneously as conditions for feeling.”
This is definitively impossible. As stated in the verse:
If visual consciousness requires simultaneous conditions—eye, etc., and feeling, etc.—
Which are “other” to it,
Then re-arising what already exists serves no purpose;
If you claim this fault has already been addressed—
If one accepts eye, feeling, etc., as present conditions for visual consciousness, then although eye, etc., are “other” to the already-existing visual consciousness, re-arising what already exists is utterly pointless—thus, arising is impossible. To avoid the flaw of “nothing arising,” one must deny that the visual consciousness already exists—but then visual consciousness is non-existent, making it non-“other.” This flaw has already been addressed. Thus, proponents of other-arising, even granting “otherness,” still find arising impossible—since arising is absent, both “otherness” and “arising” are absent. Even granting arising, “otherness” is absent—since “otherness” is absent, both are absent. Thus, “otherness” is utterly nonexistent; only the word “other” remains, devoid of meaning. Hence, this view is illogical.
Now we clarify that no “dependent cause” exists between cause and effect. As stated in the verse:
The cause that produces the effect it produces
Is useless whether the effect exists or not.
What use is there in producing what already exists? What benefit in producing what does not exist?
Both cases are useless.
First, a cause producing what already exists is definitively impossible. Earlier we stated: “It is illogical for something already arisen to arise again.” Since this flaw has already been exposed, conditions serve no purpose here. If the effect does not exist, what benefit do the causes provide? They are as unreal as rabbit horns. The Catuḥśataka states: “If one accepts the effect as already existing, or as not yet existing, then pillars and other ornaments decorating a house would be meaningless.” The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “If the effect definitely possesses intrinsic nature, what need is there for a cause? If the effect definitely lacks intrinsic nature, what need is there for a cause? If a cause does not produce its effect, it lacks the defining characteristic of a cause; and if it lacks that characteristic, how can it be an effect?” If both cases apply, what use is the cause? It incurs both aforementioned flaws. “Both cases” means “both characteristics”; where both characteristics exist, “both cases” exist. Since existence and non-existence cannot coexist in one phenomenon, such a phenomenon is impossible; thus, causes serve no purpose for it. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “How can Nirvāṇa be both existence and non-existence? These two cannot coexist, just as light and darkness cannot.” It also states: “An agent fixed or unfixed cannot perform two actions, since existence and non-existence contradict each other; thus, both cannot exist in one place.” If one claims the effect transcends both extremes—neither existent nor non-existent—what use is the cause? Since an effect transcending both existence and non-existence is definitively impossible, asserting “neither existent nor non-existent” to negate both adds no new meaning. If both existence and non-existence are impossible, then “neither existent nor non-existent” is also impossible. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “Nirvāṇa is designated as ‘neither existent nor non-existent’; if existence and non-existence were possible, then ‘neither existent nor non-existent’ would be possible.”
An opponent objects: “The arguments previously presented to establish other-arising have been completely consumed by your wisdom-fire, like dry firewood doused with ghee. Your wisdom-fire has already burned brightly enough—no more fuel is needed. Moreover, other-arising is an already-established worldly truth; no further reasoning is required, since worldly perception is the strongest evidence.” As stated in the verse:
Worldly beings abide solely in their own perceptions,
Accepted as the standard—what need is there for reasoning?
Other-arising is known to the world,
So why invoke reasoning to prove it?
All worldly beings abide solely in their perceptions, and since they perceive only other-arising, this is the strongest evidence. Reasoning is necessary only for what is not directly perceived—not for what is directly perceived. Thus, even without reasoning, phenomena are established as arising only from others.
This reflects failure to correctly grasp the treatise’s meaning, compounded by the deep-seated habitual tendencies of clinging to inherent existence accumulated since beginningless time. Upon suddenly hearing the instruction to abandon this cherished attachment, one feels profound aversion and claims it contradicts worldly perception. Without extensively explaining worldly reasoning, one cannot resolve this objection. To clarify the distinction between worldly perception and its contradictory objects, we first establish the two truths. As stated in the verse:
Due to perceiving phenomena as true or false,
Two natures of phenomena are thereby established.
What is perceived as true is the ultimate truth;
What is perceived falsely is the conventional truth.
The Buddhas and World-Honored Ones, having perfectly realized the natures of both truths, teach that phenomena—both internal and external, such as mental formations, sprouts, etc.—possess two natures: conventional and ultimate. The ultimate nature is what is realized by the wisdom that directly perceives ultimate reality; though singular, it is not intrinsically existent. The conventional nature is what is apprehended by ordinary beings whose wisdom-eye is obscured by ignorance; it arises from deluded perception. Yet it is not the same as the intrinsic nature ordinary beings imagine—i.e., not truly existent. Thus, all phenomena possess these two natures. The object of wisdom that perceives reality is the ultimate truth. Its nature will be elaborated below. The object of deluded consciousness is the conventional truth.
Having thus established the two truths, we now clarify that within deluded perception, there are two types—correct and incorrect—so both the objects perceived and the perceiving consciousnesses are twofold. As stated in the verse:
Deluded perception is also accepted as twofold:
Sharp faculties and impaired faculties.
Consciousness arising from impaired faculties
Is considered mistaken relative to consciousness arising from healthy faculties.
“Sharp faculties” refer to eyes free from cataracts or jaundice, and other senses unimpaired, correctly apprehending external objects. “Impaired faculties” are the opposite. Consciousness arising from impaired faculties is deemed mistaken relative to consciousness arising from healthy faculties.
Just as consciousness is divided into correct and mistaken, so too are its objects. As stated in the verse:
The objects apprehended by unimpaired six faculties
Are what the world knows.
Only what the world establishes is considered real;
Everything else the world deems mistaken.
Conditions causing internal impairment of faculties include cataracts, jaundice, and ingestion of certain herbs like Sarcostemma acidum. External conditions impairing faculties include gazing into oil, water, mirrors, empty valleys, listening to echoes, sunlight, and unusual times or places. With such conditions, even without internal impairment, one sees reflections, valley-echoes, mirages, etc. Similarly, mantras recited by illusionists and their accompanying medicines are understood to operate likewise. Such mantras, medicines, and false doctrines—seeming causes—can also impair the mental faculty. Dreams and similar phenomena will be elaborated below. Thus, if faculties lack the aforementioned obstructions, all objects apprehended by the six faculties are universally known to the world; relative to worldly standards, they are termed “real”—not relative to noble beings. Objects perceived by impaired faculties—such as reflections—are mistaken even relative to worldly standards.
Now, we illustrate the above meaning with a simile. As stated in the verse:
Ignorance disturbs the outer paths like sleep;
Their assertions of intrinsic nature, etc.,
And their taking illusions, mirages, etc., as real—
These too are nonexistent even in the world.
These non-Buddhist schools claim to have realized ultimate reality, yet they cannot correctly understand even the most basic phenomena—such as arising and ceasing—commonly known to herd-boys and women. Seeking to transcend the world without first establishing a firm foundation, they resemble climbers who release one branch before grasping the next—plunging into the deep ravine of wrong views, forever severed from both truths and unable to attain fruition. Thus, their assertions of the three guṇas and other intrinsic natures are nonexistent even conventionally.
Hence, it is further stated:
Just as the object perceived by an eye afflicted with cataracts
Does not refute the perception of an unafflicted eye,
So too, the cognition of ordinary beings lacking pure wisdom
Does not refute the stainless wisdom of noble beings.
Earlier, we refuted other-arising not merely by appealing to worldly perception, but also accepting it as the perspective of noble beings. If the refutation of arising is qualified as the noble perspective, no worldly contradiction arises. Just as a person with cataracts sees hair-threads, yet this does not disturb the unafflicted eye’s perception, so too the cognition of ordinary beings lacking uncontaminated wisdom does not contradict the uncontaminated wisdom of noble beings; thus, opponents are secretly ridiculed by the wise.
Thus, through the distinction between ultimate and conventional truths, we have shown that phenomena possess two natures. Now, we separately explain the worldly conventional truth. As stated in the verse:
Named “conventional” due to obscuration by ignorance,
False phenomena appear real through it.
The Buddha calls this the “conventional truth”;
All false phenomena are merely conventional.
Due to ignorance, sentient beings fail to see the true nature of phenomena and erroneously superimpose intrinsic existence upon them. Since this ignorance obscures the vision of true nature, it is called “conventional.” Through this convention, phenomena appear truly existent—even those lacking intrinsic existence appear to possess it. Since this appearance is taken as real within the deluded, conventional worldview, it is called the “worldly conventional truth.” This is precisely dependent origination—mere conventionality. Like reflections and valley-echoes—partial examples of dependent origination—even ignorant beings perceive their illusory nature. Yet colors like blue and mental phenomena like feeling appear truly existent. The true nature of phenomena remains utterly invisible to those with ignorance. Thus, this true nature—and the illusory nature perceived within convention—is not the conventional truth. Rather, phenomena like form and mind, established as conventional truth through the force of contaminated ignorance—which is part of the twelve links of dependent origination—become conventional truth. For śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas who have eradicated contaminated ignorance and directly seen conditioned phenomena as illusory, such phenomena are merely conventional, utterly lacking ultimate reality—due to absence of reification. Thus, this conventional truth deceives only fools; for noble beings, it appears like an illusion—dependent origination, merely conventional. It does not appear to noble beings practicing signless meditation, but does appear to those practicing sign-based meditation—because the latter still manifest cognitive obscurations (jñeyāvaraṇa) and ignorance. In the Buddhas’ minds and mental factors, no phenomena appear at all—since they fully awaken to all phenomena. Thus, the Buddhas teach “conventional truth” and “merely conventional.” The ultimate truth perceived by ordinary beings corresponds to the merely conventional phenomena perceived by sign-based meditators; their intrinsic emptiness is the noble ones’ ultimate truth. The Buddhas’ ultimate truth is the true intrinsic nature—unmistaken, thus the ultimate truth—known solely through each Buddha’s personal, non-conceptual realization. Conventional truth, being deceptive, is not the ultimate truth.
Having thus explained the conventional truth, we now turn to the ultimate truth. However, since the ultimate truth is beyond speech and conceptual thought, it cannot be directly indicated; instead, we clarify its nature through analogies that listeners can personally comprehend. As stated in the verse:
Just as a person with cataracts, due to cataract-force,
Sees hair-threads, etc., as distorted appearances,
So too, the nature perceived by the pure-eyed—free from distortion—
Is the true reality; this is likewise the case.
A person with cataracts, due to cataract-force, sees hair-threads, etc., in the vessel held in their hand. To dispel this, they repeatedly overturn the vessel. At that moment, people with healthy eyes approach, examine the location of the hair-threads, and find absolutely nothing—neither affirming nor denying their existence, nor distinguishing them as hair or non-hair, or as blue, etc. If the cataract-sufferer describes their experience, saying, “I see hair-threads,” and to eliminate this misconception, someone tells them, “There are no hair-threads here,” this statement involves no over-negation—the true nature of hair-threads is indeed non-existent, as perceived by the healthy-eyed. Similarly, those afflicted by the cataract of ignorance fail to see the true nature and instead perceive aggregates, elements, and sense-fields as possessing intrinsic nature—this is the conventional nature of phenomena. Yet these very aggregates, etc., as perceived by the Buddhas—who have permanently eliminated the habitual tendencies of ignorance—appear just as hair-threads do not appear to the healthy-eyed—this is the true ultimate truth of all phenomena.
Suppose one asks: “Is such a nature invisible? How then do the Buddhas see it?”
Answer: Indeed! Yet precisely because it is invisible, it is called “seeing.” As stated in the Dvayatāvibhāga Sūtra:
“Son of gods! If the true ultimate truth in the ultimate sense were an object of body, speech, or mind, it would not belong to the category of ultimate truth, but would become conventional truth. Son of gods! In the ultimate sense, the true ultimate truth transcends all speech, is without distinction, neither arises nor ceases, and is beyond speaker and spoken, knower and known. Son of gods! The true ultimate truth surpasses even the omniscient realm endowed with all sublime qualities—it is not the ultimate truth as verbally described. All phenomena are false, deceptive phenomena. Son of gods! The true ultimate truth cannot be demonstrated. Why? Because all phenomena—speaker, spoken, to whom it is spoken, etc.—are unarisen in the ultimate sense. Unarisen phenomena cannot demonstrate the unarisen.”
Thus, the wisdom realizing the true nature is utterly free from distinctions of existence/non-existence, intrinsic/other nature, reality/non-reality, permanence/annihilation, suffering/pleasure, purity/impurity, self/no-self, emptiness/non-emptiness, subject/object, oneness/difference, arising/cessation, etc.—since its intrinsic nature is unfindable. When contemplating the true nature in this way, only noble beings are valid cognizers; ordinary beings are not.
If one raises worldly objections, and if worldly cognition is accepted as valid during contemplation of the true nature, then the verse states:
If worldly cognition is accepted as valid,
What role remains for noble beings’ realization of truth?
What use is the noble path?
Accepting ordinary beings as valid is illogical.
If worldly cognition is accepted as valid, and this validity includes perceiving the true nature, then one must accept that ignorance has already been eradicated—yet accepting ordinary beings as valid cognizers is illogical. Anyone ignorant of a particular phenomenon cannot be a valid cognizer regarding it—just as someone unfamiliar with jewels cannot validly assess them. If visual consciousness, etc., already directly perceives the true nature, then diligent practice of pure ethics, listening, reflection, and meditation to realize the noble path would be fruitless.
This is not the case. As stated in the verse:
The world is not valid cognition;
Thus, no worldly objection arises during contemplation of the true nature.
By the preceding reasoning, during contemplation of the true nature, worldly cognition is not valid—thus, no worldly objection arises.
Then, for what objects do worldly objections arise? As stated in the verse:
If worldly conventions are used to refute worldly meanings,
That is called a “worldly objection.”
For example, someone says: “My property has been stolen.”
Another asks: “What property?”
He replies: “A pot.”
The other counters: “A pot is not property—it is merely an object of measurement, like a pot in a dream.”
Using a conventionally accepted matter to refute a worldly meaning—such situations involve worldly objections. When abiding in the noble perspective, with the noble ones as valid cognizers, no worldly objection arises. The wise should apply this principle to all other matters.
Thus, having explained worldly objections using the worldly acceptance of other-arising, we now further demonstrate that other-arising does not exist even conventionally; thus, refuting other-arising while abiding in that view incurs no worldly objection. As stated in the verse:
The world plants only a small seed,
Yet declares, “This child is my offspring.”
It also feels, “This tree is my planting.”
Hence, the world too does not accept other-arising.
For example, pointing to a boy and saying, “This child is my offspring,” does not mean the boy emerged from one’s own body into the mother’s womb; rather, one merely deposited the impure seed. Merely depositing this cause, one claims, “I gave birth to this child.” Thus, even the world does not accept the seed and child as “other.” If they were truly “other,” the child could not be called “my son,” just as another person could not. Similarly, the seed and tree should be understood.
From the reasoning presented above, dependent origination is shown to transcend the extremes of permanence and annihilation. As stated in the verse:
Since the sprout is not “other” apart from the seed,
The seed does not perish at the time of the sprout.
Since they are not identical,
One cannot say “the seed exists” at the time of the sprout.If a sprout is distinct from its seed, then the seed may be interrupted when the sprout arises. For instance, if there is a black ox and a yellow ox dies—not continuously—and if there arises another being, it does not follow that the saint fails to attain Nirvāṇa. Since there is no other inherent nature, just as the intrinsic nature of the sprout ensures continuity of the seed, so too is interruption avoided. And since there is no singular inherent nature, the seed is not identical with the sprout; thus, the doctrine of the seed’s non-annihilation is refuted, and permanence is likewise avoided. As stated in the sūtra: “Just as there is a seed, so too is there a sprout; the sprout is not the seed itself, nor is it utterly different from it; the true nature of phenomena is neither annihilated nor permanent.” The phrase “there is a seed” means: “if there exists a seed.”
Question: Should we not also accept that a sprout arises, yet not separately from the seed?
Answer: “The sprout is not the seed itself.”
Why is the sprout not identical with the seed?
Answer: “It is neither different nor identical.” Since neither oneness nor difference can truly exist, both alternatives are untenable. By rejecting both extremes—the view of oneness and the view of difference—the true nature of phenomena is shown to be neither permanent nor annihilated.
One should understand the ultimate meaning here: if seeds and sprouts possessed even the slightest inherent existence, these two phenomena would necessarily be either identical or different. But when they are entirely devoid of inherent existence—as in a dream—how could one even speak of identity or difference? The sūtra further elucidates this point: “All conditioned phenomena arise dependent upon ignorance; such phenomena are not truly existent; both ignorance and the conditioned phenomena arising from it are empty; their intrinsic nature is free from instability and fluctuation.” The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way) likewise states: “If a phenomenon arises dependently, it is neither identical with its conditions nor different from them; therefore, it is neither annihilated nor permanent.”
It must be definitively accepted that no phenomenon whatsoever possesses any inherent nature, since all arise dependently. If this were not accepted, the following verse applies:
If one claims that phenomena possess inherent characteristics and arise dependently,
Then such a claim undermines all phenomena.
Thus emptiness would become the cause of destruction,
Yet this is illogical; hence, phenomena lack inherent nature.
If one asserts that form, feeling, and other phenomena each possess inherent characteristics, inherent natures, and inherent essences, and arise dependently, then when meditators realize the emptiness of all phenomena and directly perceive that all phenomena lack inherent existence, they would thereby be slandering the inherent nature of origination while realizing emptiness. Just as a hammer is the cause for shattering jars and other objects, so too would emptiness become the cause for slandering the inherent nature of phenomena. But this is indeed illogical; therefore, at all times, one must never accept that phenomena originate with inherent characteristics. As the Ratnakūṭa Sūtra states:
“Moreover, Kāśyapa, those who correctly observe phenomena via the Middle Way do not impose emptiness upon phenomena to make them empty; rather, phenomena are empty by their very nature. They do not impose signlessness upon phenomena to make them signless; rather, phenomena are signless by their very nature. They do not impose wishlessness upon phenomena to make them wishless; rather, phenomena are wishless by their very nature. They do not impose non-action upon phenomena to make them non-active; rather, phenomena are non-active by their very nature. They do not impose non-arising upon phenomena to make them non-arisen; rather, phenomena are non-arisen by their very nature. They do not impose non-emergence upon phenomena to make them non-emergent; rather, phenomena are non-emergent by their very nature.” And so on, extensively.
Some hold that the dependently arisen possesses inherent existence, and that the emptiness of the dependently arisen is characterized by the absence of subject and object—just as impermanence cannot be described as either identical or different. If one accepts this view, then one must say that emptiness alone makes phenomena empty—not that phenomena are empty by their very nature. The Catuḥśataka states: “May I attain Nirvāṇa—not by wrongly viewing emptiness as non-empty—but because the Buddha declared wrong views incapable of attaining Nirvāṇa.” The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā also states: “The Great Sage teaches the doctrine of emptiness solely to eliminate all views; but if one clings to emptiness itself as real, even the Buddhas cannot transform such a person.”
Question: Although self-origination and other-origination are refuted due to the absence of ultimate origination, form, feeling, and other phenomena are objects apprehended by both direct perception and inference; thus, their inherent nature must be other-origination. If one does not accept this, how can one speak of two truths? There would be only one truth, and therefore other-origination must be established.
Answer: Indeed, ultimately there are not two truths. The sūtra states: “O monks, the ultimate truth is singular: namely, Nirvāṇa—the unerring, un-deceptive reality. All conditioned phenomena are deceptive, illusory, and false.”
Since conventional truth serves as the means to enter into ultimate truth, one should not analyze whether phenomena arise from themselves or others, but instead accept them in accordance with worldly conventions. As the verse states:
If one analyzes these phenomena,
Nothing can be found apart from ultimate reality.
Therefore, one should not mistakenly analyze
The conventional truth of worldly discourse.
That is, if one analyzes whether form, feeling, and other phenomena arise from themselves or others, nothing beyond the ultimate nature—non-arising and non-ceasing—can be found. Hence, one should not investigate self- or other-origination, but simply accept them as ordinary people do: “Because this exists, that phenomenon arises,” etc. This is the gateway through which ordinary people enter realization; thus, it should be accepted. As Āryadeva states: “Just as people speaking languages other than the barbarians’ cannot convert them, so too, if the world remains ignorant, it cannot be taught.” The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā likewise states: “Without relying upon conventional truth, the ultimate truth cannot be realized; without realizing the ultimate truth, Nirvāṇa cannot be attained.”
If one erroneously analyzes conventional discourse, it will all collapse. As the sūtra states:
“Just as a lute produces beautiful sounds
Through wood, strings, and hand movements,
So too, if an intelligent person investigates
From where the sound comes and goes,
Searching thoroughly in every direction,
Its coming and going cannot be found.
Likewise, all conditioned phenomena arise from causes and conditions;
A practitioner with correct insight sees them as empty and unmoving;
The aggregates, sense bases, and elements—
Internally empty, externally empty,
Existence empty, abiding nowhere—
Their nature is like space.” And so on, extensively.
Those who cling to conventional truth, seeing such a method for eliminating all reifications, become terrified and bewildered, asserting that the substantial causes of defilement and purity in phenomena must definitely arise. Though they speak thus, their words remain mere empty assertions. Why? As the verse states:
At the time of analyzing ultimate reality,
With what reasoning can self- or other-origination be justified?
Such reasoning applied to conventional discourse is equally unjustified;
How then can your asserted origination be established?
Just as self- and other-origination are untenable when analyzed with the reasoning used for ultimate reality, so too is origination with inherent nature untenable within conventional discourse. How then is your asserted origination of phenomena established? Therefore, origination with inherent characteristics is absent in both truths. Even if you resist, you must still accept this.
Some assert: Nāgārjuna’s statements denying self-origination, etc., aim solely at refuting the inherent nature imputed by conceptual fabrication (parikalpita), not the inherent nature of dependent origination (paratantra). However, such a position lacks grounding; thus, proponents of this view deserve only refutation.
If inherent origination is absent in both truths, how is it that the world perceives phenomena as substantially existent? As the verse states:
Like reflections and other phenomena, which are fundamentally empty,
They arise dependently upon conditions and are not non-existent.
Even though reflections and such are fundamentally empty,
Visual cognition, mental cognition, and perception still arise toward them.
Likewise, although all phenomena are empty, they arise from emptiness itself. All phenomena abide without differing from their causes and effects. If one understands how causal relations are established for reflections—which lack inherent nature—who, possessing intelligence, would, upon seeing phenomena such as form and feeling—whose causal relations do not differ from their causes and effects—definitively grasp them as possessing inherent nature? Therefore, although phenomena appear existent, they do not arise with inherent nature. As the sūtra states: “Just as a reflection appears in a mirror without possessing inherent nature, O great tree, know that all phenomena are likewise.”
Therefore, the verse states:
Since both truths lack inherent nature,
Phenomena are neither annihilated nor permanent.
Because all phenomena are like reflections—empty of inherent nature—they lack inherent nature in both ultimate and conventional truths, and are thus neither annihilated nor permanent. As the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “If a phenomenon has fixed inherent nature, it would be permanent, not non-existent; if something existed before and now does not, that would be annihilation.” It further states: “If one posits a phenomenon that is apprehended, one falls into either annihilation or permanence; thus, know that any apprehended phenomenon is either permanent or annihilated.” And again: “Just as the Buddha’s miraculous powers produce illusory persons, so too do these illusory persons produce further illusory persons. The first illusory person is called the ‘agent’; the illusory person produced by the agent is called the ‘action.’ Afflictions, actions, bodies, agents, and results—all are like cities of gandharvas, mirages, and dreams.” Using the analogy of illusion, it clarifies that phenomena lacking inherent nature arise from conditions lacking inherent nature.
Thus, since phenomena lack inherent nature in both truths—not only are the views of permanence and annihilation avoided—but even after actions have ceased for extremely long periods, their karmic results remain connected. Although one does not posit the ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness) separately, the continuity of mind, the non-failing principle, and attainment (prāpti) remain fully reasonable. Why? As the verse states:
Since actions do not cease with inherent nature,
Results can arise even without the ālayavijñāna.
Though actions have ceased after extremely long periods,
Know that they can still produce their own results.
How can results arise from already ceased actions? To answer this question, some posit functional capacities (śakti) of ceased actions and thus posit the ālayavijñāna, or other non-failing principles—like promissory notes—or attainment (prāpti), or habitual imprints (vāsanā) permeating the continuum of inner consciousness. But according to Madhyamaka, since actions do not arise with inherent nature, they also do not cease. Thus, producing results from what does not cease is not impossible; hence, actions remain intact, and the relationship between action and result is perfectly reasonable. As the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “Actions are fundamentally unarisen, because they lack fixed nature; thus, actions are also not lost, because they are unarisen.” Likewise, the sūtra states: “Human life spans one hundred years; I speak of living for that duration. Yet years cannot be accumulated; similarly, this process is likewise. Sometimes I declare it inexhaustible; sometimes, exhaustible. I declare it inexhaustible in terms of emptiness; exhaustible in terms of conventional discourse.”
Let us clarify this meaning further with an analogy. As the verse states:
As a foolish person, having seen an object in a dream,
Still feels attachment upon waking,
So too, although actions cease without inherent nature,
Their results still arise from them.
As the Parinirvāṇa Sūtra states: “Great King, know this: suppose a man, while asleep, dreams of intimacy with a beautiful woman; upon waking, he remembers that woman. Great King, what do you think? If this man dreamed of intimacy with a beautiful woman and remembered her upon waking, can he be said to be wise? The King replied: ‘No, Blessed One!’ Why? ‘Blessed One! Because the beautiful woman in his dream does not exist and cannot be found; how much less could he have intimacy with her? He merely exhausts himself needlessly.’ The Buddha said: ‘Great King, similarly, foolish, ignorant ordinary beings, upon seeing form with their eyes, generate delight in their minds and cling, believing form to be truly existent. Having clung, they develop attachment; having developed attachment, they generate greed, hatred, and delusion, and commit bodily, verbal, and mental actions. Yet these actions, once performed, immediately cease; having ceased, they do not reside in the eastern direction.’”
…“nor in the four intermediate directions or the upper and lower directions.”
It further states: “Later, at the time of death, when the karma determining rebirth is exhausted, consciousness is about to cease, and all previously performed actions appear before him. Just as a man, upon waking, recalls the image of the beautiful woman he saw in his dream, so too, when the final moment of consciousness ceases, the first moment of consciousness belonging to the next life arises—perhaps in heaven…” …“or perhaps in the hungry ghost realm.”
It further states: “Great King, after the first moment of consciousness ceases, a similar continuum of consciousness arises clearly experiencing the resultant ripening it has generated. Great King, no phenomenon transmigrates from this life to the next; yet rebirth, karma, and its results are obtainable. Great King, know this: the cessation of the final moment of consciousness is called ‘death’; the arising of the first moment of consciousness belonging to the next life is called ‘birth.’ Great King, the final moment of consciousness ceases without going anywhere; the first moment of consciousness belonging to the next life arises without coming from anywhere. Why? Because its intrinsic nature is free from location. Great King, the final moment of consciousness is empty of the final moment of consciousness; death is empty of death; karma is empty of karma; the first moment of consciousness is empty of the first moment of consciousness; birth is empty of birth—yet these karmas are never lost.”
Suppose one thinks: If actions do not arise or cease with inherent nature, yet can produce resultant ripening, then—since they do not cease, they can produce ripening—similarly, once ripening has occurred, it should produce further ripening. Since actions do not cease, this would lead to infinite regress.
Answer: Not so. As the verse states:
Although objects are equally non-existent,
A person with cataracts sees only hair-like forms,
Yet does not see other things like rabbit horns or barren women’s sons.
Know that once ripening has occurred, it does not occur again.
Just as objects are equally non-existent, yet a person with cataracts sees only non-existent hair-like forms and does not see other non-existent things like rabbit horns or barren women’s sons, so too, although actions do not cease with inherent nature, their ripening is definite.
Moreover, this analogy not only illustrates the definiteness of karma but also establishes the definiteness of ripening, as the verse states:
Thus, painful results arise from dark karma,
Pleasant results arise solely from virtuous karma.
Liberation is attained by wisdom free from virtue and non-virtue,
And contemplation of karma and its results is also negated.
Although virtuous and non-virtuous karma both lack inherent nature, just as a person with cataracts sees only hair-like forms, pleasant ripening does not arise from non-virtue, nor unpleasant ripening from virtue. When both virtuous and non-virtuous karma are abandoned, liberation is attained. Therefore, the Buddha, fearing that ordinary beings, applying reasoning, might slander karma and its results and thereby undermine conventional truth, declares: “The results of karma and their ripening are inconceivable,” thus forbidding speculation about karma and its results.
If one establishes karma and its results in this way, how then do sūtras such as the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, which posit the ālayavijñāna as the basis for the infinite functional distinctions of all phenomena—called the “storehouse of all seeds”—comparing it to ocean water giving rise to waves, the source from which all phenomena arise—how could all these be without origination?
Answer: Not so. The ālayavijñāna is spoken of only for those who require such teachings for their taming. Since it accords with the nature of all phenomena, it is merely the designation “emptiness” that is termed the ālayavijñāna. Not only is the ālayavijñāna spoken of, but also the pudgala (person); for those whose taming requires it, the pudgala is taught to guide them. As the sūtra states: “O monks! The five aggregates constitute the burden; the bearer of the burden is the pudgala.” For others, only the aggregates are taught. As the sūtra states: “Mind, mental factors, and consciousness, having been cultivated over a long time with faith, ethical discipline, and other virtues, later give rise to rebirth in heavenly realms.” All such statements are made with definitive intent and provisional meaning.
For whom are these statements made with definitive intent? As the verse states:
Speaking of the ālayavijñāna and the pudgala,
And speaking only of the aggregates—
These are taught for those unable to comprehend
The profound meaning explained above.
If sentient beings, habituated over countless lifetimes to non-Buddhist views, cannot penetrate the profound nature of reality, and upon hearing teachings on such nature become deeply fearful—thinking “I am completely nonexistent; I shall be utterly annihilated”—they regard the Buddha’s teaching as perilous and abandon the Dharma, losing great benefit, then initially the ālayavijñāna and so forth are taught to first dispel their non-Buddhist wrong views and guide them toward great benefit; later, having correctly understood the sūtra’s meaning, they naturally relinquish the ālayavijñāna and so forth. Thus, such teachings bring only benefit and no fault. As Āryadeva states: “If one delights in something, first examine that thing; if one thereby loses it, one is not a proper vessel for the Dharma.”
To guide them, not only is the ālayavijñāna taught first. As the verse states:
Though the Buddha has abandoned the view of satkāya,
He still speaks of ‘I’ and ‘mine’.
Likewise, although all phenomena lack inherent nature,
In provisional sūtras, they are spoken of as existent.
Though the Buddha has severed all satkāya-dṛṣṭi (view of a real person) and clinging to ‘I’ and ‘mine’, he speaks of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ as a skillful means for worldly understanding. Thus, the Bhagavān has indeed spoken of ‘I’ and ‘mine’. Likewise, although all phenomena lack inherent nature, speaking of their existence is a skillful means for worldly understanding; therefore, they are spoken of as existent. As the East Mountain Abode school states in accordance with this verse:
“If the World-Honored One did not conform to worldly ways,
Neither the Buddha nor the Dharma’s nature could be known.
Though the aggregates, sense bases, and elements share one nature,
Speaking of three realms conforms to worldly ways.
Though phenomena’s nature is nameless and ineffable,
Giving them names for sentient beings conforms to worldly ways.
Though entering the Buddha’s nature reveals nothing,
Speaking of ‘nothing’ conforms to worldly ways.
Though the Dharma’s supreme teacher sees no meaning or non-meaning,
Speaking of cessation and ultimate truth conforms to worldly ways.
Though neither destroyed nor born, equal to the Dharmadhātu,
Speaking of cosmic conflagrations conforms to worldly ways.
Though sentient beings’ nature cannot be found in the three times,
Speaking of the sentient realm conforms to worldly ways.” And so on, extensively.
Entering the Middle Way, Volume Two—End
Entering the Middle Way, Volume Three
Thus, the Yogācāra masters, unwilling to accept the above Madhyamaka view, seek to establish their own positions based on subjective interpretation. As the verse states:
Not seeing a cognizer apart from the cognized,
One realizes that the three realms are merely consciousness.
Therefore, this bodhisattva abides in prajñā,
Realizing the ultimate truth of mere consciousness.
“Abide” means “to dwell.” “Abiding in prajñā” means dwelling in wisdom. Since that wisdom belongs to this bodhisattva, it is called “dwelling in wisdom,” i.e., practicing prajñā. “This bodhisattva” refers to one dwelling in the prabhākarī (Luminous) ground. How does one avoid mistaken superimposition and correctly realize the ultimate truth? By realizing that external forms do not exist, and that all mind and mental factors arise dependently—this is called “realizing the ultimate truth of mere consciousness.” How does one realize this ultimate truth of mere consciousness? Hence the statement: “Not seeing a cognizer apart from the cognized, one realizes that the three realms are merely consciousness.” That is, this bodhisattva, using the reasoning explained above, examines the inner mind; finding no cognized object, one also does not see a cognizer, and through prolonged practice realizes that the three realms are mere consciousness. Through such practice, one inwardly realizes the ineffable “mere event,” gradually realizing the ultimate truth of mere consciousness.
If there is only consciousness and no external objects, how can consciousness arise bearing the aspect of those external objects? As the verse states:
Just as wind stirs the ocean,
Producing countless waves,
So too, from the ālayavijñāna—the storehouse of all seeds—
Consciousness arises through its own functional capacity.
Just as the ocean, the basis of waves, is stirred by wind as a condition, causing waves—like sleep—to surge forth ceaselessly, so too, consciousness, transmitted since beginningless time, arises when the habitual tendencies of dualistic grasping mature. At the very moment of its cessation, these tendencies are imprinted as distinctive habitual patterns in the ālayavijñāna, becoming the cause for future consciousness bearing aspects congruent with its own nature. When this cause gradually encounters maturing conditions, it matures, giving rise to impure dependent origination. Ordinary beings, however, conceptually grasp this as cognizer and cognized, though in reality no cognized object exists apart from consciousness. Those who posit causes such as the Great Lord (Maheśvara) state: “A spider is the cause of its web; crystal is the cause of water; roots are the cause of branches; this is the cause of sentient beings.” Just as they posit the Great Lord as the creator of sentient beings, so too do they posit the ālayavijñāna as the seed-basis for all phenomena, calling it the “storehouse of all seeds.” The sole difference is that the Great Lord is permanent, whereas the ālayavijñāna is impermanent.
They further claim that the scriptures establish such a meaning. As the verse states:
Therefore, the nature of dependent origination
Is the basis for conventionally existent phenomena;
It arises without external objects,
Is truly existent, and is beyond conceptual elaboration.
This dependent nature must certainly be accepted, since it serves as the basis for all conceptual proliferations. Just as one mistakes a rope for a snake, it would be unreasonable not to rely on the rope. Similarly, mistaking earth and so forth as the basis for a jar would be unreasonable without relying on earth and so forth; the mind would not arise toward a jar in empty space. Here, since there are no external objects, what serves as the basis for generating conceptual proliferations such as “blue”? Therefore, dependent origination must certainly be accepted as the cause for generating conceptual proliferations. Since it is the cause of both defilement and purity, it is rightly called “skillfully appropriating emptiness”: that is, because something is absent in a certain respect, it is rightly viewed as empty; and because something else is present in another respect, it is rightly known as existent—thus correctly penetrating emptiness without distortion. Moreover, this is not the nature of conceptual elaboration, since language grasps only conventional appearances; whatever is expressed linguistically cannot convey ultimate reality. In sum, the three defining characteristics of dependent origination are: (1) no cognized object, (2) arising solely from internal habitual tendencies, and (3) possessing inherent existence and lying beyond conceptual elaboration. Its role as the basis for conventionally existent phenomena is established precisely because it possesses inherent existence; thus, these three characteristics are not different.
Now let us question them. As the verse states:
What analogy is there for consciousness without external objects?
If you reply “like a dream,” carefully examine it.
Here, one must carefully examine: if someone sleeps in a very small room and dreams of a herd of wild elephants inside the room—a scenario that certainly does not exist—then, even without external objects, consciousness must certainly be accepted.
To reveal that this reply lacks substance, one must examine it critically. How? As the verse states:
If, when I say “dream-consciousness does not exist,”
Your analogy thereby becomes invalid.
The consciousness perceiving the aspect of wild elephants is, we also say, like the external object—non-existent—because it does not arise. If there is no consciousness, then no analogy acceptable to both parties exists; thus, no internal consciousness exists apart from external objects.
Suppose one thinks: If there were no such erroneous consciousness, one would not recall the dream experience upon waking.
This too is illogical. As the verse states:
If recollection upon waking proves consciousness exists,
Then external objects must also exist.
Why? As the verse states:
Just as your recollection is my perception,
So too external objects must exist.
Just as recollection of the dream experience proves consciousness exists, recollection of the object experienced also proves the object exists—or consciousness does not exist.
Suppose one says: If elephants and other forms exist in dreams, they are cognized objects, so visual consciousness must also exist; yet this is actually not the case, because sleep disrupts the five sense consciousnesses, making them definitely non-existent. As the verse states:
Suppose one says: “In sleep, visual consciousness is absent;
Thus, forms are not perceived by the eye, only by mental consciousness.
One grasps the aspect of the form as external—
Just as in dreams, so too here.”
Visual consciousness in dreams is absolutely non-existent; because it is absent, forms such as elephants—objects of the eye—are also non-existent, and only mental consciousness arises. Therefore, external objects are definitely non-existent; one merely misapprehends the aspect of consciousness as external. Just as in dreams, where external objects are entirely absent and only consciousness arises, so too here.
Refutation: Not so! Mental consciousness in dreams also does not arise. As the verse states:
Just as your external objects do not arise in dreams,
So too mental consciousness does not arise.
Eye and visible form give rise to visual consciousness—
All three factors are utterly illusory.
When perceiving form, eye, form, and mind must unite. Likewise, during dream-perception, these three factors can also be observed uniting. Further, just as eye and visible form are non-existent in dreams, visual consciousness is also non-existent. Thus, these three factors are all illusory, as the verse states:
The remaining three—ear, etc.—also do not arise.
“Ear, etc.” includes sound and auditory consciousness, up to mind, dharma-realm, and mental consciousness. Therefore, all three factors in dreams are utterly illusory; thus, it is unreasonable to assert that mental consciousness definitely exists in dreams.
Some, like Bhāviveka, think: The mental consciousness cognizes dharmas—including forms—that belong to the mental domain, and such forms also exist in dreams; therefore, internal consciousness cannot exist apart from external objects. This too is illogical, since the three factors in dreams are absolutely non-existent. If one asserts this merely to refute others, then the dream analogy becomes entirely useless, since dreams are not illusory, and thus cannot illustrate the illusory nature of the phenomenon being analogized.
Since the three factors in dreams are all non-real, the well-established fact of dreams allows us to establish the non-inherent nature of all phenomena in the waking state. As the verse states:
Just as in dreams, so too in the waking state—
All phenomena are illusory; consciousness does not exist.
Since objects do not exist, sense faculties do not exist either.
Just as the sense faculties, objects, and consciousness in dreams are all illusory, so too should one know that in the waking state they are likewise. Therefore, the sūtra states: “Just as illusory sentient beings appear, though manifest they are not truly existent, so too the Buddha says all phenomena are like illusions and dreams.” It further states: “All sentient beings in the three realms are like dreams; here, nothing arises nor dies; sentient beings’ lives are unobtainable; all phenomena are like bubbles and banana trees.” All such statements are excellent teachings.
We have discussed how, in the waking state, the three factors—sense faculty, object, and consciousness—do not arise; now consider them relative to dream-consciousness. As the verse states:
Here, just as in the awakened state,
Until awakening, all three factors exist.
Even though ignorance—like sleep—persists, for one who has awakened from ordinary sleep, although phenomena lack inherent nature, due to the sleep of ignorance, the three factors appear as in dreams. Likewise, for one who has not awakened from the sleep of ignorance, these three factors—though lacking inherent nature—likewise exist.
As the verse states:
Just as, after full awakening, the three factors do not exist,
So too, after exhausting the sleep of ignorance, they do not exist.
Just as, upon fully awakening from a dream, the three factors seen in the dream no longer exist, so too, upon completely uprooting the sleep of ignorance and directly realizing the Dharmadhātu, those three factors likewise do not exist. Therefore, internal consciousness does not exist apart from external objects.
If one has cataracts, hair-like forms—though non-existent—appear; thus, even without external objects, internal consciousness exists.
This too is illogical. As the verse states:
Consciousness arising from cataracted sense faculties
Perceives hair-like forms due to the cataract’s power.
Relative to that consciousness, both are real;
Relative to clear vision, both are illusory.
Know that, just as the dream analogy explains, relative to the cataracted perception, hair-like forms appear; relative to clear vision, both are non-existent. Since consciousness is difficult to know without external objects, this must be accepted.
If not, as the verse states:
If consciousness arises without an object,
Then wherever a cataracted person sees hair,
An uncataracted person examining that place
Should also perceive hair—yet this is not so; therefore, it does not exist.
If a cataracted person, though no hair exists, generates consciousness bearing the aspect of hair, then wherever the cataracted person sees hair, an uncataracted person examining that same place should generate identical hair-perceiving consciousness—since the object is equally absent. Thus, claiming consciousness arises without an object is unreasonable.
Suppose one replies: If an object were required for consciousness to arise, this would indeed be so. However, it is the habitual imprint left by prior consciousness—whether matured or immature—that serves as the cause for generating or not generating internal consciousness. Thus, only when the habitual imprint of prior consciousness bearing the hair-aspect has matured does such consciousness arise; otherwise, it does not.
This too is incorrect. As the verse states:
If you claim the pure consciousness’s functional capacity
Is immature, thus consciousness does not arise,
It is not because the cognized object is absent
That this functional capacity is non-existent.
“Absence of the cognized object” means the cognized object is non-existent. If one accepts that functional capacity exists, one could speak of immaturity and thus of consciousness arising or not. But we do not accept that functional capacity exists.
How is functional capacity non-existent? As the verse states:
Functional capacity does not exist in the already-arisen,
Nor does it exist in the not-yet-arisen.
If one posits functional capacity, does it belong to the presently-arisen consciousness, or to past or future consciousness? Functional capacity does not exist in already-arisen consciousness; if functional capacity were the six-case noun “functional capacity,” then consciousness would be the effect, and the cause would already contain the effect—an illogical proposition. If one accepts this, effects would arise without causes—for example, a sprout already existing while the seed remains intact. Thus, functional capacity does not exist in already-arisen consciousness. If functional capacity were the five-case noun “from functional capacity,” then already-arisen consciousness would arise from functional capacity—an illogical proposition, since consciousness already exists. This was previously explained in detail. Therefore, functional capacity does not exist in already-arisen consciousness.
Functional capacity also does not exist in not-yet-arisen consciousness. As the verse states:
Without a qualifier, there is no qualified;
Or even the barren woman’s son would possess it.
Without a qualifier, the qualified cannot exist. For example, “consciousness’s functional capacity”: consciousness is the qualifier, functional capacity the qualified. For a not-yet-arisen phenomenon, one cannot assert either “this is consciousness” or “this is not consciousness,” since both assertions are invalid. Since both are invalid, how can one distinguish its functional capacity? Saying “this is its functional capacity” is impossible. If no qualifier exists, one cannot say “this arises from that.” If one accepts functional capacity in the not-yet-arisen, then even the barren woman’s son should possess it. Thus, functional capacity does not exist in the not-yet-arisen.
Suppose one thinks: If consciousness arises from this functional capacity, one imagines the consciousness that will arise and says, “This is the functional capacity of that consciousness,” and “That consciousness will arise from this.” Thus, both the qualifier and the qualified can be established—as in worldly expressions like “cooking rice” and “this thread weaves cloth.” The treatise also states: “The first three types of conception in the womb refer to the wheel-turning king and the two Buddhas.”
This is entirely without substance. As the verse states:
If one speaks of what will arise by imagining it,
Since functional capacity does not exist, what will arise does not exist.
Moreover, only if something arises can one speak of it “will arise.” Things that never arise—like the barren woman’s son or space—definitely do not arise. Therefore, if functional capacity exists, one can speak of consciousness “will arise”; if future consciousness does not exist, functional capacity does not exist; and if functional capacity does not exist, consciousness “will arise” does not exist—like the barren woman’s son. This also explains the analogies of cooking rice, etc.
Furthermore, consciousness and functional capacity must mutually depend on each other. Thus, dependent origination itself cannot exist. As the verse states:
If mutual dependence constitutes establishment,
The learned declare it cannot be established.
Consciousness must already exist for functional capacity to exist; functional capacity must exist for consciousness to arise from it. Thus, they become mutually dependent. If one accepts this, consciousness lacks inherent nature—like length depending on shortness, shortness depending on length, and “this” depending on “that.” As the Catuḥśataka states: “If a phenomenon arises dependently, it depends on what it depends on; thus, what it depends on also depends on it; now, without cause or dependence, there is no dependent phenomenon.” This means: if phenomena like consciousness arise dependently on functional capacity, then functional capacity itself depends on consciousness for its establishment. Thus, one must ask: which is the dependent and which the established? It further states: “If a phenomenon arises dependently, before it is established, how can it depend? If it is already established, why depend?” This means: if consciousness arises dependently on functional capacity, does consciousness depend on functional capacity before or after it is established? If unestablished, it is like a rabbit’s horn and does not require functional capacity. If already established, why depend? Thus, the learned declare mutual dependence cannot establish anything. Therefore, functional capacity does not exist in future consciousness.
Now we shall further show functional capacity does not exist in past consciousness. As the verse states:
If functional capacity, having ceased, matures and produces,
Then from another functional capacity, another arises.
If one claims that consciousness, currently ceasing, imprints functional capacity differences in the ālayavijñāna for producing results, and that from the functional capacity of that already-ceased consciousness, future consciousness arises, then another result should arise from another functional capacity.
Why? As the verse states:
Since all continuums are mutually distinct.
As in: “Dhanu means expansion.” “Continuum” (saṃtāna) denotes successive continuity, like an unbroken river flow. During the continuous succession of cause and effect, due to the uninterrupted cycle of birth and death, momentary phenomena of the three times serve as the basis for cognition. Since this pervades every moment of the continuum, these moments are called “having a continuum.” Since they are mutually distinct and separate—accepted by the opposing school—the moment of effect arising later, being distinct from the moment of cause and its habitual imprints, is “other,” and thus “other” functional capacity should produce “other” origination.
If one claims this flaw does not arise because one accepts it, this too is incorrect. Then all phenomena would arise from all phenomena. As the verse states:
All phenomena should arise from all phenomena.
This was already refuted in the section on refuting other-origination, so we will not repeat it.
Suppose one replies, as the verse states:
Although those moments are mutually distinct,
The continuum is not distinct; thus, no flaw arises.
If one thinks: “These are moments belonging to a continuum, mutually distinct, yet the continuum itself is singular; thus, not all phenomena arise from all phenomena.” If this were acceptable, no flaw would arise—but it is not established. As the verse states:
This requires establishment but remains unestablished;
A non-distinct continuum is illogical.
Inherently distinct phenomena cannot serve as the basis for a non-distinct continuum—it is illogical, since they are “other.” As the verse states:
Just as Maitreya and亲近 (near-intimacy) are distinct,
So too, inherently distinct phenomena cannot form one continuum.
Thus, saying they form one continuum is also illogical. Previously, it was said that consciousness arises or not depending on whether the functional capacity from consciousness is matured or immature—not on whether cognized objects exist or not. Now, functional capacity is shown to be non-existent, thereby refuting that claim; thus, without cognized objects, consciousness definitely does not exist.
Having explained this, the Yogācāra masters again seek to elaborate their own position and establish their desired meaning. As the verse states:
The functional capacity that produces visual consciousness
Gives rise to consciousness without interval.
This inner consciousness, depending on functional capacity,
Is falsely designated as the colored sense faculty—the eye.
The habitual imprints of visual consciousness are formed in the ālayavijñāna at the very moment other consciousness ceases; when matured, they produce consciousness bearing the same aspect at a later time. The instantaneous functional capacity from which that consciousness arises is its basis. Worldly fools falsely designate this as the colored sense faculty—the eye—though in reality, apart from inner consciousness, the eye does not exist. The other sense faculties are likewise understood.
Having explained that eye and other sense faculties do not exist apart from consciousness, we now explain that form and other phenomena also do not exist apart from consciousness. As the verse states:
Here, consciousness arising from the sense faculty
Has no external object; it arises from its own seed,
Manifesting appearances like blue, etc., which fools misunderstand,
Grasping them as external objects.
Just as Phyllanthus emblica (Indian gooseberry) and Garcinia indica (kokum) appear red—not requiring external coloration like a jewel—so too, their sprouts and successive continuums possess distinctive appearances due to their own seed’s functional capacity. Thus, even without external blue and other colors, consciousness arises manifesting appearances like blue, and ordinary people grasp these appearances as external objects possessing intrinsic nature. For example, a lake filled with clear water reflects red jewels tied to nearby branches, creating an appearance like real jewels in the water; thus, one perceives the lake as containing real jewels. Yet those jewels do not exist in the lake; similarly, know that consciousness is likewise, and thus, apart from inner consciousness, no external objects exist.
There is another approach. As the verse states:
Just as in dreams, no other external forms exist,
Yet consciousness arises due to matured functional capacity.
So too, in the waking state, though no external objects exist,
Mental consciousness can still arise.
All this is untenable. As the verse states:
Just as in dreams, without eye faculties,
Consciousness arises bearing appearances like blue,
Solely due to matured internal habitual tendencies—
Why do blind people in the waking state not generate such consciousness?
In the waking state, visual consciousness arises clearly when the eye perceives color. Likewise, in dreams—if no eye faculty exists, yet consciousness arises bearing appearances like blue solely due to matured internal habitual tendencies—then why do blind people in the waking state, possessing matured habitual tendencies, not generate such consciousness bearing appearances like blue, just as sighted people do? Since both lack eye faculties, they are identical in this respect.
Suppose one says: The cause of such consciousness is not the absence of eyes, but the maturation of habitual tendencies producing consciousness bearing that specific appearance; only when those habitual tendencies mature does such consciousness arise. Furthermore, this requires sleep as a condition; thus, it occurs only in dreams, not in the waking state.
This is illogical. As the verse states:
If, as you claim, such consciousness arises only in dreams,
Then the sixth consciousness matures only in dreams, not in the waking state.
Thus, without the sixth consciousness maturing,
Why is it illogical to say dreams do not exist?The sixth is the mental consciousness. If you assert merely by verbal declaration that such a mental consciousness, with its characteristic modes of functioning, matures only in dreams and not during wakefulness, then we likewise assert that if such a mental consciousness, with its characteristic modes of functioning, does not mature during wakefulness, neither does it mature in dreams.
A verse states:
Just as lack of eyes is not the cause for visual cognition,
So too is sleep not the cause for dream-consciousness.
In dreams, when one perceives objects, there should be no mental consciousness arising from the maturation of functional variations conforming to the characteristic mode of visual cognition—since the sense faculty (the eye) upon which such cognition depends is inactive, just as in the case of a blind person awake. Hence, just as the absence of eyes is not the cause for a blind person’s visual cognition while awake, so too is sleep not the cause for the maturation of habitual tendencies giving rise to such consciousness in dreams.
Thus, a verse states:
Therefore, even in dreams, one must accept
That the eye itself is the cause for illusory cognition.
Hence, even in dreams, one must accept that such an object with its characteristic mode exists, such a consciousness with its characteristic mode exists, and such a visual consciousness with its characteristic mode has its supporting sense faculty.
A verse states:
Following this reasoning step-by-step,
One sees that each argument corresponds precisely to the same thesis.
Thus, such erroneous objections are dispelled.
Our own position asserts: In the waking state, all three factors—the sense faculty, the object, and the consciousness—are intrinsically empty, since they are objects of cognition, just as in dreams.
The opponent replies: In the waking state, inner consciousness is empty of external objects because it is consciousness itself, just as dream-consciousness is empty of external objects.
He further says: The objects cognized in the waking state are illusory in nature, since they are objects, just as dream-objects are illusory.
Similarly, he argues: If there were no dependently arisen nature (paratantra-svabhāva), purity and impurity would be impossible, since there would be nothing upon which they could depend—just as a “tortoise-hair garment” is impossible. Likewise, the analogy of cataracts is used.
Such a Yogācāra master, employing these and similar lines of reasoning, attempts various rebuttals; yet Mādhyamika sages, observing each of these rebuttals, see that they align precisely with his own thesis—and thereby effortlessly dispel these erroneous objections.
This explanation also accords perfectly with the Buddha’s teachings. A verse states:
The Buddhas have never taught any truly existent phenomena.
As stated in the sūtra: “The three realms are merely nominally established; there is absolutely no phenomenon possessing intrinsic nature. Ordinary beings grasp at mere nominal designations and mistakenly impute them as having intrinsic nature. There is no entity, no cognition, no ālayavijñāna, no objective reality. Fools, through perverted discrimination, falsely project conceptual fabrications, like mistaking a corpse for something real.” If someone claims that the emptiness of one phenomenon relative to another constitutes “non-existence,” that too is unreasonable. The sūtra states: “Mahāmati! The emptiness of one phenomenon relative to another is the lowest kind of emptiness.” To claim “a cow is not a horse” on the grounds that a cow lacks the nature of a horse is illogical, since a cow possesses its own intrinsic nature. Similarly, the sūtra states: “World-Honored One! When entering the six sense faculties, one enters the Dharmadhātu. By ‘six sense faculties’ are meant: eye-faculty, ear-faculty, nose-faculty, tongue-faculty, body-faculty, mind-faculty, female-faculty, male-faculty, life-faculty, pleasure-faculty, pain-faculty, joy-faculty, sorrow-faculty, equanimity-faculty, faith-faculty, vigor-faculty, mindfulness-faculty, concentration-faculty, wisdom-faculty, faculty of desire-to-know, faculty of already-knowing, and faculty of fully-knowing. Among these, the eye-faculty cannot be found in any of the three times—past, present, or future. If it cannot be found in any of the three times, it is not the eye-faculty. If it is not the eye-faculty, how can we even speak of its name? Just as an empty fist is a deceptive illusion lacking any substance—existing only as a nominal designation—so too, in ultimate reality, both the fist and its emptiness are unfindable. Likewise, the eye-faculty is like an empty fist: illusory, unreal, appearing as a false image that deceives ordinary beings. It exists only nominally; in ultimate reality, neither the eye nor its faculty can be found. Thus, after attaining omniscience, the World-Honored One, wishing to liberate beings ensnared in delusion, teaches the term ‘eye-faculty’—but this is not posited as existing in ultimate reality, since all faculties are intrinsically devoid of self-nature. Since the faculties are intrinsically empty, the eye itself and its nature cannot be found; the eye-faculty’s nature cannot be found either. Why? Because the eye is separate from its own intrinsic nature. If a phenomenon lacks intrinsic nature, it is not a substantial entity; being non-substantial, it is unestablished; and being unestablished, it neither arises nor ceases—it cannot be said to belong to the past or future.”
This passage continues extensively. Another passage states: “World-Honored One! For example, a person experiences pleasure, joy, laughter, and play in a dream. Upon awakening, he recalls those experiences, yet they cannot be found. Why? Because even the dream-experiences themselves cannot be found; how much less could they be found upon awakening! Thus, the six sense faculties are like dream-events. Likewise, all phenomena are devoid of intrinsic nature; since they cannot be found, they cannot even be spoken of.” Similar explanations apply to the five aggregates, eighteen dhātus, twelve āyatanas, dependent origination, and so forth—all elaborated in parallel fashion. Since none of these possess intrinsic nature, how could they possibly possess it? Therefore, the Yogācāra master’s assertion that consciousness is truly existent is refuted.
If external objects do not exist, how can meditators, relying on their teacher’s instructions, perceive the earth filled with skeletons? A verse states:
Meditators, following their teacher’s instruction,
Perceive the earth filled with skeletons.
Yet even those three—faculty, object, and consciousness—do not arise.
By “three,” we mean the sense faculty, the object, and the consciousness. Why? A verse states:
Because this is said to be a distorted mental engagement.
This samādhi is declared to be a mental engagement lacking true reality.
We must indeed accept this. Otherwise, a verse states:
Just as your eye-consciousness perceives its object,
So too does an impure mind perceive its object.
Others observing that same object should also perceive it,
And this samādhi should likewise not be illusory.
Just as, when watching a drama, everyone collectively views the same scene; and just as one person’s eye-consciousness arises bearing that appearance, so too do others’ eye-consciousnesses arise bearing the same appearance—if non-meditators carefully observe skeletal remains, they too should generate consciousness bearing that appearance, just as consciousness arises apprehending blueness, etc. Then this samādhi too would not be a mental engagement lacking true reality. This should be understood.
A verse states:
Just as eyes afflicted with cataracts perceive hairs,
So too does a ghost perceive a river thick with blood.
As previously stated: “Due to the power of cataracts, one sees hairs.” All such analogies should be similarly understood.
A verse states:
Since all knowable phenomena are ultimately nonexistent,
One should understand that inner consciousness is likewise nonexistent.
Since knowable phenomena lack intrinsic nature, the inner consciousness that bears their appearances is likewise understood not to arise intrinsically. As stated: “What is not knowable is not known; that ignorance itself does not exist. Therefore, the Buddha declares that both the knower and the knowable lack intrinsic nature.” Again: “All consciousnesses are like illusions—this is the Buddha’s teaching—and their objects are likewise certainly illusory.”
Hence, clinging to inner consciousness as truly existent, or denying external objects as definitively nonexistent, leads one into perilous danger. Only wise practitioners cultivating great compassion, sustained by scriptural authority, logical reasoning, and mantra practice, can avoid falling into such error.
Having thus explained that inner consciousness cannot exist without external objects, we now proceed to refute the view that only external phenomena possess intrinsic existence. A verse states:
If without the apprehended there is no apprehender,
Yet you posit a dependently arisen reality based on the emptiness of both apprehender and apprehended—
How can this “existence” be verified?
Without verification, asserting its existence is unreasonable.
If you claim this “existence” is validated by the emptiness of apprehender and apprehended, then by what consciousness do you verify this “existence”? If you claim it is self-verified, that is illogical: an agent’s function cannot operate upon itself—it would be contradictory. Just as a sword cannot cut itself, a finger cannot touch itself, an acrobat cannot ride upon his own shoulder, fire cannot burn itself, and the eye cannot see itself—so too, this consciousness cannot be verified by another consciousness, contradicting your own position. You say that if another consciousness were to become the object of this consciousness, your Yogācāra tenet would collapse. Hence, there is no possible means by which this “existence” can be known. If you claim it exists without being known, that too is unreasonable.
The opponent replies: Although no other consciousness can know it, it is self-verified. It is precisely through self-verification that this consciousness is known—hence its existence is established.
This too is untenable. A verse states:
Self-apprehension cannot be established.
Even claiming self-verification to establish self-awareness fails.
Here, some proponents of the Sautrāntika school are cited. To prove self-verification, they argue: Just as fire, upon arising, does not gradually illuminate itself and the jar, but illuminates both simultaneously; just as sound manifests both itself and its meaning instantaneously—so too, inner consciousness, upon arising, does not gradually apprehend itself and its object, but apprehends both instantly; therefore, self-verification must exist. Even those who deny self-verification must necessarily accept it. Otherwise, later recollection of an object—“I saw it before”—and recollection of having apprehended the object—“I perceived it before”—would be illogical. Since recollection can only take as its object what was previously apprehended, if consciousness had not apprehended it, recollection could not occur. Without self-verification, consciousness would not apprehend itself, and apprehension by another consciousness is also illogical, since it leads to infinite regress: If perception of blueness is known by a subsequent consciousness, then that subsequent consciousness must itself be known by yet another, and so on ad infinitum. Moreover, subsequent consciousnesses would not be able to apprehend other objects, since every subsequent consciousness arising sequentially would have as its object only the preceding consciousness. Sentient beings constitute a single continuum of consciousness. Sequentially arising consciousnesses resemble the petals of a blue lotus, rapidly rotating to appear instantaneous. Thus, to avoid infinite regress, self-verification must be accepted. Likewise, subsequent recollection—“I saw it before”—is thereby established. If consciousness did not apprehend itself, subsequent recollection would be impossible. Since subsequent recollection occurs—“I saw it before”—we infer that a consciousness capable of apprehending both itself and its object must exist. Thus, subsequent recollection establishes self-apprehension. With self-apprehension established, dependently arisen nature is likewise established. You asked: “By what means is this ‘existence’ verified?” Now, the above answers that question.
Now, to demonstrate that this answer is flawed, a verse states:
If self-verification is established by subsequent recollection,
Then the very basis of establishment remains unestablished—
Thus, what is unestablished cannot serve as a valid proof.
Moreover, attempting to establish genuine existence in this manner is flawed. Since self- and other-arising are both impossible, subsequent recollection itself is ultimately nonexistent. How then can an unestablished recollection serve to establish an unestablished self-verification? Even conventionally, recollection cannot take self-verification as its reason. Why? Just as smoke allows inference of fire only after fire is first established, so too, self-verification must first be established before subsequent recollection can infer its existence. But self-verification has not yet been established—how then can recollection, predicated upon self-verification, exist? For instance, seeing water does not allow inference of water-droplets; seeing fire does not allow inference of fire-droplets—since droplets need not exist, and water/fire may arise from rain or fire-drilling. Likewise, recollection may arise even without self-verification, as will be explained shortly. Thus, recollection predicated on self-verification cannot exist unless self-verification first exists. Since self-verification remains unestablished, this recollection is itself unestablished—and hence cannot serve as proof. Similarly, claiming “sound is impermanent because it is visible to the eye” is equally invalid.
A verse states:
Even granting self-verification is established,
Recollection of it remains unreasonable.
Since it is other, like consciousness arising in an unknown body—
This reason also refutes all distinctions.
Even granting inner consciousness apprehends both itself and its object, claiming recollection can recall them remains unreasonable—because recollection is asserted to be other than the consciousness that apprehended the object. Just as Maitreya’s self-verification and object-apprehension require prior apprehension by closely associated consciousness, so too, subsequent consciousness arising within oneself cannot recollect an object it never apprehended—since it is other, like consciousness arising in an unknown person’s body.
If one thinks: “Since they belong to the same continuum, they are causally related—thus recollection is possible.”
This too is untenable. Why? Because: “This reason also refutes all distinctions.” The reason “it is other” also refutes all distinctions—including belonging to the same continuum and causal relation. The moment of recollection arising after the apprehending consciousness is “other,” just as consciousness in another continuum; thus, it should not belong to the same continuum as the apprehending consciousness, nor be causally related to it. Hence, this “otherness” reason broadly refutes everything.
Question: According to your position, how should this be asserted?
Answer:
Without a consciousness apprehending the object,
No other consciousness—distinct in nature—can recollect it.
Thus, recollection—“I saw it”—is valid,
But this is based solely on conventional language, not ultimate analysis.
If, apart from the consciousness apprehending the object, no other consciousness distinct in nature exists—as argued earlier—then the apprehended object cannot be apprehended by a subsequent recollective consciousness. Hence, recollection itself has an object. What the apprehending consciousness knows can be known by subsequent consciousness. Thus, saying “I saw it” is permissible. This, however, relies solely on conventional linguistic usage—not on ultimate analysis—since it is based on illusory conventions.
A verse states:
Therefore, self-verification does not exist;
By what means do you know your dependently arisen nature?
Author, action, and agent are not identical—
Thus, self-knowledge is illogical.
Claiming “I know myself” makes the knower—the “I”—into the object acted upon. That very object known becomes the knower; the action has no separate identity. Thus, author, action, and agent would become identical—a scenario never observed. Just as the woodcutter, the tree, and the act of cutting are not identical. Likewise, self-verification is disproven—thus, consciousness cannot know itself. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra states: “Just as a sword cannot cut itself, nor a finger touch itself—so too, the mind cannot verify itself.”
Since self-verification does not exist, a verse states:
If it neither arises nor is known,
How can dependently arisen nature exist?
The “son of a barren woman” harms you in no way—
Why then reject this as nonexistent?
Dependently arisen nature arises neither from itself nor from another, as previously explained; now it is further stated that its essence is unknowable. If one accepts a dependently arisen nature that neither arises nor is knowable, then why reject anything sharing its nature? The “son of a barren woman” harms you in no way—yet you refuse to accept it as existent. The “son of a barren woman” is free from all conceptual proliferation, the domain of enlightened wisdom, and the ineffable intrinsic nature.
Moreover, you previously claimed: “It serves as the causal basis for conventional phenomena.” If dependently arisen nature existed, this might be reasonable. A verse states:
When dependently arisen nature is entirely absent,
How can conventional causes exist?
This implies conventional phenomena lack any real cause. Hence, your school’s assertion—that conventional causes exist in worldly discourse—lacks intrinsic nature.
A verse states:
Just as attachment to real entities destroys worldly conventions,
Attachment to real entities due to lack of wisdom destroys conventional dependently arisen phenomena—like an unburnt clay pot, which, under your scrutiny, dissolves like water poured upon it. Thus, all conventional worldly constructs—sitting, walking, acting, cooking—and all sensory phenomena—form, feeling, etc.—are undermined. Hence, this position yields only loss, no benefit.
Thus, those entering such paths based on personal conceptual fabrication. A verse states:
Abandoning Nāgārjuna’s path,
There is no authentic path to peace.
Losing both conventional and ultimate truth,
Without them, liberation is impossible.
Why does losing both truths prevent liberation? A verse states:
Conventional truth serves as the means;
Ultimate truth is the fruit born from that means.
Not distinguishing these two truths,
One strays into error through distorted views.
As stated in the Samādhirāja Sūtra (i.e., the Ratnakūṭa Sūtra, “Meeting with Reality” section):
“The world’s wise ones naturally comprehend true phenomena without hearing from others—
Namely, conventional and ultimate truth; apart from these, no third truth exists.
Beings, seeking happiness, develop faith in the Sugata;
Out of compassion for all, the Tathāgata teaches conventional truth for worldly benefit.
The Lion among Men establishes conventional truths,
Revealing the six destinies to beings:
Hell, animal realm, hungry ghosts,
Asuras, humans, and gods.
Low birth, noble lineage,
Wealthy homes and impoverished dwellings,
Servants and maids,
Male, female, and hermaphrodites—
All such distinctions among sentient beings
Are taught by the Buddha, peerless in the world.
Wise ones understand conventional truth,
Which the Buddha teaches for worldly benefit.
Beings cling to it, sinking in saṃsāra,
Unable to transcend the eight worldly dharmas:
Gain and loss, praise and blame,
Fame and disgrace, pleasure and pain.
Gaining brings delight; losing brings anger—
Other unmentioned cases should likewise be understood.
These eight afflictions constantly harm the world.
Whoever calls conventional truth ultimate truth
Is said to possess inverted wisdom.
Declaring impurity to be purity, suffering to be pleasure,
Non-self to be self, impermanence to be permanence—
Clutching such views, one loves them.
Hearing the Buddha’s teachings, one fears, slanders, rejects them,
Slandering the Buddha’s Dharma, one falls into hell, suffering intensely.
Fools irrationally seek happiness,
Only accumulating countless sufferings.
Those who rightly observe the Buddha’s Dharma
Transcend saṃsāra, enter nirvāṇa—
Like a snake shedding its old skin.
All phenomena are intrinsically empty,
Empty of characteristics, the supreme ultimate truth.
Hearing this Dharma, one rejoices—
Thus attaining unsurpassed perfect enlightenment.
The Buddha sees all aggregates as empty and still,
All dhātus and āyatanas likewise;
All sense faculties are devoid of characteristics—
The Buddha, the Compassionate One, knows them all as they truly are.”
Who can attain liberation without conventional and ultimate truth? Hence, clinging to Yogācāra views leads one astray through distorted thinking.
This statement that conventional truth serves as the means is supported by scripture: “In the Dharma beyond words, what is there to speak or hear? Yet due to superimposing changelessness, speech and hearing arise.” Only through conventional truth can ultimate truth be expressed. Through realizing the expressed ultimate truth, one attains ultimate truth. As the treatise states: “Without relying on conventional truth, one cannot realize the ultimate truth; without realizing the ultimate truth, one cannot attain nirvāṇa.” The expressed ultimate truth is the fruit born from the means. Means, fruit, attainment, and realization are synonymous.
The opponent says: “You show no restraint toward us; I shall likewise show no tolerance toward you. You skillfully refute our positions, declaring them illogical upon rational analysis—such as your refutation of dependently arisen intrinsic nature. Now, using your own arguments, I shall refute your acceptance of conventional reality.”
Answer: If you were like someone whose wealth, painstakingly accumulated over lifetimes, is stolen by another who feigns friendship and offers poisoned food—only to steal again, repaying kindness with enmity—you may act as you wish. What harm is there to us, who gain supreme benefit?
A verse states:
As you posit dependently arisen phenomena,
I do not accept your conventional reality.
Though they are ultimately nonexistent,
I declare them existent conventionally.
You assert your school’s dependently arisen intrinsic nature as realized by enlightened wisdom—I do not accept such conventional reality. If so, how? Though ultimately nonexistent, they are commonly accepted in the world; I declare them existent solely on that worldly basis—thus, such declarations serve to negate them. As the Buddha states: “The world disputes with me, but I dispute not with the world. Whatever the world declares existent, I too declare existent; whatever the world declares nonexistent, I too declare nonexistent.”
A verse states:
Just as Arhats, having entered quiescence,
Have no conventional existence whatsoever—
If conventional reality were nonexistent even in the world,
I would not declare it existent conventionally.
Just as Arhats, having entered the sublime nirvāṇa without remainder, possess no conventional existence whatsoever—if conventional reality were nonexistent even in the world, like the aggregates of Arhats—I would not declare them existent conventionally. Hence, I accept conventional reality solely on the basis of worldly consensus—not by intrinsic validity.
This is merely worldly consensus—thus, refutation should target only those who hold it; others are irrelevant. A verse states:
If the world poses no obstacle to you,
Refute this worldly consensus first.
You may first dispute with the world—
Then, if victorious, I shall follow you.
We exert great effort to dispel worldly conventional reality. You may refute this worldly consensus—if the world poses no obstacle to you, I shall assist you. Yet the world will inevitably oppose you—thus, I shall merely observe. You may first dispute with the world; if you prevail, I shall follow you. But you will surely be defeated by the world—hence, I shall rely solely on the world’s overwhelming strength.
The opponent says: “If you fear worldly obstacles, accepting conventional reality without valid reasoning, you should likewise fear scriptural obstacles and accept Yogācāra. As the sūtra states: ‘These three realms are solely mind.’”
Answer: The Buddha’s sūtras are like a lapis lazuli ground. You fail to discern their distinctive natures, mistaking them for actual “mind-water.” Now desiring to draw this “mind-water,” your intellect resembles an unburnt clay pot—attempting to draw water will shatter it into a hundred pieces, inviting ridicule from those who understand its true nature. This sūtra’s intended meaning is not as your intellect interprets it.
Then what is the sūtra’s meaning? A verse states:
Bodhisattvas on the sixth ground directly realize
That the three realms are solely mind—
To refute the permanent self as agent,
They realize the mind alone is the agent.
As previously stated in the sūtra: “Observing dependent origination according to its characteristic mode, one sees only the pure mass of suffering, the pure tree of suffering—within which there is neither agent nor experiencer. Then one reflects: ‘Action arises only due to grasping an agent; without an agent, action cannot be found in ultimate reality.’ Further, one reflects: ‘These three realms are solely mind; the Tathāgata explains the twelve links of dependent origination, all grounded in one mind.’” And so on, extensively. Thus, refuting the permanent self as agent, one sees, conventionally, that only the inner mind is the agent—thereby realizing the three realms are solely mind. “Bodhi” means omniscience; “sattva” means thought. Because one possesses such thought, one is called a bodhisattva. Alternatively, one is called a bodhisattva because one possesses unwavering aspiration toward buddhahood—or because one is an individual destined for buddhahood. This omits intermediate phrases. “Realization” means direct understanding; “direct realization” means personally experiencing the Dharmadhātu. “Present” refers to the sixth bhūmi. These are explanatory notes.
Having thus explained the sūtra’s meaning, another sūtra clarifies it. A verse states:
To enhance the wisdom of the learned,
The Omniscient One, in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra,
Uttered this vajra-like phrase—
To crush the mountain-peaks of non-Buddhist views.
This refers to the verse quoted here. As the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra states: “Others speak of sentient beings, continuums, aggregates, conditions, particles, intrinsic nature, sovereignty, and agency—I say it is solely mind.”
To explain this, a verse states:
In their respective treatises, non-Buddhists speak of sentient beings, etc.
The Buddha, seeing them as non-agents,
Says the agent of the world is solely mind.
“Non-Buddhists” refers primarily to most non-Buddhist schools. Some Buddhist groups also provisionally posit “sentient beings,” etc.; or they may not be considered legitimate Buddhist groups—since, like non-Buddhists, they cannot correctly interpret the Buddha’s sūtras. As the treatise states: “Whoever speaks of persons and aggregates—worldly Sāṃkhyas, owl-disciples, naked ascetics—ask them whether they exist apart from existence and non-existence. Thus, only the Buddha’s teaching proclaims the nectar-like Dharma, transcending existence and non-existence—this is the supreme excellence of the true Dharma.”
Know that clinging to aggregates, etc., is exclusively non-Buddhist. “Respectively” indicates different schools. This shows that non-Buddhist schools also posit aggregates, etc., as agents—since saṃsāra is beginningless, what erroneous view has not arisen? What erroneous view will not arise? Even today, proponents of “pure cessation” and similar doctrines posit real aggregates as agents. The Buddhas, seeing that such “sentient beings” are not agents, declare that mind alone is the agent of the world—this is the sūtra’s meaning.
Having thus explained the sūtra’s meaning, and having refuted alternative agents, the textual and semantic exposition is complete—thus, the word “solely” does not negate knowable phenomena. We further clarify that external objects are not negated through another approach. A verse states:
Just as one who realizes truth is called “Buddha,”
So too is “mind” the foremost principle.
The sūtra says “the world is solely mind”—
Thus, negating form is not the sūtra’s intent.
Just as one who awakens to truth is called “Buddha” (omitting the preceding clause), so too “mind” is the foremost principle. Negating other phenomena as primary, it says “the three realms are solely mind.” Thus, it merely negates form, etc., as primary—not asserting that only mind exists and form, etc., are utterly nonexistent. It negates their status as existent. Thus, only our interpretation accords with the sūtra’s meaning.
If your school holds otherwise, a verse states:
If knowing “these are solely mind”
Necessitates rejecting external form apart from mind—
Why does the Tathāgata, in that sūtra,
Say “mind arises from ignorance and action”?
The Daśabhūmika Sūtra states that consciousness arises from ignorance and volitional formations—not intrinsically existent. If consciousness existed intrinsically, it would not depend on ignorance and volitional formations—but it does depend on them; thus, consciousness is ultimately not intrinsically existent. Just as a person with cataracts sees hairs only due to distorted causes—if those causes are absent, the hairs do not appear. As the sūtra states: “Bodhisattvas, observing dependent origination according to its characteristic mode, reflect: ‘In ultimate reality, ignorance is ignorance of the truths; the karmic actions produced by ignorance are the formations; the initial consciousness arising from formations is consciousness; the four remaining aggregates co-arising with consciousness are name-and-form; the growth of name-and-form is the six sense bases; the coming together of sense base, object, and consciousness is contact; feeling co-arising with contact is feeling; craving for feeling is craving; increased craving is grasping; volitional formations arising from grasping are becoming; the resultant aggregates arising from becoming are birth; aging is the maturation of aggregates; death is the disintegration of aggregates; grief is the mental anguish arising from death’s separation, accompanied by ignorance and attachment; lamentation is speech arising from grief; suffering is the decline of the five sense faculties; sorrow is the decline of the mental faculty; and anguish is the intensification of suffering and sorrow. Thus, only the pure mass of suffering, the pure tree of suffering, arises—within which there is neither agent nor experiencer. Ignorance has two functions: one obscures the object; the other serves as the cause for formations. Formations have two functions: one produces future ripening; the other serves as the cause for consciousness. Consciousness has two functions: one perpetuates saṃsāric continuity; the other serves as the cause for name-and-form. Name-and-form has two functions: one mutually supports the other; the other serves as the cause for the six sense bases. The six sense bases have two functions: one apprehends its own object; the other serves as the cause for contact. Contact has two functions: one contacts the object; the other serves as the cause for feeling. Feeling has two functions: one experiences pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral objects; the other serves as the cause for craving. Craving has two functions: one clings to pleasant objects; the other serves as the cause for grasping. Grasping has two functions: one perpetuates afflictions; the other serves as the cause for becoming. Becoming has two functions: one produces rebirth in other realms; the other serves as the cause for birth. Birth has two functions: one produces aggregates; the other serves as the cause for aging. Aging has two functions: one transforms the sense faculties; the other serves as the cause for death. Death has two functions: one destroys conditioned phenomena; the other serves as the cause for continued ignorance.’”
This explains that consciousness arises from ignorance and volitional formations. Thus, distorted causes are required for consciousness to arise; without them, it does not arise. How? As the sūtra states: “With the cessation of ignorance, formations cease—because without ignorance as a condition, formations cease entirely, receiving no further support. With the cessation of formations, consciousness ceases—because without formations as a condition, consciousness ceases entirely, receiving no further support.” And so on, extensively. Another passage states: “Further reflecting: ‘Conditioned phenomena arise only when assembled; they do not arise when separated. They arise only when conditions gather; they do not arise when conditions do not gather. I thus understand that conditioned phenomena harbor many faults and should abandon their assembly and gathering. Yet, to mature sentient beings, I do not completely eliminate formations.’ O sons of the Buddha! Bodhisattvas thus observe conditioned phenomena as fraught with many faults, lacking intrinsic nature, neither arising nor ceasing.” Who, possessing a mind, upon seeing this teaching, would assert consciousness as truly existent? Such an assertion stems solely from self-delusion.
Hence, the sūtra’s statement “solely mind” aims to show mind as the foremost principle—not to deny form. It emphasizes mind as primary. A verse states:
Sentient and environmental worlds,
With their myriad differences, are established by mind.
The sūtra states beings arise from karma;
When mind ceases, karma ceases.
The sentient world comprises beings’ individual karmic results and afflictions. The environmental world arises from collective karmic results of sentient beings—from the wind-dhātu below up to the palace of the Akaniṣṭha Heaven. Just as peacocks’ feathers display varied colors due to their individual karma, lotuses display varied colors due to the collective karma of all sentient beings—similarly, other phenomena should be understood. As the sūtra states: “According to sentient beings’ karmic force, black mountains arise at the appropriate time—like hells and heavenly palaces, sword-forests and jewel-trees.” Thus, all beings arise from karma, and karma arises from mind—only where mind exists does karma exist; where mind is absent, karma is absent. Hence, mind is the principal cause of saṃsāric continuity—other factors are not. Thus, the sūtra establishes mind as primary—not external form.
A verse states:
If you claim form exists,
Yet it is not the agent, unlike mind—
Then negating other agents apart from mind
Does not negate form itself.
Form refers to clusters of particles. Some posit intrinsic nature, etc., as agents; others posit inner mind as agent. That form is not an agent is uncontested. Thus, we examine intrinsic nature, etc., as agents. To refute the absence of agents, the sūtra declares mind alone—the sole agent possessing agency—is the agent. By refuting intrinsic nature, etc., as agents, the contested ground is secured. Like two kings competing for one kingdom—expelling the rival king secures the kingdom for oneself. Citizens are needed by both kings—thus, citizens remain undamaged. Likewise, form is needed by both sides—undamaged. Hence, form must be accepted as existent.
Based on the foregoing reasoning, a verse states:
If abiding by worldly conventions,
The five aggregates are existent.
If authentic wisdom arises,
The practitioner’s five aggregates are nonexistent.
From this, we understand. A verse states:
Without form, one should not cling to mind;
With mind, one should not deny form.
When valid reasoning establishes form as nonexistent, one should likewise establish mind as nonexistent—since both lack valid reasoning. When mind is established as existent, one should likewise establish form as existent—since both are conventionally accepted.
Scriptural authority confirms this too. A verse states:
The Prajñāpāramitā sūtras jointly negate them;
The Abhidharma treatises jointly affirm them.
The five aggregates—form, etc.—are explained as existent in the Abhidharma, via intrinsic and common characteristics. Yet the Buddha, in the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras, jointly negates the five aggregates. As stated: “Subhūti, form is empty of intrinsic nature.” And so on, extensively, up to “consciousness is empty of intrinsic nature.”
Thus, a verse states:
Even if the sequence of the two truths is disrupted,
Your “real entities” remain unestablished.
Your view—denying form while asserting only inner consciousness—disrupts the sequence of conventional and ultimate truth established by scriptural authority and valid reasoning. Even if the two truths’ sequence is disrupted, your “real entities” remain unestablished. Why? Because they have already been refuted—thus, your effort is futile.
A verse states:
Through this sequence, one knows all phenomena:
Ultimately unarisen, conventionally arisen.
Question: Though this sūtra’s meaning is as stated, other sūtras definitively establish “mind-only.” As stated: “External objects are entirely nonexistent; mind transforms into various appearances—like body, enjoyment, and environment—thus I say ‘mind-only.’” “Body” refers to the six sense faculties—eye, etc.; “enjoyment” refers to external objects—form, etc.; “environment” refers to the physical world. Since external objects do not exist apart from inner mind, when consciousness arises, it transforms into appearances resembling sense faculties, objects, and environments—thus, body, etc., appear as external objects separate from inner consciousness. Hence, the three realms are “mind-only.”
Answer: This sūtra too has a concealed meaning. A verse states:
The sūtra states external objects are entirely nonexistent;
Mind transforms into various phenomena—
This is taught to those attached to beautiful forms,
To negate form—not definitive meaning.
Know this sūtra is provisional, not definitive. Sentient beings, attached to beautiful forms, revolve under greed, hatred, pride, etc., lacking freedom. Due to this attachment, they commit grave misdeeds, forfeiting merit and wisdom. The Buddha’s concealed intention is to counteract afflictions arising from attachment to form—thus, he teaches “mind-only.” Just as, for greedy beings, he teaches the skeleton meditation—though unreal, it is taught to counteract greed.
Furthermore, this sūtra is provisional, not definitive—how is this determined? By scriptural authority and reasoning. A verse states:
The Buddha declares this is provisional;
Without such declaration, reasoning alone cannot establish it as provisional.
Not only this sūtra is provisional—others are too. A verse states:
Other sūtras expressing similar meanings
Likewise indicate provisional meaning.What kind of sūtras are those with such characteristics? They refer to sūtras such as the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, which states: among the three natures—the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva), the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva), and the perfected nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva)—the imagined nature is devoid of intrinsic existence (niḥsvabhāva), whereas the dependent nature possesses intrinsic existence (svabhāva). Likewise, it states: “The ādāna-vijñāna is extremely profound and subtle; all seeds flow forth like a torrential river. I do not expound this to ordinary beings and fools, lest they misconstrue it as a self (ātman).” Furthermore, it says: “Just as a physician prescribes various medicines for different patients, so too does the Buddha teach ‘mind-only’ (cittamātra) for sentient beings.” Such teachings clearly indicate that these are provisional (neyārtha), not definitive (nītārtha).
Similarly, the sūtra states: “The Bhagavān teaches the tathāgatagarbha in the sūtras: it is intrinsically luminous and originally pure, fully endowed with the thirty-two marks, and exists within the bodies of all sentient beings. The Bhagavān further states: ‘Like an invaluable jewel wrapped in a soiled garment, the tathāgatagarbha is enveloped by the garments of the aggregates (skandhas), elements (dhātus), and sense-bases (āyatanas); obscured by attachment, aversion, and ignorance; and stained by the defilements of conceptual proliferation.’ Yet it remains eternal, unchanging, and immutable. Bhagavān! How does the tathāgatagarbha taught by the Tathāgata differ from the ‘self’ (ātman) posited by non-Buddhist schools? Bhagavān! Non-Buddhists also assert a ‘self’ that is eternal, uncreated, attributeless, all-pervasive, and indestructible.” The Bhagavān replies: “Mahāmati! The tathāgatagarbha I proclaim differs entirely from the ‘self’ asserted by non-Buddhists. Mahāmati! The Buddhas, Tathāgatas, and Fully Enlightened Ones designate the tathāgatagarbha using terms such as emptiness (śūnyatā), reality (tattva), nirvāṇa, non-arising (anutpāda), signlessness (animitta), and wishlessness (apraṇihita). This is done to alleviate the fear of ‘no-self’ (anātman) experienced by ordinary beings, and to reveal the domain free from discrimination and the signless realm through the gateway of the tathāgatagarbha. Mahāmati! Bodhisattva-mahāsattvas of the present and future must not cling to a ‘self’. Mahāmati! Just as a potter, using clay, his own hands, skill, a rod, water, rope, and effort, fashions various vessels from a single mass of clay, so too does the Tathāgata, abiding in the truth of ‘no-self’ (anātman) in phenomena and free from all signs, employ diverse skillful means and varied expressions to teach the tathāgatagarbha or ‘no-self’. Mahāmati! Therefore, the tathāgatagarbha I teach differs entirely from the ‘self’ taught by non-Buddhists. Mahāmati! The Tathāgata teaches the tathāgatagarbha precisely to attract and guide non-Buddhists who cling to the notion of a ‘self’. Thus, the teaching of the tathāgatagarbha aims to enable sentient beings entrenched in the view of a substantial ‘self’ to swiftly attain unsurpassed perfect enlightenment (anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi), having first cultivated the intention (adhimukti) to enter the three gateways to liberation (vimokṣamukha).”
That sūtra further states: “Mahāmati! Emptiness (śūnyatā) is non-arising, non-dual, and devoid of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva). These principles pervade all Buddhist sūtras.” Hence, sūtras exhibiting such characteristics—which the Yogācāra masters regard as definitive—are shown by this very teaching to be entirely provisional (neyārtha), not definitive (nītārtha).
Next, we shall clarify their provisional nature using valid reasoning. A verse states:
If the knowable (jñeya) is nonexistent,
Then the knower (jñātṛ) is easily eliminated too.
Since the knowable is absent, knowledge itself is negated;
Thus, the Buddha first negates the knowable.
The Buddhas and World-Honored Ones gradually guide sentient beings into realizing the absence of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva). Just as those cultivating merit and virtue readily penetrate the true nature (dharmatā) of phenomena, merit-cultivation serves as a skillful means (upāya) for penetrating dharmatā; therefore, practices such as generosity (dāna) are taught first. Likewise, negating the knowable is a skillful means for penetrating the absence of a ‘self’ (anātman). Hence, the Buddhas and World-Honored Ones first negate the knowable, because once one realizes the knowable lacks intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva), it becomes easy to realize the knower likewise lacks intrinsic nature. Among those who realize the knowable is devoid of intrinsic nature, some—by their own power alone—can directly realize the knower’s lack of intrinsic nature, while others grasp it immediately upon hearing a brief explanation. Thus, the Buddha first negates the knowable.
Wise persons should interpret other sūtras similarly. A verse states:
Having understood this hermeneutic principle,
All sūtras whose meaning is not explicit
Should be interpreted as provisional (neyārtha);
Only teachings on emptiness (śūnyatā) are definitive (nītārtha).
All sūtras that do not explicitly elucidate the dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) of non-arising (anutpāda) etc., should be understood as skillful means (upāya) for realizing the absence of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva). For example: “The great elements (mahābhūta) are not seen by the eye; how can the eye see what they produce? To refute attachment to form (rūpa), the Buddha speaks thus about form.” Another sūtra states: “The meaning of impermanence (anityatā) is that there is no meaning (artha).”
Teachings explicitly expounding emptiness (śūnyatā) should be recognized as truly definitive (nītārtha). For instance: “Know that the Sugata’s exposition of emptiness distinguishes definitive sūtras; if a teaching posits sentient beings (sattva), ‘numbered beings’ (saṃkhyāvādin), or ‘persons’ (pudgala), that teaching is provisional (neyārtha).” Another passage states: “Within a thousand-world system, the sūtras I have spoken cannot exhaustively convey the meaning; though words differ, the meaning is singular. By practicing just one thing, one practices all things; all the infinite Dharma teachings spoken by all Buddhas ultimately declare ‘all phenomena lack a self’ (sarva-dharma-anātman). One who skillfully comprehends the meaning can study here and easily attain the Dharma.” Know that sūtras such as the Anantamati-sūtra elaborate similarly at length.
Now, let us briefly explain a small portion. Just as a snake is falsely imputed onto a coiled rope—a case of the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva), since the snake does not exist there—the snake itself, if it existed, would be the perfected nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva), not the imagined nature. Similarly, intrinsic nature (svabhāva) is the imagined nature when superimposed upon dependently originated (paratantra) phenomena. The treatise states: “Intrinsic nature (svabhāva) is unproduced (akṛta) and does not depend on other factors for its establishment.” Thus, intrinsic nature is not a produced phenomenon (kṛta-dharma). Likewise, the imagined nature falsely imputed upon the illusory, dependently originated phenomena visible to us is, from the perspective of the Buddha’s realization, the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), not the imagined nature. Because one realizes intrinsic nature (svabhāva) solely by directly realizing it—without apprehending any produced characteristic—one attains the truth (satya); thus, one is called a Buddha (buddha). Therefore, one must understand the three natures—the imagined, dependent, and perfected—and thereby elucidate the esoteric intent (abhiprāya) of the sūtras.
Since the apprehended (grāhya) and the apprehender (grāhaka) have no existence apart from the dependent nature (paratantra), both are designated as the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva) when imputed upon the dependent nature. This requires careful reflection. Having concluded this tangential discussion, we now proceed to the main argument.
Madhyamakāvatāra, Chapter Three — Concluded
Madhyamakāvatāra, Chapter Four
Having refuted production from another (para-saṃbhava), we now refute co-production (sahaja-saṃbhava). A verse states:
Co-production is equally unreasonable,
As it incurs all the faults previously stated.
Those who posit co-production claim phenomena arise both from themselves (sva-saṃbhava) and from others (para-saṃbhava). For example, a pot arises from a clay lump, a rod, a wheel, a rope, water, and a potter; the pot and the clay lump are not distinct entities—the pot must already exist in the nature of the clay lump for it to arise—hence, it arises from itself. Simultaneously, the potter’s effort and other external factors also produce the pot; thus, it arises from others. Consequently, they assert co-production. External phenomena follow the same pattern; internal phenomena likewise require both self- and other-production to arise. Their school establishes nine categories—life (jīva), non-life (ajīva), merit (puṇya), demerit (pāpa), influx (āsrava), discipline (śīla), etc.—as real. For instance, Maitreya must already possess the life-faculty (jīvita-indriya) from past lives to be born now; thus, he arises from himself. Since Maitreya and the life-faculty are not distinct entities—and since the life-faculty is held to traverse various realms (e.g., heaven)—the life-faculty is deemed capable of rebirth. Maitreya also arises from his parents, wholesome/unwholesome actions (dharma/adharma), and influxes (āsrava); thus, he arises from others. Previously, we refuted production from self alone and production from other alone; this poses no difficulty for our position, as we deny both exclusive self-production and exclusive other-production.
Refutation: This assertion is likewise unreasonable, as it incurs all the faults previously enumerated. Just as the faults identified in the prior two positions apply to co-production, co-production is definitively untenable. If the pot already exists in the nature of the clay lump, it need not arise—since it already exists. As previously refuted: “Arising from itself yields no benefit; arising again after already arising is equally illogical.” Similarly, asserting that Maitreya arises only because the life-faculty already contains him is untenable. Since water, rope, and wheels inherently lack pots, pots cannot arise from them. As previously refuted: “If dependence on another implies other-production, fire should produce darkness; everything should produce everything else, since all non-producers share the same nature.” The same reasoning applies to asserting Maitreya arises from his parents, etc.
As previously explained, both self-production and other-production are unreasonable, whether examined conventionally (saṃvṛti) or ultimately (paramārtha). Similarly, co-production is definitively untenable based on the preceding reasoning. A verse states:
This is neither conventional nor ultimate;
If individual production fails, how can co-production succeed?
Not only does logical analysis show co-production is unreasonable, but even worldly observation confirms its absurdity.
For example, if one sesame seed yields oil, many sesame seeds should yield oil; yet countless pebbles, however numerous, never yield oil. Thus, if individual causes could produce effects, multiplicity would suffice—but co-production remains unreasonable.
Those who posit spontaneous production (ākasmika-saṃbhava) argue: If phenomena arise from causes, then cause and effect must either be identical, different, or both—each option leading to the faults previously cited. Since we reject causal production, none of those faults apply. Therefore, phenomena arise spontaneously. For instance, lotus stems are coarse and rigid, lotus petals soft—no artisan is observed creating them. Petals, stamens, pistils, etc., exhibit myriad colors and shapes, yet no creator is observed. Similarly, differences between jackfruit and pomegranate, etc., appear spontaneously. External phenomena follow this pattern; internal phenomena do likewise. Peacocks, tit-birds (tittiri), and cranes display intricate shapes and colors without human intervention. Thus, all phenomena arise spontaneously.
Refutation verse:
If phenomena arise without cause,
Everything would eternally arise from everything.
To obtain fruit, the world would not need
To gather seeds through multiple methods.
If phenomena arise spontaneously—as jackfruit trees are not causes of jackfruit, nor are teak trees or āmalaka trees—then teak trees should also produce jackfruit. Moreover, since jackfruit arises from the jackfruit tree (a non-cause), it should arise from all phenomena across the three realms—since all are equally non-causes. Likewise, āmalaka and rohītaka fruits mature only at specific times—thus being temporal—but if spontaneous, they should exist eternally, requiring no temporal conditions. Similarly, crows should produce peacock feathers, since crows are not causes of peacock feathers; peacocks should produce parrot feathers at all times—even in the embryonic stage. Thus, all sentient beings should arise eternally—but this is false. Hence, spontaneous production is unreasonable.
Having refuted this irrational view, we now cite contradictions with direct perception. Hence: “To obtain fruit, the world would not need to gather seeds through multiple methods.” Yet in reality, multiple methods are employed—proving phenomena do not arise spontaneously.
Further flaws arise. A verse states:
Sentient beings, lacking causes, would be ungraspable,
Like the color and fragrance of a sky-flower (ākāśa-kusuma).
Yet the flourishing world is graspable;
Thus, the world has causes, just as the mind does.
If sentient beings lack causes, they should be as ungraspable as the color and fragrance of a sky-flower. Yet they are graspable; thus, all sentient beings arise solely from causes—just as the mind does. If, as your school claims, the mind perceiving blue arises not from the presence of a blue object, then the mind perceiving blue should arise spontaneously—not from the blue object. But the mind perceiving blue arises only from the blue object; it does not arise spontaneously. Hence, spontaneous production is unreasonable.
Non-Buddhists who claim the mind arises from the great elements (mahābhūta) argue: Observable causes cannot be denied, for denying observable phenomena incurs all previously stated faults. The world commonly accepts four elements—earth, water, fire, wind—as the sole causes of all sentient beings. Through their transformations and variations, not only do lotuses, pomegranates, peacocks, and cranes arise reasonably, but even the inner mind—which realizes the ultimate nature of phenomena—arises solely from these four elements. For example, alcohol’s intoxicating effect arises from the four elements’ transformations, causing sentient beings to become drunk and stupefied. Similarly, consciousness arises from the elemental transformations in the embryonic stage (kalala), enabling cognition of all phenomena. Thus, all internal and external phenomena arise solely from present-life causes—not from past-life karma maturing in this life, nor from present-life karma maturing in future lives. Hence, future lives do not exist. To persuade a woman to enjoy sensual pleasures, one might say: “O beautiful woman, practice virtue and enjoy food and drink; your lovely body departs—you no longer possess it. This body is merely a composite illusion; having departed, it never returns—fear not.”
Now, we ask: What reasoning leads you to conclude future lives do not exist?
If you reply: “Because they are not directly perceived.”
We ask: Is your claim that future lives are not directly perceived itself a directly perceived fact—or not?
If you claim it is directly perceived, then admitting future lives are non-perceptible yet perceptible renders all non-existent phenomena perceptible. Thus, your school would hold non-existent phenomena as existent—and perceptible—like existent phenomena. If non-existent phenomena are wholly nonexistent, then existent phenomena too must be nonexistent, since existence depends on non-existence. If both non-existence and existence collapse, then asserting the existence of the great elements and denying future lives both fail.
If you claim it is not directly perceived, then since it is non-perceptible, how can its non-existence be inferred from non-perception?
If you claim inference (anumāna) proves it…
Though inference may establish conclusions, it contradicts your own tenets. As stated: “The domain accessible only to the senses defines the person; the learned speak deceptively, like wolf-tracks.” Just as the refutation of “mind arising from the great elements” proceeds, so too do all denials of reality.
Moreover, just as a person with cataracts sees a second moon—an illusory appearance mistakenly grasped as real—so too are hairs, flies, and mosquitoes seen illusorily. Similarly, your denial of future lives and other distorted perceptions are equally deluded. To illustrate this, a verse states:
The nature of the great elements posited in your theory
Is itself not even an object of your own mind.
Since your mind remains ignorant even of this,
How can you correctly know future lives?
The four elements—earth, etc.—which your school asserts as ultimately real, are not even objects of your own mental awareness. If you misperceive even present phenomena, how can you correctly know future lives—subtle realities accessible only to divine vision (divya-cakṣus)?
Another verse states:
When refuting future lives, your own nature
Becomes a distorted view of knowable reality.
Because that view shares the same basis (āśraya) as your body,
Just as when you posit the great elements as real.
“Same” denotes equivalence in meaning; “basis” (āśraya) signifies the supporting condition; “body” (kāya) refers to the physical form; “that view” denotes the nihilistic view denying future lives. Since the supporting condition is identical, distinctions are omitted; thus, “sharing the same basis” means “sharing the same bodily basis.” This is the principal reason: until the supporting condition—namely, doubt or belief in a future-life mind arising from the great elements—is established, the nihilistic view denying future lives shares that same bodily basis. Thus, when materialists posit the great elements as intrinsically real, they also possess that view sharing the same bodily basis. This occurs in two stages: (1) positing the great elements as real, and (2) denying future lives. Whichever stage is taken as the thesis, the other serves as the analogous example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta). Hence: “Just as when you posit the great elements as real”—meaning, at that time, you possess that view sharing the same bodily basis and hold a distorted view of knowable reality.
Suppose one objects: “When I posit the great elements as real, I hold no distorted view.”
Refutation: False! Since the great elements lack intrinsic existence, your mistaken belief that they arise or exist constitutes a distorted view—already established.
If you counter: “The great elements do not arise, yet this still requires proof.”
Answer: Unnecessary! It is already established. A verse states:
The great elements’ non-existence was previously stated,
As we comprehensively refuted self-, other-, co-, and causeless production.
Thus, no great elements remain unrefuted.
When we comprehensively refuted self-, other-, co-, and causeless production of all phenomena, we simultaneously refuted production from the great elements. Since nothing arises, the great elements too lack intrinsic nature (svabhāva); thus, the analogy holds. Similarly, denying omniscience (sarvajña), asserting phenomena possess intrinsic nature, denying intrinsic nature, positing a supreme deity (Īśvara), time (kāla), atoms (paramāṇu), intrinsic nature (svabhāva), spontaneity (ākasmika), and other attachments—all are established as distorted views, as previously demonstrated. As stated: “When refuting the Fully Awakened One, your own nature becomes a distorted view of knowable reality, because that view shares the same bodily basis as when you posit the great elements as real.” Thus, views of existence/non-existence, etc., are all refuted. Yet our own position incurs no flaws. Hence, wise persons should slightly adapt this verse to refute all rival schools, thereby dismantling the entire web of conceptual proliferation (prapañca) and establishing wisdom (jñāna) of the ultimate truth (paramārtha).
Suppose one objects: “You too commit this flaw.”
Answer: False! We provide no analogy proving our view is distorted; rather, ours is demonstrably reasonable. As stated: “When I realize future lives exist, that constitutes right view (samyag-dṛṣṭi) regarding knowable reality; possessing this view sharing the same bodily basis, just as when one accepts realization of no-self (anātman).” Similarly: “When I realize omniscience exists, that constitutes right view regarding knowable reality; possessing this view sharing the same bodily basis, just as when one accepts realization of no-self.” This applies to all phenomena. Thus, the preceding statement—“It does not arise from itself, nor from another, nor co-arise, nor arise causelessly”—is thoroughly established.
Question: If phenomena do not arise from self, other, co-, or causelessly, how do they arise?
Answer: If phenomena possessed intrinsic nature (svabhāva), they would necessarily arise either from themselves, others, co-arise, or causelessly—since no other mode of arising exists. Even those who posit a supreme deity (Īśvara) as creator must still classify Īśvara as arising from self, other, or co-production—thus remaining trapped in the previously refuted flaws. No fifth mode of arising exists, as no other cause is conceivable. By refuting these four distorted modes of arising, we establish that phenomena arise without intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva). To clarify this, a verse states:
Since there is no self-, other-, co-, or causeless production,
Phenomena are declared to be free from intrinsic nature (svabhāva).
Question: If phenomena lack intrinsic nature (svabhāva) even ultimately, how can non-arising blue (nīla), etc., be perceived?
Answer: Blue’s intrinsic nature (svabhāva) is not an object of any cognition; hence, blue’s intrinsic nature is wholly imperceptible.
Then what is the nature (svarūpa) repeatedly perceived in direct experience?
Answer: It is distorted perception (viparyāsa), not true intrinsic nature (svabhāva). Only the ignorant perceive it; the enlightened, free from ignorance, perceive it not at all. To clarify this, a verse states:
Due to thick ignorance, like dense clouds,
All phenomena’s nature appears distorted.
“Dense clouds” denote thick, heavy clouds; similarly, dense ignorance obscures the intrinsic nature of blue, etc., preventing its perception. Thus, ordinary beings cannot directly perceive blue’s intrinsic nature; their distorted grasp of it as intrinsic nature appears only to those clinging to inherent existence (satkāya-dṛṣṭi).
A verse states:
Just as cataract-induced distortion makes one grasp hair,
A second moon, peacock feathers, flies, and mosquitoes—
Just as a person with cataracts, due to the cataract’s power, grasps hairs, etc., though they lack such nature.
Another verse states:
Likewise, the ignorant, due to ignorance’s fault,
Observe conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛta) through various cognitions.
As the Bhagavān states: “Ignorance (avidyā) conditions volitional formations (saṃskāra).” Again: “Sentient beings, driven by ignorance, perform virtuous, non-virtuous, and immovable (āneñja) actions.” Again: “With the cessation of ignorance, volitional formations cease.”
Based on this, a verse states:
Ignorance produces action; without ignorance, action ceases—
This is understood only by the ignorant.
The sun of wisdom dispels all darkness;
The wise, realizing emptiness, attain liberation.
The wise, seeing “ignorance conditions volitional formations,” not only realize volitional formations lack intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva) but use this wisdom to eradicate ignorance itself. They also abandon grasping (upādāna) at volitional formations, having severed its cause. Thus, they attain liberation from saṃsāra.
Question: If phenomena like form (rūpa) lack intrinsic nature (svabhāva) even ultimately, their intrinsic nature is like the daughter of a barren woman (śūnyāputrī)—nonexistent ultimately—so they should also be nonexistent conventionally (saṃvṛti). Yet form’s intrinsic nature does exist conventionally; thus, it should exist ultimately too. A verse states:
If phenomena are truly nonexistent,
They should be like the daughter of a barren woman—
Nonexistent even conventionally;
Hence, they must possess intrinsic nature (svabhāva).
We reply: A verse states:
The objects perceived by those with cataracts—
Hairs, etc.—do not arise at all.
First debate this with them;
Then challenge those blinded by ignorance’s cataract.
First, debate with those whose eyes are damaged by cataracts: “Why do you see non-existent hairs, etc., yet not see the daughter of a barren woman?” Then challenge those whose wisdom-eye is clouded by ignorance’s cataract: “Why do you see form, etc.—whose intrinsic nature does not arise—yet not see the daughter of a barren woman?” This poses no difficulty for us, as the sūtra states: “Yogis see phenomena thus; others seeking yogic wisdom should likewise believe and understand the nature (dharmatā) taught.” We rely on the Buddha’s word, declaring that yogis’ wisdom realizes all phenomena lack intrinsic nature—not relying on our own intellect. We too are blinded by ignorance’s cataract, as the sūtra states: “Knowing the aggregates’ nature is empty and tranquil; bodhi’s nature is empty and distant; the path practiced is empty and without intrinsic nature; the wise know this—not ordinary beings. Wisdom’s nature is empty; the known object’s nature is empty and distant; knowing the knower is likewise empty—such a person cultivates the bodhi-path.” Thus, even yogis incur no such criticism: they see no phenomenon as possessing intrinsic nature, neither conventionally nor ultimately.
Do not hastily criticize those with cataracts; instead, examine yourself. A verse states:
If you see dreams, gandharva-cities, mirages, illusions, reflections, etc.,
Which, like the daughter of a barren woman, lack intrinsic nature—
Your seeing them yet not seeing her is unreasonable.
For example, dream-objects and the daughter of a barren woman are equally nonexistent. Yet one sees dreams but not the daughter of a barren woman. Gandharva-cities are similar. A “mirage” (marīci) is mistaking heat-haze for water. Illusions are similar. “Reflections,” etc., refer to echoes (pratighoṣa) and magical transformations (nirmāṇa); all are intrinsically empty (svabhāva-śūnya). Yet you see only these, not the daughter of a barren woman. Hence, first critique yourself, then critique ordinary beings.
Another verse states:
Though truly unarisen, it differs from the daughter of a barren woman—
As it is not an object of worldly perception;
Thus, your claim is indeterminate.
As the Bhagavān states: “Saying realms are like dreams is not speaking of ultimate truth; dreams contain nothing—deluded minds wrongly grasp them. Though a gandharva-city is visible, it exists nowhere in the ten directions; it is merely a nominal designation. The Buddha views all realms similarly. One imagining water sees water, yet no water exists in the heat-haze; similarly, those disturbed by conceptual proliferation see impurity as purity. Just as a clean mirror reflects an image lacking intrinsic nature, O great tree, know all phenomena are likewise.” This teaching clarifies that though form, etc., lack intrinsic nature (svabhāva), they are commonly perceived in the world—unlike the daughter of a barren woman. This creates an indeterminate flaw (anupapatti) in your own position, but no criticism applies to us, as we do not posit form, etc., as intrinsically arisen conventionally, then later refute them ultimately.
Why? A verse states:
Like the daughter of a barren woman’s intrinsic arising—
Neither truly nor conventionally existent—
So too, all phenomena’s intrinsic arising
Is nonexistent both conventionally and ultimately.
Based on this, a verse states:
Hence, the Buddha declares all phenomena
Are primordially tranquil, free from intrinsic arising,
And naturally nirvāṇic (svabhāva-nirvāṇa);
Thus, arising is eternally nonexistent.
Due to such authoritative teachings, arising is eternally nonexistent. The sūtra states: “The Buddha turns the sublime Dharma-wheel, declaring all phenomena are primordially tranquil, unarisen, and naturally nirvāṇic.” This states they are tranquil because they are the object of tranquil wisdom (śānta-jñāna). Why are they the object of tranquil wisdom? Because they are unarisen. Since they are unarisen, they are the object of tranquil wisdom. Why are they unarisen? Because they are naturally nirvāṇic (svabhāva-nirvāṇa). If phenomena possessed intrinsic nature (svabhāva), they could arise; but since intrinsic nature itself is nonexistent, how can they arise? This clarifies that arising is nonexistent at all times—not that something unarisen earlier later arises, nor that something arisen later arises again. Then how? It is naturally nirvāṇic (svabhāva-nirvāṇa). “Primordial” (ādi) indicates phenomena are unarisen not only when yogis attain wisdom, but even during ordinary worldly conventional discourse (lokavyavahāra). “Primordial” is synonymous with “initial”; thus, it refers to the time of worldly conventional discourse. This is the praise offered by the Bodhisattva Sarvanīvaraṇaviṣkambhin to the Bhagavān, commending the Buddha’s proclamation of phenomena upon turning the Dharma-wheel.
Scholars of our own school should not raise such objections, as this is mutually accepted. A verse states:
As jars, etc., are truly nonexistent,
Yet conventionally accepted by the world—
So too should all phenomena be regarded;
Thus, they differ from the daughter of a barren woman.
Suppose one objects: “Jars, etc., can only be nominally established if grounded in real earth, water, fire, wind, form, smell, taste, touch, etc. If, as you claim, even earth, etc., are merely nominal, with no real basis, then the flaw of the daughter of a barren woman is unavoidable.”
Answer: This is unreasonable, as no real basis can be established. As stated: “Without form, etc., jars certainly cannot exist; similarly, without wind, etc., form cannot exist.” Again: “Earth, water, fire, and wind all lack intrinsic nature (svabhāva); without the three, no single one remains; without the one, no three remain. If without the three there is no one, and without the one there are no three, and individually none exist—how can they combine to produce anything?” Just as permanent phenomena cannot produce impermanent ones, asserting real phenomena produce unreal ones is equally unreasonable. As stated: “How can the permanent produce the impermanent? Cause and effect differ in nature—this is never observed.” Just as a mirror’s illusory reflection arises from illusory forms, an illusory house arises from illusory pillars, a forest arises from trees designated as such, and dream-seeds (intrinsically unarisen) produce dream-sprouts (intrinsically unarisen), so too do all illusory phenomena arise solely from illusory phenomena—consistent with reason. As the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “Like the Buddha’s miraculous powers…” up to “…all are like gandharva-cities, mirages, and dreams.” Hence, your objection fails.
Question: If you refute self-, other-, co-, and causeless production in both truths, how is conventional production—such as ignorance and volitional formations producing consciousness, or seeds producing sprouts—definitively established?
Answer:
Phenomena do not arise causelessly,
Nor from Īśvara, time, atoms, intrinsic nature, persons, or Nārāyaṇa;
Nor from self, other, or co-production—
Thus, know they arise solely dependently.
By the preceding reasoning, phenomena’s arising is neither spontaneous nor from Īśvara, time, atoms, intrinsic nature, persons, or Nārāyaṇa, nor from self-, other-, or co-production; thus, they arise dependently (pratītyasamutpanna). This alone establishes conventional reality (saṃvṛti-satya) without undermining worldly conventions. As the Bhagavān states: “Worldly conventions declare: ‘This exists, therefore that exists; this arises, therefore that arises’—specifically, ‘ignorance conditions volitional formations.’” The Ratnāvalī states: “This exists, therefore that exists—as long as length exists, shortness is spoken of; this arises, therefore that arises—as a lamp burns, light shines.” The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “Volitional formations arise from action; action arises from the agent; besides this dependent origination, no other cause of action exists. Just as we refute action and the agent, so too do we refute the experiencer and the experienced, and all other phenomena.”
Thus, teaching solely dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) avoids not only causeless production but also all dichotomous extremes—permanent vs. impermanent, existent vs. nonexistent, etc. To clarify this, a verse states:
Since phenomena arise dependently,
They elude all conceptual proliferations (prapañca);
Thus, this principle of dependent origination
Shatters the entire net of wrong views.
Only this principle of dependent origination establishes conventional phenomena—not any other reasoning. Hence, this principle shatters the entire net of wrong views previously described. Only this dependent nature (pratītyasamutpanna-svabhāva) is accepted as the meaning of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda); no phenomenon is accepted as possessing intrinsic nature (svabhāva). As stated: “If something arises from this or that, it lacks intrinsic arising; lacking intrinsic arising, how can it be called ‘arising’?” The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “Phenomena arising from causes and conditions—I declare them to be empty; they are also mere designations (prajñapti); this is the Middle Way (madhyamā-pratipad).” The sūtra also states: “If something arises dependently, it is unarisen; herein, no intrinsic arising exists. If phenomena depend on conditions, they are declared empty; knowing emptiness is non-negligence (aprāmāda).”
Without accepting intrinsic nature (svabhāva), the previously described modes of arising cannot occur within non-intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva). Intrinsic nature (svabhāva) is required for natural (svābhāvika), self-, other-, co-, or Īśvara-based arising. Further, concepts of permanence (arising and abiding) and annihilation (arising and ceasing) arise only with intrinsic nature; otherwise, they do not. To clarify this, a verse states:
Intrinsic nature (svabhāva) gives rise to all proliferations;
Having analyzed, all intrinsic natures are found nonexistent;
Without intrinsic nature, those proliferations do not arise—
Like fire without fuel.
By the preceding reasoning, all phenomena are established as lacking intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva). Thus, when yogis realize the noble path (ārya-mārga), they see ultimate reality (paramārtha-satya) by seeing nothing—perceiving not even a speck of intrinsic nature (svabhāva) in phenomena. Thus, beginningless habitual proliferations—of form, feeling, virtue, non-virtue, existent, nonexistent, etc.—all subside. Like a person with cataracts cured by collyrium (añjana)—eliminating proliferations of hairs, etc.—the result is not transforming hairs into other objects, but eliminating the proliferative cognition itself.
Hence, a verse states:
Ordinary beings are bound by proliferations;
Eliminating proliferations is liberation.
The wise declare that eliminating proliferations
Is the fruit of investigation (vicāra).
Ordinary beings (pṛthagjana) cannot comprehend reality (dharmatā) and are bound by proliferations; thus, noble beings (ārya), realizing reality (dharmatā) thus, attain liberation. Therefore, completely dismantling all proliferative views (prapañca-dṛṣṭi) is the fruit of investigation (vicāra) in Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, etc. As stated: “If phenomena possessed intrinsic nature (svabhāva), what merit would seeing emptiness (śūnyatā) hold? Deluded proliferations bind; they are precisely what is refuted.”
Hence, a verse states:
Investigation in treatises is not for debate;
To reveal truth, it aims at liberation.
Nāgārjuna’s extensive investigation in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is not motivated by love of debate or defeating opponents. Rather, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā investigates and reveals truth to answer: “How can sentient beings correctly realize reality (dharmatā) and attain liberation?” Thus, it is taught accordingly.
Question: In your treatise, you extensively enumerate and refute opponents’ positions—so isn’t your treatise intended for debate? How can you claim its fruit is solely eliminating proliferations?
Answer: Though this investigation is not undertaken for debate, revealing truth naturally undermines fragile opposing views—like darkness vanishing near light. Thus, we incur no fault. A verse states:
If explaining truth destroys opposing views,
This incurs no fault.
As stated: “Though Buddhas have no intention, their teachings destroy others’ views; yet others’ views self-destruct, like fire consuming brushwood.”
If one teaches solely for debate, one inevitably harbors resentment toward opponents’ flaws and attachment to one’s own reasonable position—thus failing to eliminate attachment and aversion (rāga-dveṣa). Why? A verse states:
Attachment to one’s own view and aversion to others’
Are proliferations (prapañca);
As long as proliferations persist, bondage remains—
Liberation is impossible.
But if one teaches without debating, a verse states:
Hence, eliminating attachment and aversion
Leads swiftly to liberation through investigation.
As stated: “The wise engage in no debates; they hold no position (pakṣa). Even their own position does not exist—how could they have others’?” Again: “If you love your own position, you dislike others’; thus, you cannot realize nirvāṇa—neither conduct brings peace.” The sūtra states: “If hearing this Dharma stirs craving, or hearing non-Dharma stirs aversion, pride overwhelms one, leading to delusion and suffering.” Thus, the doctrine of non-self (anātman) in phenomena (dharma-anātman) has been clarified through both scriptural authority (āgama) and valid reasoning (yukti).
Now, we shall clarify the doctrine of non-self (pudgala-anātman) in persons. A verse states:
Wisdom perceives afflictions’ faults—
All arise from the view of personality (satkāya-dṛṣṭi);
Knowing ‘I’ is its object,
Yogis first refute the ‘self’.
The view of personality (satkāya-dṛṣṭi) is a defiled cognition (kleśa-jñāna) that takes ‘I’ and ‘mine’ as its object. Since afflictions arise from it, they are said to “arise from the view of personality.” What are these? Afflictions (kleśa)—such as craving (rāga)—and sufferings (duḥkha)—such as birth, aging, illness, death, sorrow, etc.—all arise from the view of personality. The sūtra states: “The view of personality is fundamental, the cause, and the accumulation.” This declares all afflictions arise from the view of personality; since it remains uneradicated, it generates volitional formations (saṃskāra) and causes suffering—hence, it is the cause of all afflictions and sufferings. Its object is the ‘self’ (ātman), as self-grasping (ātma-grāha) takes only the ‘self’ as its object. To eliminate all afflictions and sufferings, one must eliminate the view of personality. Since realizing non-self (anātman) is the sole means to eliminate it, yogis must first realize non-self. Once non-self is realized, the view of personality is instantly eradicated, and all afflictions and sufferings cease. Since investigating the ‘self’ is the skillful means (upāya) for liberation, yogis must first investigate: What is the ‘self’ (ātman) that is the object of the view of personality?
What is the nature (lakṣaṇa) of the ‘self’ that is the object of the view of personality? Let us first outline non-Buddhist positions. A verse states:
Non-Buddhists posit the ‘self’ as the permanent experiencer—
Attributeless, inactive, and non-agent.
Based on slight differences in these meanings,
Non-Buddhist schools divide into many sects.
The Sāṃkhya school asserts: “Primordial nature (prakṛti) is unchanging; the seven principles—‘great principle’ (mahat), etc.—are both unchanging and changing; the remaining sixteen principles are exclusively changing; the ‘self’ (puruṣa) is neither principle (prakṛti) nor changing.”
It is called “primordial nature” (prakṛti) because it produces results.
When does it produce them?
When the ‘self’ (puruṣa) desires sensory objects (viṣaya), primordial nature, perceiving the ‘self’s’ desire, unites with it and produces sound, etc.
The sequence of production: primordial nature produces the ‘great principle’ (mahat); mahat produces ego (ahaṃkāra); ahaṃkāra produces the sixteen principles. From the five subtle elements (tanmātra)—sound, etc.—within the sixteen principles arise the five great elements (mahābhūta).
“Unchanging” (avikāra) means solely productive—not subject to change like mahat, etc. The seven principles—including mahat—are both primordial nature (prakṛti) and changing (vikāra): relative to their results, they are primordial nature; relative to primordial nature, they are changing. The sixteen principles—including the five sense-faculties (indriya)—are exclusively changing. Hence: “The sixteen are exclusively changing.” The ‘self’ (puruṣa) is neither productive nor changing; thus: “The ‘self’ is neither primordial nature nor changing.” All changing phenomena arise in this sequence.
How does the ‘self’ (puruṣa) experience?
Answer: By the mental faculty (manas) empowering the five sense-faculties (indriya), it apprehends the five sense-objects (viṣaya)—sound, etc. Consciousness (vijñāna) then arises, generating craving (tṛṣṇā) for the object; the ‘self’, reflecting on the object of consciousness, experiences it—since the ‘self’s’ nature is reflective (cetana), it is said to experience objects.If the Self (Puruṣa) cultivates few desires, becomes detached from objects, and gradually practices tranquil meditation, it attains the divine eye (divyacakṣus). Next, using this divine eye, it observes its own intrinsic nature (svabhāva); upon doing so, it feels shame—as if it were another’s wife—and immediately severs itself from the Self. All transformations (parināma) then reverse entirely and vanish into the intrinsic nature, becoming invisible. At that moment, only the Self remains alone—thus it is called “liberation” (mokṣa). Although transformations cease, the Self remains unceasing, ever independent and eternal—hence it is termed “permanent” (nitya).
The intrinsic nature (prakṛti) is the agent (karta), and among all transformations, a portion also belongs to the agent. Since the Self engages in minimal activity, it is not an agent; rather, it is the experiencer (bhoktṛ), as previously explained. Because it possesses no inherent nature of joy (sattva), sorrow (rajas), or delusion (tamas)—the three guṇas—it is said to be “devoid of qualities” (nirguṇa). Because it pervades everything, it is said to be “inactive” (niṣkriya). These constitute the distinctive characteristics of the Self.
Earlier it was stated that the intrinsic nature is the agent, and that among transformations, a portion belongs to the agent. But precisely which transformations belong to the agent, and which do not?
We shall now briefly explain: The three guṇas—joy (sattva), sorrow (rajas), and delusion (tamas)—are so named because sorrow is characterized by agitation and movement, delusion by heaviness and obscuration, and joy by lightness and clarity. Suffering (duḥkha), pleasure (sukha), and delusion (moha) are merely alternate names for these same three guṇas. When the three guṇas are in perfect equilibrium, this state is called “primordial darkness” (tamas or pradhāna); at that time, qualities predominate and tranquility is supreme. Before any transformation occurs, the intrinsic nature is termed “existent” (sat). From the intrinsic nature arises “Mahat” (the Great Principle), which is synonymous with “buddhi” (intellect). From Mahat arises “ahaṁkāra” (egoity), which has three types: “transformative egoity,” “joyful egoity,” and “deluded egoity.” From transformative egoity arise the five subtle elements (tanmātras): form, sound, smell, taste, and touch. From the five subtle elements arise the five gross elements (mahābhūtas): earth, water, fire, wind, and space. From joyful egoity arise the eleven sense-faculties: the five action-faculties—mouth, hands, feet, anus, and genitals; the five cognition-faculties—eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and skin; and the mind (manas), which serves both functions. Deluded egoity activates the other two types of egoity. Among these, Mahat, ahaṁkāra, and the five subtle elements relate both to the intrinsic nature and to transformation. The ten faculties (excluding mind) and the five gross elements belong exclusively to transformation. The intrinsic nature, however, does not participate in transformation.
According to the Sāṃkhya system, even minor differences in interpretation give rise to numerous non-Buddhist schools. For example, the Vaiśeṣika school posits that the Self possesses nine qualities: cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, virtue (dharma), vice (adharma), and potency (saṃskāra). Cognition refers to the capacity to apprehend objects. Pleasure is the experience of desired objects. Pain is the opposite of pleasure. Desire is the wish for desirable things. Aversion is the rejection of undesirable objects. Effort denotes the intelligent application of means to accomplish tasks successfully. Virtue refers to what leads to superior rebirth and ultimate liberation. Vice is its opposite. Potency is that which arises from cognition and itself becomes a cause of further cognition. When these nine qualities unite with the Self, they generate wholesome and unwholesome karma, causing transmigration through saṃsāra. When the Self, through authentic wisdom, eliminates the root causes of cognition and other qualities, it abides alone and attains liberation. This Self is declared permanent, agent, experiencer, endowed with qualities, and omnipresent—and therefore inactive. Another school asserts that the Self possesses capacities of contraction and expansion.
The Vedāntins posit that just as space appears divided within different pots due to differences in their material forms, so too does the one Self appear manifold due to bodily differences. Thus, merely on account of slight distinctions in the Self, various non-Buddhist schools emerge.
Different non-Buddhist schools hold divergent views concerning the Self. A verse states:
As the daughter of a barren woman cannot arise,
So all those Selves posited by them are nonexistent.
Nor is this (nonexistent) Self the basis for the conception of “I”;
We do not accept even conventionally such a thing.
Your posited Self is certainly nonexistent, since you yourself admit it is unproduced—like the daughter of a barren woman. Nor is this Self the object of the “I-conception,” since you likewise admit it is unproduced. Moreover, it is not only ultimately nonexistent and not the object of “I-conception”; even conventionally, it lacks both these characteristics.
This reason does not merely refute the existence of the Self and its role as the basis of “I-conception” as unreasonable. A verse states:
In all those philosophical systems,
Where non-Buddhists posit distinctions of the Self,
Their own admission that it is unproduced refutes all such distinctions—
Hence all those distinctions are nonexistent.
In Sāṃkhya, distinctions attributed to the Self include permanence, non-agency, being the experiencer, absence of qualities, and inactivity. Refutation proceeds thus: That Self is not permanent, nor is it non-agent, nor is it devoid of qualities, nor inactive—since it is admitted to be unproduced, like the daughter of a barren woman. Likewise, in Vaiśeṣika, the Self is refuted as follows: It is not permanent, nor is it the agent—since it is admitted to be unproduced, like the daughter of a barren woman. Know that this school broadly refutes all conceptions of the Self held by non-Buddhists, using the reasoning of “unproducedness” and the analogy of the daughter of a barren woman.
Therefore, a verse states:
Hence, apart from the aggregates, there is no distinct Self;
Since apart from the aggregates no Self can be apprehended.
Hence, there is no Self distinct from the aggregates, because outside the aggregates no Self can be apprehended. As stated: “If a Self existed independently of appropriation, that would not be the case; for if separate from appropriation, it should be observable—but in fact, it is not observable.” Also: “If the Self were distinct from the five aggregates, it should lack the characteristics of the five aggregates.”
Not only is there no Self apart from the aggregates; further faults arise. A verse states:
Not accepted as the conventional basis for ‘I-conception’,
Since ignorance still gives rise to ‘I-view’.
Those who do not conceive of the Self in such a manner still, due to clinging to other distinctions, generate the “I-view” and cling to “I” and “mine.” Therefore, a Self existing apart from the aggregates cannot reasonably serve as the basis for the “I-conception.”
Suppose one thinks: Though ordinary people do not understand the Self’s permanence, unproducedness, etc., nevertheless, due to habitual tendencies from past lives, they still possess an “I-view” capable of apprehending the Self.
Refutation: This is also untenable. Not only practitioners of such philosophies hold the “I-view”; even those completely untrained in philosophy are observed to entertain self-grasping. A verse states:
Beings born as animals over many eons
Have never seen a permanent, unproduced Self,
Yet still exhibit self-grasping—
Therefore, there is absolutely no Self apart from the five aggregates.
Some sentient beings have been reborn as animals for countless eons, never escaping that realm; they have never perceived a Self possessing such characteristics. The word “also” includes those reborn in hells and other unfortunate realms. Even though they have never perceived such a Self, self-grasping still arises in them. Who, possessing intelligence, would posit such a Self as the basis for self-grasping? Therefore, there is no Self apart from the aggregates.
Within Buddhist teachings, some hold differing views. A verse states:
Since apart from the aggregates no Self exists,
The object of the ‘I-view’ is solely the aggregates.
From the preceding reasoning, since a Self apart from the aggregates cannot be established, the object of satkāyadṛṣṭi (“person-view”) is solely the aggregates; thus, the term “I” refers only to one’s own aggregates. This is the position of the Sautrāntika school within Buddhism.
Others hold alternative views. A verse states:
Some posit that the ‘I-view’ depends upon the five aggregates;
Others posit it depends solely upon the mind.
Some assert that the five aggregates—form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness—are all objects of satkāyadṛṣṭi, claiming that self-grasping arises from them. As the Buddha says: “Bhikṣus, know that all self-grasping held by śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas alike arises solely from seeing these five appropriated aggregates.” To clarify that this view arises from the impermanent, composite phenomena—not from a real “I” or “mine”—the Buddha designates such a view, which takes the form of “I” and “mine,” as satkāyadṛṣṭi.
Others posit that only the mind is the Self. Scripture states: “I am my own refuge; who else could be my refuge? By skillfully taming myself, the wise attain heaven.” Here, “myself” refers to the inner mind. How do we know this? Because no Self exists apart from the aggregates. Other scriptures similarly speak of taming the mind: “One should skillfully tame the mind; a tamed mind leads to happiness.” Hence, the mind—the basis of self-grasping—is designated “Self.”
This view must be refuted. A verse states:
If the five aggregates themselves are the Self,
Then, since aggregates are multiple, the Self should be multiple.
Further, the Self would become a concrete entity,
And the ‘I-view’—apprehending a concrete entity—would not be mistaken.
Those who posit the five aggregates as the Self incur the fault that, since aggregates are multiple, the Self should also be multiple. Those who posit only the mind as the Self incur the fault that, since visual consciousness, etc., differ, or since consciousness arises and ceases moment-to-moment, the Self should also be multiple—or other appropriate faults arise. Such faults apply equally to both positions—“aggregates-as-Self” and “mind-as-Self.” Subsequent faults likewise apply to both. Scripture states: “When a worldling is born, only one sentient being (pudgala) is born.” Thus, other schools also reject multiple Selves.
Further, the Self would become a concrete entity: Only material phenomena such as form, etc., are designated “aggregates” due to distinctions such as past, present, future, etc.; hence, asserting them as the Self makes the Self a concrete entity. However, scripture states: “Bhikṣus, know that there are five phenomena which are mere names, mere words, mere conceptual imputations: past time, future time, space, nirvāṇa, and sentient being (pudgala).” Another verse states: “Just as a chariot is conceptually imputed upon the collection of its parts, so too is a sentient being conventionally imputed upon the collection of the aggregates.” Since the posited Self incurs the fault of concreteness, the five aggregates cannot be the Self.
Moreover, since satkāyadṛṣṭi apprehends a concrete entity, it would not be erroneous—just as visual cognition of blue or yellow is not mistaken. Then eliminating satkāyadṛṣṭi would not involve uprooting but merely severing attachment—just as severing attachment to blue or yellow is termed “severance.”
Further faults arise. A verse states:
At parinirvāṇa, the Self would certainly be severed;
Before parinirvāṇa, each momentary phase
Would arise and cease without agency—hence no fruit;
Others’ actions would bear fruits experienced by others.
If the Self is identical in nature to the five aggregates, then at parinirvāṇa—when the aggregates cease—the Self too must cease. Yet it is unacceptable to say the Self ceases at parinirvāṇa, since that would entail the extreme view of annihilation. Hence, the Self cannot be identical in nature to the aggregates. Furthermore, before parinirvāṇa, since the aggregates arise and cease moment-to-moment, the Self—being identical to them—must likewise arise and cease. One could not think, “My present body existed formerly,” nor “At that time I was King Mahāsudarśana,” because that former Self, like the former body, has ceased, and one accepts rebirth into other lives. As the treatise states: “That which is apprehended cannot be the apprehender, since it arises and ceases; how can the apprehended serve as the apprehender?” Also: “If the five aggregates are the Self, the Self must arise and cease.”
Even granting arising and ceasing, since there is no agent-Self, no results would follow. If an agent existed, it would be impermanent. Without an agent, actions would lack support, and thus actions and their results would bear no relation. If one claims actions performed in an earlier moment yield results in a later moment, then actions performed by others would yield results experienced by others—since others perform actions while others experience their consequences. Thus, one incurs faults such as breakdown of karmic causality and experiencing results of unperformed actions. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “If they claim difference, then apart from that, there should be a present Self; the Self dwells in the past, and before death, the present Self is born. Thus, cessation occurs, karmic results are destroyed, others’ actions yield fruits for this one—such faults arise.” Hence, positing the five aggregates as the Self is unreasonable.
Objection: Although successive moments differ, they form a single continuum—thus no fault arises.
Refutation: A verse states:
If a truly singular continuum were free of faults,
Its defects were already examined earlier.
Earlier it was stated: “As reliance on Maitreya and Āryadeva’s methods…”—its defects were already explained. The treatise states: “If a deva differs from a human, that deva is impermanent; if a deva differs from a human, there is no continuum.” Hence, asserting that mutually distinct phenomena constitute a single continuum is unreasonable, and all faults remain unavoidable.
Further, to demonstrate that neither the aggregates nor the mind is the Self, a verse states:
Therefore, neither aggregates nor mind is the Self,
Since the world’s finitude, etc., are indeterminate.
Because scripture declares the world’s finitude, etc., as indeterminate (avyākṛta), positing either the aggregates or the mind as the Self is unreasonable. The fourteen indeterminate propositions are universally recited by all Buddhist schools: “The world is eternal,” “The world is not eternal,” “The world is both eternal and not eternal,” “The world is neither eternal nor not eternal,” etc. The Buddha declared these matters indeterminate. The East Mountain Abode school’s sūtra states: “If a bhikṣu holds the view that the world is eternal, he should be expelled. If he holds that the world is not eternal, he should be expelled. If he holds that the world is both eternal and not eternal, he should be expelled. If he holds that the world is neither eternal nor not eternal, he should be expelled.” Similarly, for all fourteen indeterminate propositions, cohabitation is forbidden. If “world” refers to the five aggregates—which are impermanent and arise and cease—then “The world is not eternal” could be determinate. After parinirvāṇa, the aggregates cease to exist; thus, “The world is finite” could also be determinate. Likewise, “The Tathāgata does not exist after death” could be determinate. Yet scripture refutes views such as “The world is finite”; therefore, positing the five aggregates as the Self is unreasonable.
Further faults arise. A verse states:
If your yogi perceives no-Self,
Then certainly no phenomena are perceived.
If the five aggregates or the mind were the Self, then when yogis realize the truth—perceiving the absence of Self in all phenomena, i.e., perceiving the characteristic of no-Self in the truth of suffering—they would perceive “no aggregates” as “no-Self.” But this is not accepted; hence, the aggregates are not the Self.
Objection: In discussions of karmic causality, the term “Self” refers to no other entity—thus it merely signifies the aggregates. When perceiving no-Self, it refers to the non-Buddhist “eternal Self.” Thus, perceiving no-Self means rejecting the non-Buddhist eternal Self and seeing only conditioned phenomena—avoiding the fault of perceiving “no phenomena.”
Refutation: A verse states:
If you claim that at that time the eternal Self is rejected,
Then your mind and aggregates cannot be the Self.
If, fearing the fault of perceiving “no phenomena,” you assert that “Self” refers to the eternal, non-Buddhist Self—and deny that aggregates or mind are the Self—you abandon your own position.
Objection: In this context, we do not posit the eternal Self; thus no fault arises.
This is also untenable. Here you posit the eternal Self, elsewhere the aggregates—how can such arbitrary, unfixed assertions be valid?
If you claim “it does not exist,” then the aggregates too cannot serve as its locus—this was already explained. Hence, if, when stating “all phenomena are devoid of Self,” you deny that “Self” signifies the aggregates, then at other times you should also deny it. Conversely, if at other times you allow “Self” to signify the aggregates, then here too you should allow it.
Further faults arise. A verse states:
In your school, yogis perceive no-Self,
Yet fail to comprehend the true nature of form, etc.
Since cognition of form gives rise to craving, etc.,
Due to failure to comprehend their intrinsic nature.
Just as someone who has never tasted honey from a flower, seeing only birds on the flower, cannot know its sweetness, while one who has tasted it knows its sweetness even without seeing birds—and cannot abandon craving for it—so too, yogis, although perceiving phenomena such as form as devoid of an eternal Self, still fail to comprehend their intrinsic nature; how then can they know? If they see form, etc., as possessing intrinsic existence, how can seeing their lack of an eternal Self eliminate craving for form, etc.? If merely realizing the absence of that Self suffices to eliminate craving for objects, then no sentient being seeks pleasurable objects to please the eternal Self, nor avoids unpleasant objects fearing suffering for it. Craving, etc., arising from form, etc., cannot be eliminated without comprehending the intrinsic nature of form, etc.—thus they resemble non-Buddhists.
Objection: We rely solely on the Buddha’s authoritative teaching (āgama); rational analysis cannot refute it. Scripture states: “Bhikṣus, know that all self-grasping held by śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas alike arises solely from seeing these five appropriated aggregates.” Similarly here. A verse states:
If you claim the Buddha says aggregates are the Self,
Hence you posit aggregates as the Self,
Then that scripture merely refutes a Self apart from aggregates—
Other scriptures declare form is not the Self.
That scripture does not explicitly teach that the aggregates are the Self, nor does it command belief in aggregates as the Self. The Buddha’s hidden intent is to show that no Self exists apart from the aggregates—thereby refuting non-Buddhist theories relative to conventional truth, and correctly revealing conventional truth.
How do we know this scripture refutes only a Self apart from the aggregates?
Because other scriptures refute form, etc., as the Self. How is this done? A verse states:
Other scriptures declare form is not the Self,
Feeling, perception, formations—all are not the Self,
Consciousness too is not the Self—
Thus, briefly, the aggregates are not accepted as the Self.
Hence, that scripture—“solely seeing these five appropriated aggregates”—refutes only a Self apart from the aggregates.
Since other scriptures refute form, etc., as the Self, we understand those scriptures also refute the object of satkāyadṛṣṭi—the falsely imputed Self that apprehends the aggregates—as they speak from the perspective of ultimate truth. If no apprehender exists, then what is apprehended certainly cannot exist. Hence, abandoning craving for form, etc., is perfectly reasonable. Since other scriptures make such statements, the prior scripture’s brief statement does not accept aggregates as the Self.
Furthermore, even if that scripture expresses an explicit meaning, it still does not state that the aggregates are the Self. Why? A verse states:
When scripture says “aggregates are the Self,”
It refers to the aggregate-collection, not the aggregates’ essence.
Just as saying “trees constitute a forest” refers to the collection of trees—not to each individual tree as the forest—so too, scripture says only the collection of aggregates is the Self, yet even that collection is utterly nonexistent. A verse states:
Not the basis, not the tamed, not the verified—
Since that does not exist, neither does the collection.
As the Buddha says: “I am my own refuge, and also my own enemy; if I do good or evil, I myself am the witness.” Here, “I” is the basis and the witness. Also: “By skillfully taming myself, the wise attain heaven.” Here, “I” is the tamed. Since a collection has no substantial reality, calling it “refuge,” “witness,” or “tamed” is unreasonable. Hence, the collection is not the Self.
Objection: Since no collection exists apart from its constituent factors, the result must be the result of those factors. Thus, serving as refuge, being tamed, and acting as witness are all reasonable.
This is also untenable—the faults were already explained.
Further faults arise. A verse states:
At that time, the collection of parts should be called “chariot,”
Since chariot and Self are equivalent.
Scripture states: “You have fallen into wrong views, falsely grasping sentient beings within empty, composite collections. The wise understand their nonexistence. Just as a chariot is conceptually imputed upon the collection of its parts, so too is a sentient being conventionally imputed upon the collection of the aggregates.”
From the preceding reasoning, a verse states:
Scripture says the Self is imputed based on the aggregates—
Hence, only the aggregate-collection is not the Self.
Anything imputed based on another phenomenon cannot be merely the collection of its bases, since it depends on something else. Just as material phenomena (rūpa) are established based on the great elements (mahābhūtas)—e.g., color is established based on earth, etc., and eyes are established based on earth, etc.—yet those phenomena are not merely collections of great elements. Likewise, establishing the Self based on the aggregates does not mean it is merely the aggregate-collection.
Objection: Bottles, etc., are indeterminate cases.
This is also untenable, since asserting bottles are merely collections of color, etc., fails for the same reason.
Objection: Merely piling up wheels, etc., is insufficient for a chariot; only wheels, etc., arranged in a specific shape qualify as a chariot. Thus, the shape of form, etc., is the Self.
This is also untenable. A verse states:
If you claim shape is the Self, then form alone should be the Self,
Since mental aggregates, etc., lack shape—
They cannot be the Self.
They lack shape.
Further faults arise. A verse states:
The apprehender apprehending one thing is unreasonable;
Action and agent must also be one.
The “apprehender” is so named because it apprehends; thus, it is the agent. The “apprehended” is so named because it is apprehended; thus, it is the action. The apprehender is the Self; the apprehended is the five aggregates. If the collection of form, etc., is the Self, then agent and action must be one. You do not accept this, since fuel and fire, potter and pot, would also be one. The treatise states: “If fuel is identical to fire, agent and action are one.” Also: “Applying the logic of fuel and fire to Self and apprehended, and to pot and cloth, all are similar.” Just as fuel and fire are not one, neither should Self and apprehended be one.
Objection: There is no agent at all—only the collection of apprehended phenomena exists.
This is unreasonable. A verse states:
If you claim action exists without an agent—
This is impossible; without an agent, action cannot exist.
If you deny the agent, you must also deny action without cause. The treatise states: “As we refute action and agent, so too should we refute apprehension and apprehender—and all other phenomena.” Here, the term “apprehender” is applied to phenomena due to their capacity to apprehend; if no function exists, neither does the phenomenon. Hence, establishing the function applies to both apprehender and apprehended. The meaning of “apprehension” is given in the Vyākaraṇa Śāstra: “Jita and loṭa denote multiplicity.” Thus, applying “loṭa” to action also applies to the apprehended action. Just as action is established based on the agent, and the agent based on action, so too is the apprehender established based on the apprehended, and the apprehended based on the apprehender. As the treatise states: “The Self is not different from the apprehended, nor is it identical to it; nor is it without the apprehended, nor is it necessarily without it.” Hence, we know action cannot exist without an agent. If scripture states action and result occur without an agent, it refutes an inherently existent agent—not the conventionally imputed, nominally designated Self. As scripture states: “A sentient being, under the influence of ignorance, performs meritorious deeds.”
Further faults arise. A verse states:
The Buddha says the Self is nominally established
Based on the six elements—earth, water, fire, wind, consciousness, space—
And based on the six sense-spheres—eye, etc.—
Saying the Self is established based on mind and mental factors,
Hence, those are not the Self;
Their collection is also not the Self—
Hence, they are not the object of self-grasping.
Scripture states: “Great King, the six elements, six sense-spheres, and eighteen mental inclinations constitute the sentient being (pudgala).” The six elements are earth, water, fire, wind, consciousness, and space; the Self is nominally established based on them. The six sense-spheres are eye-contact sphere, etc., up to mind-contact sphere; the Self is nominally established based on them. The eighteen mental inclinations refer to six types each of joyful, sorrowful, and neutral inclinations arising toward form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and phenomena; the Self is nominally established based on these inclinations and on mind and mental factors. Since scripture says the Self is nominally established based on the six elements, etc., it is not identical to them—i.e., not wholly different. Nor is merely their collection acceptable. Since none of these phenomena is the Self, none is the object of self-grasping. If the five aggregates are not the object of self-grasping, and no object exists outside them, then the object of self-grasping lacks intrinsic existence. Yogis, realizing the Self is unfindable, also realize “mine” lacks solidity, thereby extinguishing all conditioned phenomena and entering parinirvāṇa without remainder. Hence, this investigation is supremely excellent.
End of Chapter Four of the Madhyamakāvatāra
Madhyamakāvatāra Chapter Five
Some posit the object of self-grasping as the five aggregates; others posit only the mind. If, according to their view, self-grasping arises whenever aggregates arise, then self-grasping must arise continuously. A verse states:
Realizing no-Self severs the eternal Self;
You do not accept this as the basis of self-grasping.
Hence, understanding the meaning of no-Self
Is supremely rare in permanently severing self-grasping.
If the eternal Self were the object of self-grasping, its nonexistence would suffice to sever self-grasping. Yet you posit other phenomena (the aggregates) as the object of self-grasping, and sever self-grasping by realizing the nonexistence of other phenomena (the eternal Self). Alas, this holds only within your own system—it bears no actual relevance.
Let us illustrate with an analogy. A verse states:
Seeing a snake dwell on one’s own wall,
One says, “There is no elephant”—to dispel fear.
If this also dispels fear of snakes—
Ah! Truly, others would laugh.
Suppose a foolish person, unaware of a terrifying venomous snake in his room, lives carefree without seeking remedy—merely thinking, “There is no elephant!” How could this dispel fear of the snake? Similarly, those who posit aggregates or only the mind as the object of self-grasping, knowing the eternal Self does not exist, still cannot eliminate self-grasping based on aggregates—and certainly cannot attain liberation from saṃsāra.
Having thus shown the Self is not identical to the aggregates, we now explain that neither the Self nor the aggregates possess intrinsic nature as basis or support. A verse states:
Within the aggregates, no Self exists;
Nor does the Self contain the aggregates.
Only if they differed could such relations hold;
Since they do not differ, this is mere conceptual distinction.
Only if the Self and aggregates differed could “basis” and “support” be reasonable—e.g., “curd in a dish”: the world accepts dish and curd as distinct, thus forming basis and support. Yet aggregates are not distinct from the Self, nor is the Self distinct from aggregates; hence, no basis-support relationship exists between them.
Nor does the Self “possess” aggregates. A verse states:
The Self is not colored, since the Self does not exist—
Hence, “possession” is entirely meaningless.
Unlike “a cow is colored,” where cow and color differ,
Both Self and color are nonexistent and non-different.
The Self and aggregates being identical or different was refuted earlier. If one posits the Self “possesses” aggregates: If identical, like “Deva is colored”; if different, like “Deva has a cow.” Yet Self and color are neither identical nor different; hence, positing the Self “has color” is unreasonable.
Now let us summarize the above refutations, clarifying satkāyadṛṣṭi through the four modes of misapprehended object-characteristics. A verse states:
The Self is not colored; color is not the Self;
Color contains no Self; the Self contains no color.
Know these four modes apply to all aggregates—
Thus, twenty types of “I-view” arise.
Although the five aggregates are devoid of Self, satkāyadṛṣṭi, grasping aggregates as Self in four ways, yields twenty types of satkāyadṛṣṭi.
Objection: Should we examine five modes? The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “Not the aggregates, not apart from aggregates, neither mutually contained, nor is the Tathāgata possessed of aggregates—where then is the Tathāgata?” This yields five modes. Why only twenty views?
Answer: The twenty types of satkāyadṛṣṭi are scripturally established. If satkāyadṛṣṭi did not apprehend aggregates, it would not grasp “I.” It operates only by apprehending aggregates in four modes—no fifth mode exists. Since nothing other than the five aggregates can be grasped as “I,” satkāyadṛṣṭi comprises only twenty types. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā’s fifth mode refutes non-Buddhist positions.
Scripture states: “With the vajra-wisdom-staff, one shatters the mountain of twenty types of satkāyadṛṣṭi and attains the stream-entry stage.” A verse states:
With the vajra-wisdom-staff realizing no-Self,
Shattering the mountain of “I-view” like a mountain—
Meaning: Upon the mountain of satkāyadṛṣṭi,
Such towering peaks exist.
Before the mountain of satkāyadṛṣṭi is shattered by the sacred vajra-wisdom-staff, it rises from the foundation of beginningless ignorance, extending vertically through the three realms and horizontally across the ten directions, daily accumulating cliffs of afflictions. Once shattered by the direct realization of no-Self—the vajra-wisdom-staff—the highest peak collapses simultaneously—know that peak is this very “I-view.”
Now we refute the Sautrāntika school’s assertion of a substantially existent sentient being (pudgala). A verse states:
Some posit an existent sentient being—
Indescribable as one or different, permanent or impermanent—
Perceived by the six consciousnesses,
And the object of self-grasping.
Since no Self exists apart from the aggregates, there is no substantially existent sentient being apart from them. Nor is it identical to the aggregates’ intrinsic nature—this incurs arising-and-ceasing faults. Hence, the Self and aggregates cannot be described as identical or different—just as they cannot be described as permanent or impermanent. Yet it is perceived by the six consciousnesses. Further, this sentient being may be called substantially existent, since it is the agent and experiencer—bound and liberated within saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. It is also accepted as the object of self-grasping.
This is unreasonable. A verse states:
Not accepting mind or matter as indescribable—
All substantially existent phenomena are describable.
If the Self is a substantially existent phenomenon,
Like the mind, it should not be indescribable.
This verse shows that what is indescribable cannot be substantially existent.
Next, clarifying nominal existence. A verse states:
As you admit the bottle is not substantially existent,
So too, it is indescribable as identical or different from color, etc.
Since the Self and aggregates are likewise indescribable,
One should not posit intrinsic existence.
Just as you accept the bottle and color, etc., are indescribable as identical or different—yet nominally existent—so too the Self should be nominally existent, like the bottle. These two verses have clarified refutation and establishment.
Now further clarify that identity and difference are attributes of substantially existent phenomena—and refute the substantially existent Self by showing the Self is not such an attribute’s basis. A verse states:
Your consciousness is not admitted as different from itself,
Yet is admitted as different from color, etc.
Substantially existent phenomena are seen only in these two modes—
Since the Self is not based on substantially existent phenomena, it does not exist.
If, as you claim, the Self substantially exists, then it must be like consciousness—not different from itself, yet different from color, etc. But this is not the case. Knowing it is not based on substantially existent phenomena, the Self is not substantially existent—like the bottle.
Through such analysis, positing the Self as substantially existent is unreasonable. A verse states:
Hence, the basis of self-grasping is not substantially existent—
Neither apart from the five aggregates, nor identical to them,
Neither the aggregates’ basis, nor possessing aggregates.
Analyzing the object of self-grasping, positing it as substantially existent is unreasonable—since it is neither apart from the aggregates, nor identical to their intrinsic nature, nor the aggregates’ basis, nor dependent on the aggregates as basis. To clarify basis and support, the concise text mentions mutual dependence. Positing the Self as “possessing aggregates” is also unreasonable.
Hence, whether one posits a nominally existent Self or admits the Self is unfindable, one should not accept the Self as described earlier. A verse states:
This is established based on the aggregates.
Just as, to preserve conventional truth, we accept phenomena arising dependently on causes and conditions, so too, accepting a nominally existent Self—though refuting the flawed modes described above—allows conventional designation of the Self based on the aggregates, enabling worldly linguistic conventions.
To establish the meaning of nominal existence, we now clarify it through external analogies. A verse states:
As we do not accept the chariot as different from its parts,
Nor as identical to them, nor as merely their collection,
Nor as dependent on parts, nor as parts’ basis,
Nor as merely accumulation, nor as shape.
Here, the five categories—identity, difference, basis, support, and possession—were explained earlier.
The categories of accumulation and shape require further establishment. To clarify this, a verse states:
If you claim accumulation is the chariot,
Then scattered parts piled up should be the chariot.
Though previously stated, this is reiterated to reveal additional faults. Hence, a verse states:
Since parts cannot exist without a possessor,
Accepting shape alone as the chariot is unreasonable.
If parts cannot exist without a possessor, then parts themselves do not exist. What, then, accumulates to form the chariot? The word “also” encompasses the meaning that accepting shape alone as the chariot is unreasonable—likewise, accepting accumulation alone is unreasonable. Why? Because without a possessor, parts do not exist. Hence, accepting shape alone as the chariot is unreasonable. The nonexistence of parts is accepted by your own school.
Further, if you posit shape alone as the chariot: Is this shape the shape of the parts, or the shape of their accumulation? If you posit the shape of the parts, does it retain the original part-shapes, or does it discard them for new shapes?
If you claim it retains the original shapes, this is unreasonable. Why? A verse states:
Your parts each had their shapes beforehand;
When the chariot is made, they remain unchanged.
As scattered parts contain no chariot,
So too, the chariot does not exist now.
If wheel-shapes, etc., remain unchanged before and after chariot-construction, then just as no chariot exists among scattered parts, no chariot exists after construction—since part-shapes undergo no change.
If you posit the second option—that new wheel-shapes, etc., arise during construction—this is also unreasonable. A verse states:
If, when the chariot is made, wheels, etc., acquire new shapes,
These should be observable—but they are not.
Hence, shape alone is not the chariot.
Wheel-shapes, axle-shapes, etc., include square, long, round, etc. If, during construction, new wheel-shapes, etc., arise apart from the original ones, they should be observable—but they are not. Wheels with rim, hub, spokes, etc., show no shape-change during construction; similarly, axle-shapes remain unchanged. Hence, accepting part-shapes as the chariot is unreasonable.
If you posit the shape of the accumulated parts as the chariot—this is also unreasonable. A verse states:
Since your accumulation is utterly nonexistent,
That shape cannot depend on part-accumulation.
Hence, depending on the nonexistent,
How can shape exist here?
If the claimed accumulation possessed even slight substantial reality, shape could be nominally imputed upon it. But the claimed accumulation is utterly nonexistent—how can shape be nominally imputed upon the nonexistent? You accept that nominal imputation requires a substantial basis.
Objection: Though accumulation is not substantially existent, shape—though not substantially existent—can still be nominally imputed upon it.
A verse states:
As you accept this nominal imputation,
So too, depending on an insubstantial cause,
An insubstantial effect arises—
Know that all arising is thus.
Depending on insubstantially existent ignorance, insubstantially existent volitional formations arise. Depending on insubstantially existent seeds, insubstantially existent sprouts arise. Thus, know all causal relations are insubstantially existent. Wasting countless efforts clinging to the illusory deer—a mirage with no meat—what purpose does this serve?
A verse states:
Some claim that form, etc., abide thus,
Thus generating the cognition “bottle”—but this is unreasonable.
Here, it is claimed that cognition of “bottle” arises upon form, etc., abiding thus—and this is refuted by the chariot analogy.
Further, a verse states:
Since form, etc., do not arise,
They cannot be the shape.
Form, etc., do not arise—as previously explained. Since they do not arise, form, etc., do not exist. Positing their nonexistence as the cause for nominally imputing “bottle,” or positing “bottle” as caused by substantially existent phenomena, is unreasonable. Hence, “bottle” is not the shape-difference of form, etc.
Question: If the chariot is found nonexistent upon examining it through the sevenfold analysis, then the chariot should not exist. All worldly linguistic conventions based on the chariot—e.g., “take the chariot,” “buy the chariot,” “make the chariot”—should cease. Yet we observe common usage: “take the chariot,” etc. Since this is commonly accepted, the chariot must substantially exist.
Answer: This fault belongs only to you. You claim the sevenfold analysis must yield a findable phenomenon before establishing anything. You do not accept other means of establishment. Hence, how can worldly conventions like “take the chariot” exist in your system? For us, there is no fault.
Why? A verse states:
Though examined through the sevenfold analysis,
It is ultimately and conventionally nonexistent.
Yet, without analysis—simply conventionally—
It can be established based on its parts.
As previously stated: “As we do not accept the chariot as different from its parts,” etc.—examined through the sevenfold analysis, the chariot is not established either ultimately or conventionally. Yet, without analysis—merely conventionally—just as blue, etc., and feeling, etc., are established as dependently arisen, so too can the name “chariot” be nominally imputed based on wheels, etc. Since we accept nominal imputation based on dependent arising, our system suffers no fault of undermining worldly linguistic conventions. Even opponents must jointly accept this.Moreover, within this school, by the criterion of worldly consensus, not only can the conventional designation “chariot” be established, but also all its various designations—such as “possessor of parts,” “possessor of components,” “agent,” and “experiencer”—can be accepted without scrutiny, solely on the basis of worldly consensus. The verse states:
That chariot may be spoken of to sentient beings
As possessing parts and possessing components,
Also as agent and as experiencer.
Here, “possessor of parts” (skandha-saṃyukta) refers to the chariot in relation to its constituent parts—such as wheels—while “possessor of components” (aṅga-saṃyukta) denotes the chariot in relation to its individual components—again, such as wheels. “Agent” (kartṛ) designates the chariot in relation to its capacity to perform functions—e.g., carrying or moving—while “experiencer” (bhoktṛ) designates it in relation to what is experienced—e.g., being ridden.
Furthermore, some misinterpret the Buddha’s teachings, claiming that only a collection of parts exists, with no “possessor of parts” at all, since such a possessor cannot be found apart from the collection. Likewise, they assert that only individual components exist, with no “possessor of components”; only actions exist, with no agent; and only experiences exist, with no experiencer—since no experiencer can be found apart from experience. Holding such a view, they declare that all worldly conventional speech is fundamentally inverted. Yet if their position were valid, then the very prior reason—the non-existence of the possessor—would also undermine the existence of the parts themselves. Therefore, this view must be rejected.
The verse states:
Do not destroy the worldly conventions accepted by ordinary people.
By means of worldly conventions, although none of the seven analyses yields any findable essence when scrutinized, nonetheless, when left unexamined and accepted merely as conventionally agreed upon by the world, all such designations are perfectly valid. Thus, a yogi, following this sequential method of analysis as described above, can swiftly penetrate to the profound depths of ultimate reality. The verse states:
None of the seven modes of analysis yields anything at all;
For the practitioner, nothing whatsoever is found.
Yet thereby he swiftly enters the meaning of reality—
Hence, such conventional establishment is rightly accepted.
If the chariot possessed even the slightest intrinsic nature (svabhāva), then during careful analytical scrutiny by a yogi, at least one among the seven modes would necessarily reveal that intrinsic nature. But in fact, nothing whatsoever is found. Therefore, the so-called “chariot” is merely a deluded fabrication arising from ignorance—a mental obscuration blinding the eye of wisdom—and possesses no intrinsic nature whatsoever. When yogis arrive at this definitive understanding, they swiftly realize and enter into the ultimate meaning. The word “also” (api) further indicates that conventional truth remains unharmed. Thus, we properly accept that the chariot is conventionally established without analysis, solely through worldly consensus. All wise persons should know that this position entails exclusively benefits and absolutely no faults.
Question: Although yogis do not perceive any chariot, they still perceive the collection of its parts—surely this collection must exist?
Answer: Seeking threads in the ashes of burnt cloth would indeed be laughable. The verse states:
When the chariot itself does not exist at all,
Its “possessor-of-parts” is absent; therefore, the parts too are absent.
One might object: “When the chariot is dismantled, surely the wheels and other parts remain intact—how then can it be said that, because the ‘possessor-of-parts’ is absent, the parts themselves are also absent?”
Answer: This objection is likewise untenable. Such thinking arises only because one previously perceived the wheels as belonging to the chariot; only then does one identify them as “parts of the chariot.” Others, who have never seen the wheels in relation to the chariot, simply see the wheels as independent entities, regarding each wheel in relation to its own constituent parts—as a “possessor-of-parts” in its own right. Since they have never perceived the wheels as related to the chariot, they do not recognize them as “parts of the chariot.”
Next, let us understand this principle through the following analogy. The verse states:
Just as when a chariot is burned, its parts are also destroyed,
So when wisdom burns away the “possessor-of-parts,” no parts remain.
Just as fire burning the chariot—which is a “possessor-of-parts”—necessarily destroys its component parts, similarly, when the “wisdom-fire” arises through analytical investigation—specifically, through contemplating how wood rubs against wood and produces the insight that nothing whatsoever can be found—this wisdom-fire consumes the chariot, and consequently, the parts that serve as its fuel are also consumed and cannot persist independently. Thus, in order to preserve conventional truth and enable yogis to swiftly realize ultimate reality, the chariot is posited as a mere conventional designation.
The verse states:
Thus, as commonly accepted by the world,
Based upon the aggregates, elements, and sense bases,
The “I” is likewise accepted as the apprehender.
Just as the chariot is nominally designated based upon wheels and other parts—with the wheels being the objects apprehended and the chariot the apprehender—so too, within conventional truth, in order to avoid the annihilation of worldly language, the “I” is likewise accepted as the apprehender, just as the chariot is. The five aggregates, six elements, and six sense bases are the objects apprehended by the “I.” Since the “I” is nominally designated based upon the aggregates and so forth, just as the wheels are objects apprehended by the chariot, so too are the aggregates and so forth objects apprehended by the “I.” Just as worldly language establishes both the apprehended and the apprehender, so too should the relationship between action and agent be understood and accepted analogously to the chariot. The verse states:
The apprehended is action; this is the agent.
The aggregates and so forth—the apprehended—are established as action; the “I” is established as the agent.
If the “I” is accepted as dependently designated, then it cannot serve as the basis for distinctions such as permanent or impermanent. Thus, distinctions such as permanent, impermanent, etc., are also refuted. The verse states:
Since it lacks intrinsic nature, it is neither permanent nor impermanent,
Neither arising nor ceasing,
Nor does it possess the nature of permanence, etc.;
Nor is it singular or plural.
The “I,” nominally designated based upon the aggregates, is neither permanent nor impermanent. If the “I” were impermanent, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “What is experienced is not the ‘I’; since experience undergoes arising and cessation, how could experience serve as the experiencer?” It further states: “If something did not exist before but now exists, this entails an error: the ‘I’ becomes something produced, and thus arises without cause.” If the five aggregates were the “I,” then the “I” would undergo arising and cessation. Yet you do not accept that the “I” undergoes arising and cessation; therefore, the five aggregates cannot be the “I.” To posit the “I” as impermanent is therefore unreasonable. Likewise, to posit it as permanent is equally unjustified. As the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “That the ‘I’ existed in the past is unfindable; the ‘I’ of the past does not create the ‘I’ of the present. If you claim the ‘I’ is identical, yet the body assumes different forms, then where else, apart from the body, could there be a separate ‘I’?” Nor does it possess the nature of permanence, etc. As the treatise’s author states in the chapter “Analysis of the Tathāgata”: “In the state of quiescence, there is neither permanence nor impermanence—nor any of the four extremes; in quiescence, there is neither finitude nor infinitude—nor any of the four extremes. Those deeply entrenched in wrong views claim there is no Tathāgata; yet the Tathāgata’s quiescent nature cannot be conceived as either existent or nonexistent. Likewise, in emptiness, one should not speculate whether the Tathāgata, after nirvāṇa, exists or does not exist.” Neither is the “I” identical to nor distinct from the aggregates. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “If the five aggregates are the ‘I,’ then the ‘I’ undergoes arising and cessation; if the ‘I’ is distinct from the five aggregates, then it lacks the characteristics of the five aggregates.” It further states: “Fire is not identical to fuel,” and so forth.
Why can the “I” not be distinguished as permanent or impermanent?
The treatise states: “Because it lacks intrinsic nature.” Only if the “I” possessed even the slightest intrinsic nature could distinctions such as permanent or impermanent be applied to it. Since the “I” entirely lacks intrinsic nature, such distinctions do not apply. As the sūtra states: “The World-Protector declares that four phenomena are inexhaustible: sentient beings, space, bodhicitta, and Dharma. If those phenomena truly existed, how could they fail to be exhausted? Since they lack true existence, they cannot be exhausted; therefore, they are declared inexhaustible.”
If analyzed according to the seven modes, permanence, impermanence, and so forth are definitively unfindable. If someone fails to see this lack of intrinsic nature and, due to ignorance, clings to intrinsic nature, then, reinforced by the view of personal identity (satkāyadṛṣṭi), they grasp at a self—and thereby wander endlessly in saṃsāra. The verse states:
Sentient beings perpetually generate self-grasping,
And upon that basis generate grasping-at-what-is-mine.
Know that this “I” arises from ignorance,
And is conventionally established without analysis.
When analyzing the “I,” non-Buddhist schools, seeing that the “I” cannot be identified with the aggregates, wrongly posit an intrinsic self distinct from them. Within Buddhist schools, some, seeing that no self distinct from the aggregates can be found, mistakenly posit the aggregates themselves as the “I.” However, those who correctly understand the Buddha’s teaching see that neither exists—and thereby attain liberation. Moreover, all sentient beings—gods, humans, hungry ghosts, animals, etc.—are driven by ignorance and continually generate self-grasping toward that “I.” They further generate grasping-at-what-is-mine toward internal phenomena—such as the eyes—and external phenomena—those things over which they believe they exercise control or to which they feel attached. Yet this “I” is fabricated by ignorance and possesses no intrinsic nature. Though it lacks intrinsic nature, it is nominally designated due to ignorance. Thus, yogis, seeing that the “I” is ultimately unfindable, realize that the apprehended objects—such as the eyes—likewise do not arise. Because yogis see that no phenomenon possesses intrinsic nature, they become liberated from saṃsāra. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “If both ‘I’ and ‘what-is-mine’ are extinguished in both internal and external phenomena, then all clinging is also extinguished; with clinging extinguished, birth and death are extinguished.”
How can there be no “I” and no “what-is-mine”? The verse states:
Since there is no agent, there is no action;
Therefore, without the “I,” there is no “what-is-mine.”
If yogis see both “I” and “what-is-mine” as empty,
Then they attain liberation.
Just as without a potter there is no pot, so too, without the “I,” there is no “what-is-mine.” Thus, seeing that both the “I” and “what-is-mine” are unfindable, yogis directly perceive the absence of saṃsāra and thereby attain liberation. If one does not perceive form and so forth, then craving and other afflictions arising from attachment to form do not arise; therefore, śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, having attained nirvāṇa, do not take rebirth. Bodhisattvas, though seeing the absence of self, out of the power of great compassion, continue to be born in the three realms until attaining unsurpassed perfect enlightenment. Therefore, all wise persons should diligently seek the teaching of no-self as described here.
The “I” and “what-is-mine” are merely nominal designations, just like the chariot: as the chariot is unfindable under the seven modes of analysis, so too are pots and other phenomena to be understood analogously. However, these are established solely by worldly consensus, and the Buddha accepts them without scrutiny. The verse states:
Pots, garments, tents, armies, forests, garlands, trees,
Houses, small carts, and guesthouses—
All these are to be known as conventionally designated by sentient beings,
Since the Buddha does not dispute with the world.
The sūtra states: “The world disputes with me, but I do not dispute with the world.” Therefore, we must not contradict worldly conventions.
Next, by what criteria does the world establish conventional language? The verse states:
Qualities, parts, craving, characteristics, fuel, etc.,
And qualified, part-possessing, craving-possessing, characterized, burning entities—
As the chariot is unfindable under the seven modes of analysis,
So too are these established by worldly consensus.
A pot is a “possessor-of-parts,” with clay and so forth as its parts; a pot is a “possessor-of-qualities,” with bluish color, decorative patterns, etc., as its qualities; a pot is the “characterized,” with features such as a bulging belly, flared mouth, and elongated neck serving as its “characteristics.” Similarly, garments and other phenomena are to be understood. Craving is attachment; “possessor-of-craving” refers to the base upon which craving depends. Fire is the burner; fuel is what is burned. In all these cases, “possessor-of-parts” is established based upon parts; parts are established relative to the “possessor-of-parts”; and similarly, fire is established relative to fuel, and fuel relative to fire—just as in the chariot analogy. All these are merely worldly conventions; no analytical scrutiny applies to them.
Not only are parts and so forth mutually dependent, but cause and effect are likewise interdependent. The verse states:
A cause is called “cause” only because it produces an effect;
If it does not produce an effect, it is not a cause.
An effect arises only if it has a cause;
So tell me: which arises first, and from which does which arise?
Cause and effect are mutually dependent: one exists only if the other exists. Both cause and effect lack intrinsic nature. If, as you claim, cause and effect possessed intrinsic nature, then which arises first—the cause or the effect? Does the effect arise from the cause, or is the cause established by the effect? Therefore, cause and effect are merely conventional designations, dependent upon each other—not intrinsically existent, just like the chariot.
Next, if you claim that a cause intrinsically produces an effect, does it produce the effect while conjoined with it or while disjoined? The verse states:
If cause and effect are conjoined when producing the effect,
They become one; thus, cause and effect should be indistinguishable.
If disjoined, the cause is no different from a non-cause;
Apart from conjunction and disjunction, no third alternative remains.
If cause and effect are conjoined when producing the effect, then their conjunction results in oneness—like seawater merging with river water—making it impossible to distinguish this entity as cause and that as effect; how then could one entity arise from another? If they are disjoined, then just as disjunction prevents production of non-effects, so too should disjunction prevent production of this effect. Or, if disjunction could produce an effect, it should produce all effects. For those who posit intrinsic nature for cause and effect, besides conjunction and disjunction, no third alternative remains. Therefore, a cause possessing intrinsic nature cannot possibly produce an effect.
Hence, the verse states:
If the cause does not produce the effect, then there is no effect.
When the cause cannot produce the effect, there is no effect.
The verse states:
Without the effect, the cause should not be a cause.
The designation of something as “cause” depends on its capacity to produce an effect. If something could be a cause even without producing an effect, then the very rationale for calling it a “cause” would vanish. Therefore, cause and effect lack intrinsic nature.
What is your position? The verse states:
These two—like illusions—do not compromise my view;
Worldly phenomena are thereby fully established.
If, as other schools claim, the producer and the produced possess intrinsic nature, then this analysis applies to them. But according to my school, all phenomena arise from deluded conceptual proliferation—never intrinsically; like illusions. Though lacking intrinsic nature, they remain objects of conceptual cognition—like the illusory hairs seen by someone with visual impairment. No conceptual analysis applies to such phenomena. Therefore, I incur no fault of overstatement. Worldly phenomena—accepted without scrutiny—remain fully established; thus, everything is accomplished.
An opponent raises the following difficulty: “As you analyze whether cause and effect arise conjoined or disjoined, you commit the same error.” The verse states:
Does the refuter and the refuted being conjoined or disjoined entail this fault?
Does this fault not likewise apply to you?
If you claim the refuter and the refuted are conjoined in refutation, the fault is as previously stated. If you claim they are disjoined, the fault is likewise as before. Besides conjunction and disjunction, no third alternative remains. Thus, your refutation lacks the capacity to refute the refuted; rather, your refutation itself is refuted by others—thereby establishing cause and effect.
Hence, the verse states:
Your words merely undermine your own position;
Therefore, you cannot refute the refuted.
Next, the verse states:
Your own statement commits the same fallacy as the apparent refutation;
You slander all phenomena without justification.
Therefore, you are not accepted by the wise;
You are a “refutation-only” proponent, without a positive thesis.
This “same fallacy” has already been explained above. “Slandering all phenomena without justification” means: you say, “Since both are disjoined, neither can produce.” What is your reasoning? Like a magnet, though disjoined from iron, attracts only iron in suitable conditions—not all things. Like the eye, though disjoined from visible forms, sees only forms within its range—not all forms. Similarly, though a cause is disjoined from its effect, it produces the effect only under suitable conditions—not every disjoined thing. Thus, your groundless slander of all phenomena contradicts sound reasoning; therefore, you are not accepted by the wise. Moreover, you are a “refutation-only” proponent—one who refutes others’ positions without establishing your own. Since your analysis lacks a positive thesis and merely refutes others’ positions, you fit this description.
To answer this difficulty, the verse states:
Previously, the faults arising from the refuter and the refuted being conjoined or disjoined
Were discussed. Who, holding a definite thesis, incurs such faults?
Since I hold no such thesis, I incur no fault.
You claim: “Your own statement commits the same fallacy as the apparent refutation.” This does not apply to my position. Why? Because, in my view, whether the refuter and the refuted are conjoined or disjoined, neither case constitutes a refutation—since both refuter and refuted lack intrinsic nature. Therefore, one should not dwell on conjunction or disjunction. As the sūtra states: “Venerable Subhūti, is non-arising attained through arising? Or through non-arising?” Subhūti replies: “Venerable Śāriputra, I do not accept non-arising attained through arising, nor through non-arising.” Śāriputra asks: “Venerable Subhūti, does non-arising then involve no attainment or realization?” Subhūti replies: “Venerable Śāriputra, though there is attainment and realization, it is not through duality. Venerable Śāriputra, attainment and realization are merely worldly conventions—stream-enterer, once-returner, non-returner, arhat, pratyekabuddha, and bodhisattva are likewise merely worldly conventions; in ultimate reality, there is no attainment and no realization.” This passage rejects both extremes—arising and non-arising—as flawed. Yet it would likewise be unreasonable to deny both utterly; therefore, without scrutiny, worldly conventions accept attainment and realization. Similarly, though the refuter and the refuted—whether conjoined or disjoined—are unfindable, within conventional language, the refuter does refute the refuted.
Next, the verse states:
Just as distinctions such as eclipse occur to the sun’s reflection,
Though the sun and its reflection are neither conjoined nor disjoined—
Yet the reflection arises dependently, conventionally.
Just as, to beautify the face, the reflection—though unreal—is useful,
So too, though this reason is unreal, it purifies the face of wisdom and reveals the thesis.
The reflection, as described, contains not even the slightest real entity. Whether it arises conjoined with the sun or disjoined—both possibilities are equally untenable. Yet, given the presence of the requisite conditions (e.g., a reflective surface and light), the reflection appears and serves to convey the intended meaning. Similarly, a refuter lacking intrinsic nature can refute the refuted; a valid reason lacking intrinsic nature can establish its conclusion—without falling into either extreme. Therefore, the claim that my own statement commits the same fallacy is unfounded. Since wisdom is likened to the face, “face of wisdom” signifies wisdom itself. “Purifying the face of wisdom” means purifying wisdom by eliminating ignorance. “Capable” signifies recognizing that this reason possesses this capacity. Since the conventionally established is ambiguous, applying dichotomous analysis is inappropriate. Thus, whether the Mādhyamika refutes or answers, neither side gains advantage from the two extremes. As Āryadeva states: “Existence, non-existence, and both—these views are all silenced; attempting to raise objections against them is ultimately futile.” The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “When questioning using emptiness, if someone attempts an answer, that answer fails—it coincides with the very position being refuted.” From this, the causal reason should likewise be understood.
Some argue: “At this point, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā functions as a causal reason, not an explanatory reason. The difficulty concerning conjunction or disjunction is an explanatory reason, not a causal reason. Therefore, my own statement is not an apparent refutation.”
This reply is invalid. Since the matter under discussion involves flaws, others reject it. If the causal reason is flawed, then the explanatory reason is likewise flawed. Therefore, this reply is unreasonable. Furthermore, to establish the thesis of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, I myself propound a valid reason, while the opponent raises a refutation. My reply to that refutation merely resembles a refutation—and is itself refuted by others. Thus, only my reply is truly impeccable.
Next, the verse states:
If the cognizing cause were truly existent,
And the cognized thesis possessed intrinsic nature,
Then this reasoning about conjunction, etc., would apply;
Since it does not, your labor is in vain.
You falsely project the defects of an impure thesis onto a pure one—thus exhausting yourself uselessly. Just as refuting the singularity, plurality, circularity, or blackness of hairs seen by someone with visual impairment harms no one with clear vision, similarly, analyzing the emptiness of cause and effect—while you cling to extremes and refute—causes no harm. Therefore, your examples—eyes and magnets—though unsuitable, must still be refuted, since their flaws are equivalent. Now abandoning the correct path of emptiness and clinging to the crooked path of erroneous discrimination, you fabricate false distinctions and obscure the true path—why exert such immense effort?
Next, the verse states:
It is easy to realize that all phenomena lack intrinsic nature;
It is difficult to make others realize they possess intrinsic nature.
Why, with your net of evil discrimination,
Do you trouble the world?
Using widely accepted analogies—such as dream, illusion, etc.—one can readily realize that all worldly phenomena lack intrinsic nature. To make others realize phenomena possess intrinsic nature, however, is extremely difficult—due to the lack of mutually agreed-upon analogies. Thus, I can refute all objections, and no one can answer. Who compelled you to trouble the world? Worldly beings, like silkworms spinning cocoons, are already entangled in the cocoon of afflictions and erroneous discrimination; why do you now further bind them with threads of erroneous discrimination, forming an impenetrable net all around? Abandon this futile debate! All phenomena are like reflections—lacking both inherent and shared characteristics; how then could there be direct perception or inference? The sole direct perception here is omniscience.
Next, the verse states:
Having thoroughly understood the preceding refutations,
We again refute the external answer concerning conjunction, etc.
How can you be a “refutation-only” proponent?
Thereby, all other refutations should be understood.
Having clearly understood the prior establishment of dependent origination and conventional designation, and the refutations remaining after countering opposing views, we proceed to examine whether cause and effect arise conjoined or disjoined. External opponents, answering this difficulty, propose certain arguments—these require re-refutation. As previously stated, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā aims solely to dispel conceptual proliferation. Does the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā commit the fault of refuting phenomena? Here, I do not refute others’ positions, since nothing possesses refutability. Am I then a “refutation-only” proponent? Moreover, what validates your definition of “refutation-only proponent”? Who, rejecting their own thesis, refutes only others’ positions? Thus, this definition of “refutation-only proponent” is fundamentally unreasonable. Other refutations should be understood accordingly.
From “That which is not produced by itself, nor by another…” up to “…observing, one swiftly attains liberation,” the text elucidates the emptiness of phenomena (dharmas). From “Wisdom perceives the faults of afflictions…” up to this verse, it elucidates the emptiness of person (pudgala).
Now we shall expound the distinctions of emptiness. The verse states:
Emptiness of self is taught for the sake of liberating beings,
Divided into two: person and phenomena.
Emptiness of self is briefly presented in two forms: emptiness of person and emptiness of phenomena.
Why are two kinds of emptiness taught?
Answer: “For the sake of liberating beings.” The Buddha teaches the two kinds of emptiness to liberate sentient beings. Specifically, for the liberation of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, he teaches emptiness of person; for the liberation of bodhisattvas aiming to attain omniscience, he teaches both emptinesses. Though śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas can perceive dependent origination and its nature, they do not fully cultivate emptiness of phenomena, possessing only methods to eliminate afflictions operating within the three realms. Their cultivation of emptiness of person, however, can be considered complete.
The verse states:
Moreover, the Buddha, adapting to the capacities of disciples,
Explains these two kinds of emptiness in multiple ways.
Due to the diverse inclinations of disciples, the Buddha further elaborates these two kinds of emptiness in numerous ways. The verse states:
Having extensively expounded the sixteen emptinesses,
He summarizes them into four, also accepting them as Mahāyāna.
The sūtra states: “Moreover, Śubhūti! The marks of Mahāyāna are: inner emptiness, outer emptiness, inner-and-outer emptiness, emptiness of emptiness, great emptiness, supreme-emptiness, conditioned-emptiness, unconditioned-emptiness, ultimate-emptiness, boundless-emptiness, non-dissipative-emptiness, intrinsic-nature-emptiness, all-dharmas-emptiness, self-character-emptiness, unobtainable-emptiness, and non-intrinsic-nature-emptiness.” After extensively explaining the sixteen emptinesses, the sūtra continues: “Moreover, Śubhūti! The existent is empty by virtue of existence; the nonexistent is empty by virtue of nonexistence; intrinsic nature is empty by virtue of intrinsic nature; other-nature is empty by virtue of other-nature.” It further presents four emptinesses and declares these emptinesses constitute Mahāyāna. If there were no emptiness and no non-emptiness, there would be not even the slightest phenomenon. Thus, all phenomena are merely designated conventionally, adapted to the capacities of disciples—just as form and so forth are designated. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “If there existed something unempty, there would exist something empty; but since nothing unempty exists, how could anything empty exist? Emptiness cannot be expressed; non-emptiness cannot be expressed; neither together nor separately can they be expressed—only through provisional names are they indicated.”
We now explain inner emptiness. The verse states:
Since it is by nature thus, the eye is empty by virtue of eye-nature.
Likewise, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind are also thus.
Since it is neither permanent nor destructible, the six inner phenomena—eye, etc.—
Are devoid of intrinsic nature; this is called inner emptiness.
The sūtra states: “What is inner emptiness? ‘Inner’ refers to inner phenomena—namely, eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. Know that herein the eye is empty by virtue of eye-emptiness, neither permanent nor destructible. Why? Because this is its nature.” “Permanent” here means not abandoning its essential nature; yet it momentarily persists and immediately ceases—thus not being wholly destroyed. This means: if a phenomenon possessed intrinsic nature, it would be either permanent or permanently destroyed. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “If intrinsic nature arose from causes and conditions, this would be impossible; for if intrinsic nature arose from causes and conditions, it would be a produced phenomenon. If intrinsic nature had a producer, how could this be meaningful? Intrinsic nature is defined as unproduced—requiring no other phenomenon for its completion.”
Do the distinctive characteristics described in the treatise correspond to this nature? Does the treatise’s author accept such a nature?
Answer: As the Bhagavān states: “Whether a Buddha appears in the world or not, the nature of phenomena abides eternally and stably.” This nature of phenomena may be accepted as existent.
What is this nature?
Answer: It is the intrinsic nature of the eye and so forth.
What is the intrinsic nature of the eye and so forth?
Answer: It is the nature that is unproduced, not dependent on anything else, and realized by wisdom free from the obscuration of ignorance.
Does this nature exist?
Answer: Who claims it does not? If it did not exist, for what purpose would bodhisattvas practice the pāramitās? Indeed, bodhisattvas diligently practice countless difficult practices precisely to realize this nature. As the sūtra states: “Good man, know that ultimate reality is unborn, unceasing, unabiding, non-coming, and non-going. It transcends expression by words, explanation by words, and comprehension by conceptual thought. Good man, know that ultimate reality is inexpressible—realized individually and inwardly by noble wisdom alone. Good man, know that ultimate reality—whether a Buddha appears in the world or not—is the very purpose for which bodhisattvas shave their heads, don monastic robes, renounce household life with right faith, and go forth. Having gone forth, they diligently strive, as if rescuing their heads from fire, to attain this nature and abide unwaveringly. Good man, if ultimate reality did not exist, practicing the holy life would be futile and pointless; the appearance of Buddhas in the world would also be pointless. Because ultimate reality exists, bodhisattvas are called ‘experts in ultimate reality.’”
An opponent objects: “Ah! Since you deny that even the slightest phenomenon possesses intrinsic nature, yet suddenly affirm an unproduced, independent intrinsic nature—you are certainly self-contradictory!”
Answer: You have not understood the intent of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Its intent is this: if the intrinsic nature of the eye and so forth—the nature grasped by ordinary beings—were truly their intrinsic nature, then practicing the holy life would be futile, since that is not the eye’s true nature. Practicing the holy life to realize this true nature, however, is beneficial. Moreover, I speak of “unproduced” and “independent” only relative to conventional truth. If intrinsic nature were not what ordinary beings perceive, then calling it “intrinsic nature” would be reasonable. This intrinsic nature is neither ultimate reality nor non-reality, since it is quiescent. Furthermore, this intrinsic nature is not merely accepted by the treatise’s author, but can also convince others—thus it is established as mutually agreed upon by both parties. Some claim heat is the intrinsic nature of fire, but such assertions are utterly unreasonable: since fire is dependently originated, it is produced and dependent. Given this, asserting “unproduced” and “independent” is illogical. Here, “unproduced” and “independent” signify freedom from the mistaken belief in intrinsic nature; thus, within conventional truth, it is established as meaningful. Having extensively clarified this, we now state the definitive meaning. When the verse says “the eye is empty by virtue of eye-nature,” it signifies emptiness of intrinsic nature—not emptiness due to the absence of an inner agent, nor emptiness due to the absence of subject-object duality, i.e., not emptiness meaning “this phenomenon is absent because that phenomenon is absent.”
Next, outer emptiness. The verse states:
Since it is by nature thus, form is empty by virtue of form-nature.
Sound, smell, taste, touch, and phenomena are likewise thus.
Form and so forth are devoid of intrinsic nature; this is called outer emptiness.
The sūtra states: “What is outer emptiness? ‘Outer’ refers to outer phenomena—namely, form and so forth. Form is empty by virtue of form-emptiness, up to phenomena being empty by virtue of phenomena-emptiness.” As previously explained—“neither permanent nor destructible, by nature thus”—this extensive meaning permeates the explanations of each subsequent emptiness.
The verse states:
The two divisions—inner and outer—are devoid of intrinsic nature;
This is called inner-and-outer emptiness.
The sūtra states: “All inner and outer phenomena lack inner or outer intrinsic nature; this is called inner-and-outer emptiness.”
The verse states:
All phenomena are devoid of intrinsic nature;
The wise call this emptiness.
Furthermore, this emptiness itself is empty by virtue of emptiness-nature;
This emptiness of emptiness is called emptiness of emptiness.
It is taught to eliminate the clinging of those who grasp at emptiness.
The sūtra states: “What is emptiness of emptiness? ‘Emptiness’ refers to the emptiness of all phenomena. This emptiness itself is empty by virtue of emptiness-emptiness; this is called emptiness of emptiness.” Some cling to emptiness as a real phenomenon; to eliminate this clinging, emptiness of emptiness is taught. As stated: “To dispel all conceptual proliferations, the nectar of emptiness is taught; if one then clings to emptiness, the Buddha declares this extremely blameworthy.”
The verse states:
Since it pervades all sentient and environmental worlds,
Is illustrated by boundlessness and limitlessness,
It is therefore called great emptiness.
Apart from the ten directions, there is no sentient world or environmental world; since it pervades all sentient beings, it is called “great.” Since loving-kindness and other immeasurables are cultivated pervading the ten directions, the ten directions serve as the illustration of boundlessness; due to its limitless extent, it is also called “great.” The verse states:
Since it is the place of the ten directions,
And the ten directions are empty by virtue of direction-nature,
This is called great emptiness, taught to eliminate clinging to greatness.
The sūtra states: “What is great emptiness? The east is empty by virtue of east-emptiness.” Some cling to the ten directions as infinitely vast and develop a substantialist view of “greatness”; to eliminate this clinging, great emptiness is taught—just as the Vaiśeṣika school clings to direction as real.
The verse states:
Since it is the supreme goal, nirvāṇa is called supreme meaning.
It is empty by virtue of its own nature; this is called supreme-meaning emptiness.
To eliminate the clinging of those who grasp at nirvāṇa as real,
Those who understand supreme meaning teach supreme-meaning emptiness.
The sūtra states: “What is supreme-meaning emptiness? ‘Supreme meaning’ refers to nirvāṇa. Know that herein nirvāṇa is empty by virtue of nirvāṇa-emptiness.” Some cling to nirvāṇa as a real phenomenon; to eliminate this clinging, this emptiness is taught. “Goal” (prayojana) here means “purpose” or “object of knowledge.”
The verse states:
The three realms arise from causes and conditions; hence they are called conditioned.
They are empty by virtue of their own nature; this is called conditioned-emptiness.
The sūtra states: “What is conditioned-emptiness? ‘Conditioned’ refers to the three realms. Know that herein the desire realm is empty by virtue of desire-realm-emptiness.”
The verse states:
If a phenomenon lacks arising, abiding, and cessation, it is called unconditioned.
It is empty by virtue of its own nature; this is called unconditioned-emptiness.
“By virtue of its own nature” here means “by virtue of unconditioned-nature.” The sūtra states: “What is unconditioned-emptiness? ‘Unconditioned’ refers to non-arising, non-ceasing, non-abiding, and non-changing. Know that herein unconditioned is empty by virtue of unconditioned-emptiness.”
The verse states:
If a phenomenon lacks finality, it is called ultimate.
It is empty by virtue of its own nature; this is called ultimate-emptiness.
The sūtra states: “What is ultimate-emptiness? ‘Ultimate’ refers to constant ultimacy and definitive cessation. If a phenomenon’s ultimacy is unfindable, it is called ‘ultimate.’ Know that herein ultimacy is empty by virtue of ultimacy-emptiness.”
The verse states:
‘Dissipative’ means capable of being released and abandoned;
‘Non-dissipative’ means incapable of release and abandonment.
That non-dissipative phenomenon is empty by virtue of non-dissipative-nature;
Since it is by nature thus, it is called non-dissipative emptiness.
The sūtra states: “What is non-dissipative emptiness? ‘Dissipative’ means capable of being released, abandoned, or discarded. Know that herein non-dissipative is empty by virtue of non-dissipative-emptiness.” “Dissipative” means capable of being discarded; “non-dissipative” means completely incapable of being discarded.
The verse states:
The nature of conditioned phenomena, etc., is not created
By śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas, or Buddhas—
Therefore, the nature of conditioned phenomena, etc., is called intrinsic nature;
It is empty by virtue of its own nature; this is called intrinsic-nature emptiness.
The sūtra states: “What is intrinsic-nature emptiness? It is the intrinsic nature of all phenomena—uncreated, unconditioned, not made by śrāvakas.”
The verse states:
The eighteen dhātus, the six contacts, the six sensations arising therefrom,
And all phenomena—whether material or immaterial, conditioned or unconditioned—
All such phenomena are empty by virtue of their own nature;
This is called all-dharmas emptiness.
The sūtra states: “What is all-dharmas emptiness? ‘All dharmas’ refers to conditioned and unconditioned phenomena.” The eighteen dhātus comprise the six internal sense bases, six external sense bases, and six consciousnesses. The six contacts are eye-contact up to mind-contact. The six sensations arise from contact as condition. Here, all phenomena are empty by virtue of all-dharmas emptiness.
The verse states:
The lack of intrinsic nature in characteristics such as obstruction—this is self-character emptiness.
What are the self-characters of form and so forth? To elaborate, the verse states:
The character of form is obstruction and change;
Feeling’s character is reception;
Perception’s character is image-apprehension;
Volition’s character is activity;
Distinct cognition of objects is the character of consciousness.
The aggregate’s intrinsic nature is suffering;
The element’s nature is like a venomous snake.
Elements are likened to venomous snakes due to their function of supporting or sustaining.
The verse states:
The Buddha taught the twelve sense bases as the door from which all suffering arises.
Because they are the source from which all suffering arises.
The verse states:
All dependently originated phenomena have combination as their character.
Combination is the character of dependent origination, since dependent origination is revealed through combination.
The verse states:
Generosity-pāramitā’s character is giving;
Ethical discipline’s character is freedom from distress.
The verse states:
Patience’s character is non-anger;
Diligence’s character is blamelessness.
Diligence’s character is maintaining wholesome phenomena.
The verse states:
Concentration’s character is unification.
Because it unifies all wholesome phenomena.
The verse states:
Wisdom’s character is non-attachment.
Because it leads to nirvāṇa and does not cling to anything.
The verse states:
The six pāramitās are taught with such characters.
The four concentrations, four immeasurables, and other formless concentrations—
The Buddha declares their self-character to be non-anger.
The Buddha declares non-anger as their character, since they are attained only by abandoning anger.
The verse states:
The thirty-seven factors of awakening have the character of liberation.
Liberation means emancipation. Since these are the causes of liberation from saṃsāra and lead to emancipation, they are called “liberation-capable,” i.e., their character is attaining liberation. The meanings of concentration, etc., have been explained previously.
The verse states:
Emptiness’s character is non-apprehension;
Its character is separation.
Since all phenomena are unapprehendable, they are not stained by conceptual defilements. Thus, the emptiness-liberation-door has separation as its character.
The verse states:
The signless is quiescence; the third sign is suffering.
Non-delusion and the eight liberations have the character of liberation.
The signless-liberation-door, since signs are unfindable, has quiescence as its character. The third—i.e., the wishless-liberation-door—has suffering and non-delusion as its characters. Because one correctly observes conditioned phenomena as suffering and, with correct wisdom, observes their nature, one does not wish for them. Thus, the third liberation-door has suffering and non-delusion as its characters. The eight liberations are: (1) perceiving external forms while retaining internal form-perception; (2) perceiving external forms without internal form-perception; (3) perceiving pure forms in the fourth dhyāna; (4–7) the four formless liberations, as previously explained; (8) cessation of perception and sensation. Since these liberations enable liberation from obstacles to meditative absorption, their character is liberation.
The verse states:
The sūtras declare skillful discernment as the nature of the ten powers.
The ten powers mentioned below should be understood as having skillful discernment as their character. Since skillful discernment is unimpeded, it is called “power.”
The verse states:
The Buddha’s four fearlessnesses have firmness as their nature.The Four Fearless Assertions refer to the Buddha’s self-proclamation: “I am the Perfectly Enlightened One.” Should any śramaṇa, brāhmaṇa, deva, Māra, Brahmā, or any other being in the world raise a challenge grounded in the Dharma—asserting that the Buddha is not perfectly enlightened with regard to this Dharma—the Buddha sees clearly that such a challenge has no valid basis. This is elaborated extensively in the sūtras.
Alternatively, the Buddha declares: “I have permanently eradicated all defilements.” As before, should anyone raise a challenge grounded in the Dharma—asserting that the Buddha has not yet fully and permanently eradicated these defilements—the Buddha sees clearly that such a challenge lacks foundation.
Or again, the Buddha proclaims that all obstructive, defiling phenomena necessarily function as obstacles. As previously explained, should anyone raise a challenge grounded in the Dharma—asserting that such phenomena do not necessarily obstruct—the Buddha sees clearly that such a challenge is baseless.
Or the Buddha proclaims the authentic path of complete liberation, which all noble beings practice and thereby attain definitive liberation, definitive realization, complete cessation of all suffering, and final termination of suffering. This is elaborated further in the sūtras.
These four fearlessnesses are characterized by supreme unshakability—no one whatsoever can disturb or undermine them.
Verse:
The Four Unhindered Knowledges have the characteristic of inexhaustibility—namely, unhindered eloquence and so forth.
The Four Unhindered Knowledges will be expounded below; their defining characteristic is inexhaustibility.
Verse:
That which bestows benefit upon sentient beings is called Great Compassion.
That which rescues sentient beings from suffering is Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compassion’s complement—Great Compassion’s counterpart—Great Compass…This passage refers to the “Path-Trace.” If a certain practice leads to the fundamental nature of all paths, it is called the “All-Encompassing Path-Trace.” Some practices lead to Buddhahood; some lead to Pratyekabuddha Enlightenment; some lead to Śrāvaka Enlightenment; some lead to rebirth in the heavens; and others even lead to the hells. The term “etc.” indicates the existence of numerous such varieties. If any given practice leads to a particular destination, the Buddhas and Tathāgatas know this truthfully and directly—knowing precisely that this practice leads to that specific destination. Therefore, the Buddha’s unobstructed wisdom regarding all such practices is established as the “Power of Knowing All-Encompassing Path-Traces.” This is elaborated extensively in the sūtras.
Next, we shall expound the “Power of Knowing the Purity and Impurity Arising from Meditative Absorptions, Liberations, Concentrations, and Attainments.” The verse states:
Inboundless worlds, practitioners differ;
Four meditative absorptions, eight liberations,
Calm abidings (śamatha) — i.e., concentrations — whose mark is one-pointedness of mind on a wholesome object;
And nine attainments — namely, the four meditative absorptions, the four formless attainments, and the attainment of cessation of perception and sensation — each with their distinctions:
Unobstructed wisdom comprehends them all — thus named the “Power.”
Within boundless worlds, differences among practitioners give rise to boundless distinctions. There are four meditative absorptions (dhyānas); eight liberations (vimokṣas); śamatha (calm abiding), synonymous with samādhi (concentration), defined as one-pointedness of mind on a wholesome object; and nine sequential attainments (samāpattis): the four dhyānas, the four formless attainments, and the attainment of cessation of perception and sensation. Causes of defilement include ignorance and irrational attention, while causes of purification include hearing the authentic Dharma and rational attention. The Buddha’s wisdom operates unobstructedly upon these meditative practices—whose variety is boundless due to differences among practitioners—and thus is established as the “Power of Knowing the Purity and Impurity Arising from Meditative Absorptions, Liberations, Concentrations, and Attainments.” This is explained extensively in the sūtras.
Next, we shall expound the “Power of Recollecting Past Abodes.” The verse states:
From ignorance, dwelling in the three realms of existence,
Self and others, each sentient being’s births,
Fully encompassing boundless beings, along with their causes and locations —
Such wisdom is declared the “Power.”
The phrase “from ignorance” refers to the scope of recollection—namely, all past abodes transmitted since beginningless saṃsāra. “Fully encompassing boundless beings” means including the entire boundless realm of sentient beings. “Along with their causes” includes all causal conditions. As stated in the sūtra: “I was once in such-and-such a place, bearing such-and-such a name, such-and-such a clan,” etc. If one recalls, “Such was my appearance,” this is recollection of characteristic features; if one recalls, “Having died there, I was reborn here; having died elsewhere, I was reborn here,” this is recollection of locations; and the rest refers to recollection of causes. Thus, the Buddhas and Tathāgatas possess unobstructed wisdom regarding all past abodes—including their causes, locations, and characteristic features—and this constitutes the “Power of Recollecting Past Abodes.” By virtue of this power, the Buddhas and Tathāgatas know truly and directly all mental and mental factors arising in the past. By knowing accurately whether sentient beings possess or lack wholesome roots, the Buddhas teach accordingly, ensuring all teachings bear fruit. This is explained extensively in the sūtras.
Next, we shall expound the “Power of Knowing Death and Rebirth.” The verse states:
Throughout the boundless expanse of space, in every world,
At the moment of death and rebirth of each sentient being,
Wisdom pervades all such diverse objects without obstruction —
Thus named the “Power.”
“Death” refers to the dissolution of the five aggregates; “rebirth” refers to the continuity of consciousness at conception. All worldly phenomena—whether death or rebirth—occur throughout the boundless expanse of space, governed by countless karmic actions. The Buddhas and Tathāgatas, in a single instant, effortlessly and truly comprehend all such phenomena completely. This wisdom of the Blessed One is ultimately pure and unobstructed by any object whatsoever; therefore, it is established as the “Power of Knowing Death and Rebirth.” Moreover, the Buddhas and Tathāgatas do not merely know the death and rebirth of sentient beings; with the pure divine eye, they also perceive countless eons of cosmic formation and dissolution. This is explained extensively in the sūtras.
Next, we shall expound the “Power of Knowing the Exhaustion of Defilements.” The verse states:
The Buddhas’ omniscient wisdom swiftly eradicates afflictions and their latent tendencies;
Disciples’ wisdom likewise eliminates afflictions —
Unobstructed wisdom regarding this is named the “Power.”
Here, “afflictions” refer to ignorance, craving, and so forth, which disturb the three realms. Any phenomenon that clings to, imprints upon, and follows the mind is termed a “latent tendency” (vāsanā). Afflictions, their boundaries, imprints, roots, and latent tendencies are various names for the same reality. Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas eliminate afflictions through the path of uncontaminated wisdom, yet they cannot eradicate their latent tendencies. For example, though oil and flowers may be removed from a vessel or garment, because they have long been in contact, faint residual impressions remain. Likewise, although Arhats have eliminated afflictions, their latent tendencies persist: those who had repeatedly acted as monkeys in past lives still leap about; those who had been Brahmins in former lifetimes still address others as “maidservants”—even when the Buddha admonishes them, they cannot change. Latent tendencies of ignorance obstruct clear cognition of knowable objects; latent tendencies of craving and other afflictions serve as causes for corresponding bodily and verbal behavior. Only the Buddhas’ omniscient wisdom, attained at full Buddhahood, can permanently eradicate both latent tendencies of ignorance and craving, as well as the afflictions sustaining them; no other beings can accomplish this. Hence, when all afflictions and their latent tendencies—and the afflictions perpetuating those tendencies—are fully eradicated, the Buddhas’ sublime wisdom operates unobstructedly concerning all such phenomena, and this is established as the “Power of Knowing the Exhaustion of Defilements.” This is explained extensively in the sūtras.
Thus, the Buddha’s ultimate, perfect, and incomprehensible wisdom-realm encompasses all such qualities. Moreover, it possesses all other virtues and abides eternally inseparable from the Dharmakāya. Each of these virtues, if fully elaborated, could only be compared to space itself. It serves as the great refuge for those helpless beings swept away by the four raging torrents of desire, views, ignorance, and existence. These ten powers of the Buddhas reach their ultimate purity within the Buddha-ground of Universal Luminosity. The merits manifested in each pore of the Buddhas’ Rūpakāya—the major and minor marks, the powers, the fearlessnesses, and the unique Buddha-qualities—are exclusively the domain of Buddhas. Even if the Buddhas themselves, empowered by their own wisdom, were to dwell for inconceivable aeons solely devoted to expounding these qualities without interruption, they still could not exhaustively describe them. How much less could Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, or Bodhisattvas possibly comprehend or articulate all the Buddhas’ qualities! Hence, we illustrate this meaning through analogy. The verse states:
Like the mighty Garuḍa bird soaring skyward —
Not because space ends does it return,
But because its own strength is spent.
So too, the Buddhas’ virtues are like boundless space —
Neither disciples nor Bodhisattvas can proclaim them.
Just as the Garuḍa, with fully developed wings and aided by the wind, flies far and high, yet does not return because space has ended but because its own strength is exhausted—so too, the Buddhas’ virtues are as limitless as space itself. Even Bodhisattvas abiding on the ten bhūmis, having realized inconceivable liberation, cannot fully expound the Buddhas’ virtues; how much less could Pratyekabuddhas or Śrāvakas possibly comprehend or declare them! It is not that the virtues themselves are finite, but rather that the speaker’s wisdom-power is exhausted.
If even such beings cannot comprehend or declare the Buddhas’ virtues, how much less could we—who are obscured by the cataract of ignorance and utterly fail to perceive reality as it is—possibly praise or expound the Buddhas’ virtues? Therefore, this lies beyond my capacity. The verse states:
How could I, ignorant of the Buddhas’ manifold virtues,
Possibly comprehend or praise them?
Yet since Nāgārjuna has already expounded them,
I confidently recount just a small portion.
Though I know nothing at all of the Tathāgatas’ virtues, I can nevertheless recount a small portion without doubt—because I rely on authoritative instruction. Hence the statement: “Yet since Nāgārjuna has already expounded them.”
This treatise broadly presents the Buddhas’ profound dharmatā and vast merits. The verse states:
Profound refers to emptiness of intrinsic nature;
All other virtues constitute vastness.
Understanding both profundity and vastness,
One attains these very virtues.
Next, we shall expound the Buddha’s Nirmāṇakāya (Emanation Body), which constitutes a shared sphere of experience for Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas—a common skillful means, adaptable to individual capacities, and also accessible to ordinary beings, naturally serving as causes for rebirth in higher realms, etc. The verse states:
The Buddha attains an immovable body,
Yet emanates anew into the three realms.
Manifesting descent from heaven, birth from womb,
Enlightenment, and turning the Wheel of Dharma.
The world contains myriad practices, bound tightly by the cords of attachment.
With great compassion, the Buddha guides all to Nirvāṇa.
Although the Buddhas and Tathāgatas have transcended the three realms, they manifest Nirmāṇakāyas conforming to worldly conventions—displaying parents and so forth—and re-enter the three realms to teach the Dharma appropriately. The Buddha guides all sentient beings, whose conduct varies widely, to abide in Nirvāṇa. “With great compassion” means this is done not for fame, reputation, or expectation of reward.
Thus, the establishment of the Tathāgata’s bodies has now been explained. Next, we clarify why the Buddha teaches three vehicles (yānas) within the single vehicle—this constitutes his “intentional teaching” (nītārtha). The verse states:
Apart from realizing the true meaning,
No other method purifies sentient beings’ defilements.
The true meaning of all phenomena — non-arising as their nature —
Is entirely non-different and unchanging.
Likewise, the wisdom realizing this true meaning
Is also without distinction.
Therefore, the Buddha taught the Buddhas’ vehicle
As singular, unequalled, and undivided.
Without realizing the true meaning, one cannot fully eradicate all afflictions. As previously explained, the true meaning of all phenomena—their nature as non-arising—is absolutely uniform and unchanging. Though appearances may seem diverse, in reality they are identical; hence the true meaning itself is immutable and undifferentiated. Since it is nondual and unchanging, the wisdom apprehending this true meaning must also be singular in nature. Were wisdom inherently plural, it could not realize the true nature, since the nature itself would remain unrealized. Thus, because the true meaning is singular, the wisdom apprehending it is likewise undifferentiated—hence there is only one vehicle, not three. As the sūtra declares: “Kāśyapa! Because one realizes the equality of all phenomena, one attains parinirvāṇa. This is singular—neither dual nor triple.” “Mahāyāna” (“Great Vehicle”) is so-called because “great” refers to the Buddhas and Tathāgatas, who, having permanently severed ignorance, attain unobstructed wisdom free from all hindrances—thus their vehicle is called “great.” Alternatively, the vehicle itself is great, hence “Great Vehicle.” It is called “Great Vehicle” because those endowed with inconceivable Buddha-wisdom abide therein; or because it can cognize the boundless distinctions of all phenomena; or because it permanently eradicates all ignorance. Since this vehicle is itself great, it is named the “Great Vehicle.”
If great Nirvāṇa is singular, why do sūtras state that Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas also attain Nirvāṇa through their respective vehicles?
This is the Buddha’s intentional language. The verse states:
Sentient beings suffer the five corruptions,
Which generate numerous faults.
Thus, the world cannot enter the Buddha’s profound, inaccessible sphere.
Yet the Buddha, the Perfectly Awakened One,
Possessing wisdom, compassion, and skillful means,
Made a solemn vow in past eons:
To liberate all sentient beings.
That which renders body and mind utterly incapable is called the “five corruptions”: the corruption of the age, of views, of afflictions, of sentient beings, and of lifespan. Being intensified causes of affliction, they undermine superior faith and confidence, thereby obstructing aspiration toward the Buddhas’ supreme, wondrous wisdom. Consequently, worldly beings cannot enter the Buddha’s profoundly difficult-to-comprehend wisdom. Yet the Buddhas and Tathāgatas do not abandon sentient beings merely because they are temporarily unfit vessels; instead, possessing perfect wisdom, great compassion, and skillful means, they made a vast vow in past eons: “May I liberate all sentient beings.” Thus, they never slacken in liberating beings, but diligently seek further skillful means to fulfill their vow.
Since many obstacles prevent sentient beings from entering the Mahāyāna, the Buddha must still establish worldly beings in Nirvāṇa. The verse states:
Like a wise guide leading travelers to a treasure-isle,
To relieve their fatigue, he magically creates a delightful city.
The Buddha guides disciples to contemplate the bliss of quiescence,
Cultivating mental seclusion first—then revealing the One Vehicle.
This analogy is elaborated extensively in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra (Lotus Sūtra). Briefly: just as a great merchant, midway to the treasure-isle, creates a magical city for travelers to rest—so too, the Buddha, before reaching the Mahāyāna, skillfully teaches the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha vehicles, grounded in the bliss of quiescence, as a provisional means for entering the Mahāyāna. Later, having freed disciples from the afflictions of saṃsāra, he reveals the sole, ultimate Mahāyāna. They, too, will eventually fulfill their accumulations and attain omniscient wisdom, just as the Buddha did. The rationale for teaching the One Vehicle is elucidated in texts such as the Saṃgraha Śāstra.
Next, we shall expound the time of the Buddha’s enlightenment and his duration of abiding in the world. The verse states:
In as many world-systems as exist within the Buddha’s field of wisdom,
Counted as fine dust particles —
So many eons did the Buddha take to attain enlightenment;
Yet this secret has never been revealed.
Although the Buddhas and Tathāgatas manifest birth and parinirvāṇa via their Nirmāṇakāyas, the causal basis for those emanations—the duration required for attaining Buddhahood—is now to be expounded. Specifically: the number of eons required for the Buddha’s enlightenment equals the number of fine dust particles contained in all world-systems within the Buddha’s field of wisdom. This is difficult for those who have not previously cultivated wholesome roots to believe or comprehend; thus, this secret is not disclosed to all. However, those who develop heightened faith and understanding in this matter accumulate immeasurable merit; hence, it is occasionally revealed to them.
Thus, the time of the Buddha’s enlightenment has now been expounded; next, we shall expound the duration of his abiding in the world. The verse states:
Until space itself ceases to exist,
And until all sentient beings attain ultimate quiescence,
Nourished by compassion, born from the mother of wisdom —
How could the Buddha enter final quiescence?
The Blessed One arises from the Buddha-mother Prajñāpāramitā and is nurtured by the nurse of great compassion. Therefore, we understand that the Buddha’s future lifespan extends until space itself perishes and all sentient beings become Buddhas—never entering final parinirvāṇa.
How does the Buddha’s great compassion—motivated to benefit all sentient beings and liberate them throughout future time—manifest? The verse states:
Worldly beings, deluded, consume poison-food;
The Buddha’s compassion for them surpasses
A mother’s agony seeing her beloved child ingest poison —
Thus, this supreme refuge does not enter extinction.
“Food” refers to the five sense-objects. Craving them constitutes consuming poisoned food, causing immense suffering. Clinging to them as real arises from the flaw of ignorance. Just as the Buddha feels boundless compassion for sentient beings in saṃsāra who consume this poisoned food, even a loving mother witnessing her cherished child mistakenly ingest poison would feel anguish less intense than the Buddha’s compassion. Since this compassion sustains him, how could he enter Nirvāṇa?
Because great compassion prevents the intention to enter Nirvāṇa, the Buddhas and Tathāgatas, observing the world overwhelmed by manifold sufferings, do not enter parinirvāṇa. The verse states:
Due to ignorance, people cling to “existence” or “non-existence”;
Thus, they undergo the positions of birth-and-death,
Suffering separation from loved ones, meeting with enemies,
And falling into evil destinies —
Hence, the world becomes a field of compassion.
Great compassion blocks the mind’s entry into extinction —
Therefore, the Buddha does not enter Nirvāṇa.
Ignorant persons clinging to “existence” firmly believe in karma and its results, leading to rebirth in human or celestial realms; thus, they inevitably endure the suffering of birth-and-death, separation from loved ones, and meeting with enemies. Those holding wrong views who deny “existence” fall into hells and other evil destinies, inevitably enduring the aforementioned sufferings. Therefore, the Buddhas and Tathāgatas, contemplating suffering sentient beings, generate great compassion, blocking their own minds from entering Nirvāṇa and abiding eternally in the world.
The verse states:
Candrakīrti, the excellent mendicant,
Extensively compiled the meaning of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā;
Following the holy instructions, he expounds this treatise’s meaning.
Apart from the root treatise, no other text expounds this Dharma correctly and completely.
The wise surely recognize: this meaning belongs to none other.
No other treatise apart from the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā correctly and completely expounds the Dharma of emptiness. Likewise, the wise should decisively recognize that the exposition of this treatise—and its refutation of objections—regarding emptiness is unparalleled in any other treatise. Hence, some claim that the Sautrāntikas’ ultimate truth corresponds to the Mādhyamikas’ conventional truth; this shows they have not understood the true meaning of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Others claim the Sarvāstivādins’ ultimate truth matches the Mādhyamikas’ conventional truth; this, too, demonstrates ignorance of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā’s true meaning, since equating supramundane with mundane truths is unreasonable. Therefore, the wise should recognize this system as uniquely distinctive.
Some, lacking understanding of the Bodhisattva’s intent and the true meaning, hear this text and become terrified, abandoning this supramundane Dharma. Now, to correctly reveal the treatise’s true meaning, the verse states:
Frightened by the ocean-hue of Nāgārjuna’s wisdom,
Beings abandon this excellent tradition.
Opening the flower-bud of his verses, the Kumuda,
Candrakīrti fulfills his aspiration.
If someone asks: “Did eminent masters such as Vasubandhu, Dignāga, and Dharmapāla, upon hearing this text, become frightened and abandon the correct exposition of dependent origination?”—the answer is as above.
How, then, can one penetrate this meaning? The verse states:
Previously declared profound—terrifying indeed;
Even the learned find it difficult to fathom.
Only those with prior habitual inclinations
Can truly comprehend it well.
Seeing fabricated systems—as in teachings asserting a self—
Therefore, outside this tradition, no other treatise deserves delight.
Just as non-Buddhist schools, having never planted the seeds of faith and understanding in emptiness, may sever afflictions of the desire, form, and formless realms and establish their own philosophical systems, yet remain unable to believe or understand the Buddha’s ultimate truth—so too, even though such masters possess extensive learning, lacking the seed of faith and understanding in emptiness, they cannot grasp emptiness. Conversely, those who cultivated faith and understanding of emptiness in past lives, by the force of that cause alone, can presently penetrate the depths of emptiness. Even those clinging to non-Buddhist false doctrines can, by the force of causality alone, fathom emptiness’s depths. Therefore, aside from the Mādhyamaka tradition, seeing other schools’ fabricated reasoning—which resembles the false doctrine asserting a self—we should abandon attachment to or delight in them, recognizing them as unworthy of wonder. Rather, cultivating enhanced faith and understanding in the correct view of emptiness is supremely rare.
The verse states:
By commenting on Nāgārjuna’s tradition,
I gain merit pervading the ten directions.
My afflicted, bluish mind—like autumn stars—
Becomes radiant and pure;
Or like the wish-fulfilling jewel atop the serpent’s head.
May all sentient beings universally realize the truth and swiftly attain Buddhahood!
This Madhyamakāvatāra (“Entering the Middle Way”) was composed by the Ācārya Candrakīrti, who illuminates the profound and vast principles, abides in the Mahāyāna, achieves unshakable wisdom and compassion, extracts milk from painted cows, and shatters clinging to inherent existence.
The scriptural citations confirming this are numerous. Should later translators undertake translation, they should faithfully follow this commentary, observing carefully and impartially.
During the reign of King Śrīdeva in Kashmir, the Indian scholar Tilakaraśa and the Tibetan translator Pa-tshab Nyi-ma-grags translated this text in the precious, unparalleled city of Kashmir, at the Temple of Secret Treasures. Later, at the Ra-mo-ga Monastery in Lhasa, the Indian scholar Suvarṇadvaja and the same Tibetan translator refined and critically revised the translation according to the Eastern Indian manuscript.
Translated at the Sino-Tibetan Institute of Buddhist Studies on Mount Jinyun, April 10, 1942, Republic of China era, based on the Tibetan canonical version.
Madhyamakāvatāra, Sixth Chapter — Completed